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Accidental releases of hazardous substances in the 
process industries often lead to disasters ending with 
substantial losses, these being dependant on whether the 
substance involved is flammable and/or toxic After 
reviewing the primary steps relating to safety, such as 
the plant siting and layout, and throwing some light on 
the methods of handling of different substances and their 
behaviour on spillage together with the particular dangers 
associated with LPGs 9 and the emergency operations 9 the 
present work focusses on the formation and dispersion of 
dense vapour clouds originating from catastrophic failures 
of storage tanks. 
The factors influencing these vapour clouds (release 9 
atmospheric 9 and topographical conditions) are discussed. 
Field and laboratory experiments are reviewed. The 
possible ignition of the vapour cloud formed is discussed 
together with the potential consequences from both 
flammable and toxic substances. Finally 9 the hazard range 
and possible losses resulting from a sudden release of 
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. 	-U.- 	c V [}:rj]  BE3 (D L_ 
Factor of atmospheric transmittance () 
A s Constant & 
C B Concentration (Kg/m3) 
A coefficient of discharge (0.62 for a sharp edge 
orifice and unity for a well rounded none on a 
VesSel) 
Specific heat of the substance at constant pressure 
(f10 ø() 
Specific heat of air at constant pressure (J/°iZ) 
Specific heat of gas at constant pressure (/99() 
CL 	Diameter of the pipe Cm) 
Diameter of the pool Tire (m) 
Distance travelled by the cloud (m) 
Fireball diameter (m) 
fr 	The cross wind width of the source (m) 
8 Steady rate of evaporation (/cm2) 
8 Subscript denominating values at 1 
8 Friction factor 
8 Symbol denominating values in 
conditions(-) 
Fraction of energy radiated 
Failure probability (—) 
Acceleration due to gravity. (ti'/2) 
& 	Discharge rate (K/s0m2) 
8 Grashof number 
class F weather 
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At 2 Height of the cloud at time 't' (m) 
8 Heat of combustion of the fuel (J/Kg) 
8 Impulse &•P 
Scaled impulse 
8 Intensity at fireball surface (t/m2) 
8 Energy intensity at a distance' (/m2) 
g Energy intensity at a distance' after attenuation 
(w/m2) 	 - 
Energy dissipated by radiation (/m2) 




6:J L 8 QmEmEkmst S f fA- 
8 Constant ( 0,0076) 
g Von Karmans constant 
8 Thermal diffusivity of the cloud (m2/s) 
A- 8 Lenght of the pipe (m) 
Lenght scale (m) 
L 8 Typical dimension of the cloud (m) 
8 Mass of air (Kg) 
Mass of gas (kg) 
8 Total mass of the vapour cloud (Kg) 
Mass of fuel in the fireball (Kg) 
0 8 Subscript denotating values at time 't'= 0 
Overpressure in the positive phase (kPa) 
8 The upstream stagnation pressure in the tank (N/m2) 
Downstream pressure (N/m2) 
The critical exit pressure (N/m2) 
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Prandtl number 
Power of fireball () 
o Amount of heat supplied by the entrained air (J) 
Rate of heat picked up from the ground (/m2) 
Quantity of material released (Kg) 
Amount of heat required to vaporise the liquid 
fraction (J) 
Q Theoretical 2norgy rleased (J) 
Flaw of gas from a continuous source (Kg/s) 
B Radial distance from the centre of the cloud (m) 
g Distance from explosion (m) 
	
g 	Radius of the cloud at time t' (m) 
Reliabi)I.ity (- 
Richardson number 
Fireball radius (m) 
Relative humidity 
Distance from fireball (m) 
&s Symbol denotating values at the slumping 
Time (s) 
g Fireball duration (s) 
Duration of continuous release (s) 
B Temperature of the ambient air ( UK) 
13. 	Film temperature 	(K) 
B Temperature of the ground (K) 
Temperature of the gas cloud ('K) 
Ove B Fireball temperature (K) 
The edge velocity (m/s) 
i Edge entrainment velocity (mis) 
JL1-r B Top entrainment velocity (m/s) 
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,A4s Longitudinal turbulent velocity (mis) 
)L-- Friction velocity (m/s) 
Wind speed at a height 'Z' (mis) 
Ambient velocity (m/s) 
V s Volume of the cloud (m3) 
Volume of entrained air (m3) 
VjL,g Local cloud velocity (m/s) 
The liquid burning rate (cm/mn) 	- 
W Mass vaporised within one minute (g/cm2) 
Wjg Mass of explosive (Kg) 
L so Distance downwind (m) 
Crosswind distance (m) 
Meteorological roughness length (m) 
Vertical coordinate (m) 
Scaled distance m 
GREEK SYMBOLS 
c'L so Coeficient of ST 
065 Edge entrainment constant (-) 
cy Top entrainment constant (.-) 
P Entrainment constant(-)  
91 Volumetric coefficient of expansion of the cloud 
(1/K) 
Constant(-) 
Net heat of combustion (J/g) 
s. Latent heat of vaporisation (J/g) 
s. Emissivity(-) 
]tnitial temperature ( °K) 
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Final temporaturG (i() 
38 Temperature of liquid ( °K) 
Temperature of substrat ('() 
A Hazard rate (-) 
A Yield of the explosion 
I,, 	 t s Viscosity 	9•ft 
Constant (= 1) 
Ip i/ci 
- Scaled time Cfs ) 
Density of the fluid ((g/m3) 
Density of the heavy fluid (Kg/m3) 
Density of the surrounding fluid (Kg/m3) 
Density of air (Kg/m3) 
Density of the cloud (KO/M3) 
Density of the gas (Kg/m3) 
Density of the cloud as a function of the radius R 
(Kg/m3) 
Constant in Stefan-oltzman eqution (= 5067x1O) 
Standard deviation in the axis 'x' (iii) 
Standard deviation in the axis y' (m) 
Standard deviation in the axis 'z (m) 
Flashing fraction (-) '0 s 
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The 	rapid growth of 	chemical 	petrochemical 
industries thuhout the or 	over tho )1.t 
response to the Ancrozoing domando in energy, heanth cur 
anothAng otc. 	of 	the roin 	1ti©n has boon  
accompanied by large Lncromuoo in tho production of  
haxmrdous mmterlano of hich have resulted in 
diomotrous events.on thozo v wocan cith the toxic 
runs ases at Sevesop Xty (1176) and Bhopal, 	 (19I Q 
the xp1oion at FUxborough U74 	the Mexico city 
dAoaoter (1984)0 Major incAdento are Rioted in Luou 
(1960). Sun (17) and Davenport U930 
lu 
7he occurence of such Incidentup moot of th' ti 
not prevent reductions in production or banning of some 
although hazardouz q products (crude oi 
gas and theirderivatives). 7hiz Is due to the 	ct that 
the 	nfits gained outweigh by far the costs which,in 
this context, refer to the 	 of human lives in 
proprty (the former being difficuRt to v)tutc0 As a 
rut certain 12vens of risk p although unwanted, are  
accepted or-Di 	by governmentsp LndurtrL&n companies  
and people who voluntarily expose thtv 	to 
relating to their jobs. This kind of risk is often Judged  
orththi0 Tho concept of acceptable risk is not 
PE 1 
howovorp shared by tho pubRAU who are not dirt)y 
Involved in the tiviti connuctQd withthe risk  
although they taku profit by uoing th 
manufactured to oatisly their needs.  
The risk i 	rtic.a)1iry objuctod to when 100002 
resulting Iram raro v but catastrophAc q Large 	 of 
hazardous su tnc hijh0 As a rut thu tund 
of RLveo and nummrouz intUtionc3 Loot in ac=lduntan 
AncLdunto tothr with the public concern have 14d 
governments and Induatrian QuthorLtLuuto davoto groat 
attention to thQ controlof those rd bringing the  
Love n of risk to much or values. one of thL-SQ actions 
As the ppointsnt by the ritish government of the  
Advisory Committee on major Hazards (ACMHI whose  
assignment is to advise on means of control for industrial 
Installations processing or manufacturing hazardous 
subt&n0 Thu ffcorts dapRoyud by this coiritts 
resulted in the elaboration of thrme reports containing  
valuable recommendations. 
)t shoud 	bs notud g howovor y that although such 
recommendations contribute drastically to minimizing 
hazardous events they do not provont thsir complete 
elimination. This is due to ths fact that proc000 units 
are designed, constructed and operated by human bins the  
errors of ho at the origin of most of the fiaurs 
which, in many occasions v result in flammable and/or toxic 
AE 2 
7ho runuazoo of rti©WIr introt in this thoolo Q70 
those 	originating 	from catastrophic izinuroo of 
prurisd 	 tanks contmAning nlquolAed Th 
purpose of studying the iivio.ar of such r2nuzs2s Ries in 
the need to underztand tho mochznAom by whLch tho vapour 
c)ouds formd1 dAzporsa in tho atmoophoro. such vipour 
clouds can exhibit density allocto making thm movu vry 
close to the ground. This phenomenon hmo boon observod in 
loth real incLdentz and oxperAmontan invtition0 
Tho extent and nature of tho hmzardo pr2zonted by 
dense vapour cloud depend on Ito ntur 
toxic), tho quantAty of matorA&R rQnoasodp tho storageand 
release conditions, the itmophric conditions (wind speed 
and atmosphericstability), the nature of tho trriin 
downwind of the release, the public rosponso and the  
emergency operations.  
XnaLdents 1iky to occur aro fir (pool lirs o flash 
lLre v fireball), xp)1.oion and intoXiction0 The oflacts  
of these potential IncAdonto aro burnupInjuries 	 to 
blast waves, buildingcollapse, flying mii 
InJuries due to oAther external contact or inhtion of 
toxic chic]0 These effectsmay runt in immit 
deathp 	1&iyd or natent inJuri0 
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21 HMTRODUCTHOW. 
9fty is of prime importance in locating and operating  
pnantz where hazardous ir or 
manufactured. Risk can be inici 9 tho.nD, not completely 
intd by the combination of sevoran measures taking 
into account economicp econogic and humanitarian problems.  
As far &a humanitarian matters are concernedhn human 
lives are to be preserved) dAstancQ o as a first 
plays a groat rune in the location ol tho plant. Economic  
and econogLa problems, on the other hand q depend on the  
layout of tho plant (separation of dillerent unite of 
process, spacing dAstances, segregation in the tor 	of 
different products 	 the chemical and physical  
properties of the iffrnt substances processed or stored  
(hydrocarbons and chemicals if released in the sea or 
rivers may cause 'co]1oic the preventive  
measures adopted and emergency procedurao avallabnQ. 
22 PLANT BXTGO 
Thu choice of a suitabRoit for tho contrtion of a 
given plant is, in prIncipne, done in ouch a way that it 
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complies with the xvaibi)ity of 	 UtInItLOU which 
lacinAtatu the 	 nt of the )rt0 These ir 
-The access to raw materials to be  
-Transport and marketing of in 	products (ivii1biity 
of harbours, railways and 
-SuLtabRm terrain with now imic actAvLtAaz p and heavy 
load bearing citi 
-Skinned labour. 
-The abundance of oo)in water 	 rivers). 
-Entarninking with other plants in the same area.  
-Sfty whIchp dependingon the 	 of rick presented 
by the plant, may occupy a preponderant role in the choice  
of the it0 
As far &5 zzlety As nccrn 	two ninwo of defence are  
of prime Amportance in the 1.oction of a plant. The firt 
which concerns not only the public but t 
ll 9 deals with the ninrin 	managing of the  
plant. The main objective with ragmrd to safety As good  
prevention in order to avoid Incidents rather than to try 
to protect people and property. from their eflects.  
Preventing leaks and explosive mixtures should be  
considered as the first and moot affAclant measure to b 
tkn0 However, whatever the f fort deployed in szluty 
moasurzop the occur2nco of noako and nozo of continmnth 
is oititii unavoAdmbna. Thoralorop the second nine of 
da?foncz which acts as an alternative should th first 
faiR p Is the remote loction of the plant with rp'ct to 
populated ir0 
PE 5 
Although, most of the tLmop dLztancm tundo to reduce  
damage and casuaRtios o its value dpsndm on the popu1ation 
density, the nature and magnitude of tho hazard. 
The main hazardous Events which may arise in a plant are  
explosions and toxic releases. The danger arising from 
explosions is gnra11y blast wave which v -ssu)ts in 
effects such as bodily displacement, buinding coUapss and 
-flying missiles. Ann these effects represent a direct and 
immediate threat to peopne situated within short distances 
from the origin of the explosion. The effects are so rapid 
that there is no time allowed for actions to be taksn0 At 
much greater distances, hovsr, the intensity of an 
explosion decays rapidly and so do their harmful effects. 
Concerning toxic rslsasss the hazard results in the 
inhalation of toxic substances whose effects may be 
significant even at remote distances. Unlike explosions, a 
toxic release doss allow for actions to be undertaken in 
order to minimize the consequences of its Effects. The 
efficiency of these measures depends on one hand on the 
circumstances of the release (nature of the product 
distance, weather conditions time) and on the other 
hand o on the effectiveness of the smsrgsncy operations. 
A low populated area around the plant or a remotely 
located one have a great dsal to contritbut in minimizing 
the number of casualties should an Incident happen. But,  
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it is not ccnvnint hvsr, from the conomic and  
oci1 points of view to leave large areas of land unused.  
Thrs should be a compromise trntivs combining  
dLstancz andpopulation density oo that lcnd wzzstoand 
casualties are asnow as 
23 PLANT LAYOUTO 
En general, a plant is divided into .s number of process 
units, a storage tank area containing i muntitude of 
products ranging from raw materAanz to vAnan products. and 
pump houses all together intsrUnksd by pipes of different 
lengths and distrs0 
For convenience of zalety o expnoAtation and maintenance 
operationsp the plant is separated into blocks or plots so 
as to follow the natural subdivisions of the procss0 The 
factors which are considered during the early stage of the 
layout consist of to min aspoctop namely aconomico and 
safety. These features Read to actions such as ths 
optimisation of the ovsri)1)t cost invested in construction 
and subsequent operation cost. This can be sxp1iinsd by 
such facts as the minimisation of vulnerable pipsor 
segregation of different ris.s containment of accidents,  
fabrication and maAntenance q operation etc.. 
Xn praictic' svsra)I. layout are considrod in ordr to 
chose tho most suitab0 En oach, ovLory 	block 	i 
subdivided into sections containing groups of siiair 
PAfE 7 
equipment (pumps hat-xchanrs reactors tc0 
Another type of construction in a plant Layout consists 
of the different buildings containing control rooms,  
workshops, canteen, electrical substations, medical 
centre, laboratories and the main office block. 
2.3.1 Segregation. 
As the different products processed or obtained have 
different degrees of riskp there shoui.d be a zeparation in 
units and storage areas usuaR)ty classified as zones of 
medium and high risk. The type of hazards presented 
can be initiators Unammable or toxic raleasep ignition 
sources), transmitters (process units tanks containing 
highly flammable products) and potential victims (people 
whether employees or among the public). 
The purpose of the segregation is to keep substances and 
equipment of different navels of hazard away from each 
other so as to prevent escalations in the event of an 
incids'nt0 When dividing the overall area of a plaint into 
blocks it is to be Ibornin mind that each block should 
contain compatible types of hazard from the point of view  
of 11r2 and explosion. 
As mentioned above the degree of risk is c)lassifisd as 
now, medium and high. To well known examples are the 
electric area and flash point classifications which are 
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described respectively in BS 5245s part 1 1976 and I3SCP 
3013 1974 9 as 
a) EEctrica]t ara 
-on 0 in which an explosive gao-Mir mixturG i 
continuously present or prosont for long periods  
(greater than 1000 houro pr yar)0 
-on ig in which an explosive gas-air mixture is iky 
to occur in normal operation 	than 1000 hour 
per year but greater than 10 hours per yar)0 
-acne 2g in which an oxpnozivu gau-&Lr mixture Lo not 
likely to occur in normal operation, and iF it 
occurs cjfl oxist only for a short time (Ross than 
10 hours per yar)r 
b)F1ash point. 
-Class As. a liquid with flash point below 22 oC (73 oF)0 
-Class 38 a liquid with flash point between 22 oC and 66 
oC (73 and 130 oF)0 
-Class Co a Liquid with flash point above 66 oC (130 OF). 
2.3.2 Spacing Distances. 
Once the segregation of the ons containing diffarnt 
types of hazard has been compnoted, saparation distances  
between these- zones and equipment belonging to one glvcon 
zono have to be adopted The purpose of owparatLon 
dAztanC22 in process induatrLez 10 janralLy for 
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convenience of safety (containment of firms therabV  
preventing their spread to other equipment or units, the  
easy deployment of firs lighting equipment, escape stc) 
aintsrncs transport and opsration0 
Minimum distances adptsd often comply with standards 
and codes of practics0 Hn process units separation 
distance can be defined as the distance bstssr the edges 
of to units or one unit and an ignition source whoroaz 
for storage it is between tank and tank. Storage areas and 
process units are also kept away from each other. 
Little explanation is given to the different distances 
adopted which vary from one cods to another. For process 
units the gap is generally im between to separate blocks 
but may have to be increased to 25m in the presence of 
tall stuctures0 For stored products the distance is 
usually a function of the vapour pressure of the product 
in question, the type of storage and the means of 
protection available. The provision of adequate protection 
walls between tanks or tanks and units and/or water 
cooling systems can permit separation distances to be 
reduced.  
The confusion created by the various diffsrsncs between 
codes and guidelines has lead Simpson (1971) to suggest 
to main factors on which separation distances should be 
based. These ars 
-Heat of burning liuid and ignition of a vapour escape. 
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Heat radiated from a burning liquid can ignLte dillarent 
substances at different distances and cause burns and 
discomforts. Thus q separation distances can be trin'd 
as functions of heat flux rmdAmted and thir abl.Ri.ty to 
ignite different substances. SLmpson (1971) distLnguAshus  
three of ht fxo 
ZX120 kw/m2 (4000 I3TU/ft2Th) which As the )1iit appnicabne  
for buildings such as control rooms and orkhopswood or 
phautic, areas to w hich the pb1ic has access.This vmnuo  
suggezts according to KnetE (180) that largetor 
tan kz m ust be Rocated at noaat 200iü from public roads.  
kw/m2 (100 13Th/f t21h) whAch Is Threshold of pain 
ftcr a short time (10-20o) and Az suggested for people  
carryIng out emergency oprtiou0 
16 kw/m2 (500 8TU/ft2h) whLch Is the 	v]1. of minor 
discomfort and is utd as the )iit for people who 
y be in the urroundir areas. 
Therelorep the diffrnt equipment should be 	prtd 
by distancoz so that if a 11.rQ occurs in one of them v tho  
heat rdition received by others or by people should not 
exoed the figures indicated above. 
24 EASE OF HANDLING OF DIFFERENT SUBSTANCES. 
Thu conditions of handling in 	 of dAlleront 
substances in a given plant depend on their phyicx]1. state 
it ambient pressure 	 temperature. This may be o1i 
nAquLd or gaseous. For oconomAc reasons all products  
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mostly stored in liquid state in tanks differing in shapes 
and is under different conditions.  
The phase diagram in Fig. 	1 	appendix) Illustrates 
typical bhaviour. The segment AS raprL3sentz the vapour 
pressure variation with temperature for the solid phase. 
This implies that the nine AS in iat the conditions of 
pressure and temperature at which a certain substances 
Initially in a solid state is translarmod into vpours0 
Such a phenomenon is called uication The snt SC 
represents the vapour pressure variation with temperature 
for the liquid phase. This means that for a substance 
stored in a Liquid state at its boiling point (on the nine 
BC) an increase in temperature Leads to an Increase in 
pressure so that the boiling point is maAntained on the 
same )l.ins IBC in the new uiUbriui0 The point C 
corresponds to the critical tempurature and prsurs At a 
temperature above the critical temperature the substance 
cannot exist in the liquid phase whatever the value of the 
pressure. At point C physical properties of both liquid 
and gas (dsnsity 9 specific snthalpy, viscosityl are the 
same. The latent heat of vaporisation/condensation is 
sro 
The state of a given substance and consequently the 
conditions of its storage are greatly affected by it 
dsnsity. Substances wAth small molecular weights are often 
found as gas or vapours at normal conditions of pressure 
and temperature. Thus their torags as Liquefied gasoo in 
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limited vo l umes is re iatLvun y expensive. The high pressure  
required to keep them in .i liquid state necessitateshigh 
tinrd storage tanks.  
Gaseous substances it ambi ent conditions of prozouru and 
tempera ture whose range varies from one part of the jiob 
to another ( - il.0 oC to 30 oC in the IIJX and -6 oC to 50 oC 
inAlgeria) tor in a nAquId otatQ oLthor in 
pressure t&nks at atmospheric tomporaturu or in 
rulrAg2rated tankz at tosric pruzzuro or o von in 
i-rriritd tnks where prosouro and rfrirtion 
combined 	 30402L Tho purpozQ of )1iufyin 
sous substances Is on)ty for the convonlenco of otorago 
and trmnsportationp as when liquefied they occupy va n umuz  
which, tim hun d r ~Dds of ti 
Different substances are c nasoiliod into four main 
categories depending on their critical t pratur and 
boiling points with relation to the iiint t emperature  
(tabl e  
- 	 Category 	 with critical t ompora turez  
and a tmospheric boiling pointo below ambi ent. Among theZa  
WO hav&B Hitrogenp Oxygenp Methane . These  
hici prviou1y, 	 to be pormanunt gameop 
are nowad ayo handnod ao rolrigoratod liquids in tan ks  
under the rma l inution uini vacuum j ac kutz.  
-  Category (2) Subst ances ith critical t emperatures  
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above and boiling points below aIisnt0 Examples of these 
substances rg LPS, Propns, Butane v Ammonia,ChYt.orins 
Propy1sns From table A.i it can be seen that their 
critical temperatures are &IR above ambient.Therefore,  
they can be Uquelied under the affect of pressure )1ons 
This category of substances when stared under prssurs 9 
have the tendency to 	sh-off in the event of Q noss of 
containmsnt0 A certain fractionwhich depends on the 
physical properties of the substance and the conditions of 
storagap flashes-off into vapour neaving the remaining in 
a Riquid state at its atmospheric boiLing point 
342) 
Because of their abiaity to give rise to hazardous 
vapour clouds (see 3O03) these substaness are frequently 
considered in hazard assessment. The main part of this 
thesis deals with the behaviour and effects of substances 
bonQiinQj to this category. 
Category 	(3) 1. 	Substances with 	both critical 
temperatures and boiLing points above ambient. This 
category comprises all products in a Liquid state at 
ambient conditions of pressure and temperature. 
Catsjory (4)9 Substances at sllsvatsd temperatures and 
pressures. some substances of category 3 fall into this 
category under certain process conditions. Under the 
effects of high pressure and temperature they behave as 
Liquefied gases. To common examples are water steam 
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boilers and cyclohsxsns which was maintained at 
Flixlorouh above its atmospheric pressure boiling point 
under i pressure of about 9 bars.  
2.5 IBEHAYXOUR OF DIFFERENT CATEGORIES OF SUBSTANCES O 
SPILLAGE.  
2.5.1 The behaviour of substances belonging to ctsioris 
1 and 2 when spilt as cryogenic liquids and liqusfid 
gazes (hsthr from pressure tanks or refrogir&ted ones 
rsspsctivc1y is described in 342 
2.5.2 Spillage 01 Category 3 Substances.  
As already stated above, these substances have both 
atmospheric boiling points and critical temperatures above 
ambient. They are generally stored as liquids at ambient 
conditions of pressure and temperature either in floating 
roof tanks for category A (flsh point below 221 oC) and 
18 (flesh point between 2218 and 66 oC) substances, and in 
fixed roof tanks for category C (flesh point above 66 oC) 
substances.  
Tanks handling thsss liquids mro alwayo surrounded by 
bunds whose capacities are equal to those of the tanks 
thslvss in the event of a sAnglo tink by bund and to 
CL 
110% of ths bisst tank when ssvsrl tanks zro surrounsd 
by the same bund0 )N? a loss of containment occurs the bund 
Is theoretically supposed to cops with the wholu capacity 
PAGE 15 
of the 	xkin tank. )n roan conditionu, hovr, if the  
Iak cannot be stopped, the content of the tank can be 
transferred to another on0 But, bolore the product is 
completely run out, a great amount wAnn crtainy go in 
the bund where its surlaco tiU be in direct contact with 
the ambient air. At this stage the evaporation is 
Inevitable and the rats of evaporation depends on the 
vapour pressure, the size of the poon and the wind speed. 
Ths vapours emanating from heterogeneous hiquids such as 
staihissd crude oih most of the time do not present 
great dangers. Except at the beginning of the spiUas 
where the mixture vapour/air Immediately above the pooh 
surface is rich in light products. Ths mixture is often 
rapidly diluted to below the lower fhammabihity himit 
(LFL) at small distances from the pooL As the night 
products are exhausted the evaporation rats snows don 
significantly and so doss the danger. However, if the 
substance were to be toxic, the concentration can stilhl be 
noxious at remote distances from the pool. 
Spillage of category 4 substances. 
AU these products which, for process rsasons 9 ars 
maintained as liquids at high conditions of pressure and 
temperature behave, when rs)Isassd 9 in the same way as 
those of category 2 Xf containment be host a certain 
fraction will -flash into vapour. Iut 9 sines the vapours 
flashed off come from an overheated liquid, its heat wAni 
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rapidly he d1issipitd in the surroundings and 	part of  
the vapour released will be condensed to give droplets of 
aerosol.  
26 DAGGER EAATJH'G FROM LPS9.  
2.6.1 Dolinition.  
Liquefied Petroleum Gs LPG1 Is i name given to a 
fraction of hydrocarbons which form the ihtt part to 
be separated from tbi1i 	crude oi)10 Apart from the  
cmxU percentages of mathmne v ethane pentanup this 
friction consists predominantly of to components namely 
propane (C3ll1 	and butane (C4IHULO)0 Depending on the  
commercial requirements, the to substances can be  
sprtLy or as mixtures. 
At norm&1 atmospheric pressure 	 temperature propane  
and butane xit au vapours but can aasny be iufid 
when subJected to a ModerateIncrease in prsurc 9 & fall 
In temperature or both. The need to t liquefy them is only 
for the convenience of storage and transportation az the 
volume occupied when they are liquidis bDUt 20 times  
less than that of a vapour stt0 
LPG gases are colour) 	 odourn000 but for ron 
of zalety they are made dotoctmbno by cfl by th 
addition of small quantities of morcaptanz. 
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From the point of view of weight liquid propano and 
butane 	 loss dense than water by a factor of nearly to 
but their vapours 	 denser than the 	thitnt air by a 
factor of one and a half for propane to for butane. 
This last feature makes them, when released to the  
atmospherep flow very close to the roun filling all Row 
spaces in their path rdrins, hollows tc00 
2.6.2 Dangers. 
X1 a large Ross of containment occurs whether it is 
instantaneous or continuous and depending on whether the 
leakage comes from a pressurised or a cryogenic storage 
(see 342) the gas wAln he diluted by the air in some 
proportions so that at the centre of the cloud formed the 
gas is too rich to burn s, but at the edges the 
concentration lies within the flammability range. 
An Ignition at tho edgeof the cloud  
very rapidly around the whole volume of the 
a violsnt 	turbulancs which will Read to 
whose effect will allow the firs to flash 
point of release. The ignition can give 
fireball (see 
ill propagate 
cloud creating  
further mixing 
back to the 
rise to a hugs 
t is to be noted that the volus of explosive mixture 
which will be generated from a small amount of )liqud 
propane is very high. A cubic centimeter of liquid propane 
when homogeneously mixed with air at the lower 
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flammability limit (LFL) will give nearly iL2000 cubic 
ntimtrs of oxplooivo mixture (12 litres)- 
Generally speaking g the hazards from LPGs to both people  
and property arise from to ituations 
a) On a small scale such as a domestic situation g a 
Raking cylinder in an enclosed space(house, workshop 
etc.), ill give rise to a flaabl jas/air fflLxturo  
which, if Ignited in an early stage could result in a very 
rapid development of a fir0 Rlp on the other hand th 
ignition is delayed so that the as forms an &xpnoBLVO  
mixture with the airp the rsult will b2 a severe 
xpoion 
b)On a nargo scalopthe ignition of a largz naakago from a 
storage tank in a plant road tanksr, or rail tanker (a 
sudden failure resulting from a crash) will give rAou to a 
huge fire propagation in an early inition0 The Intensity 
of the heat generated will cause serious AnjurAeu and 
death to the nearby population or the passers by. 91, on 
the other hand the ignition is delayed, the ensuing  
result may be a devastating vapour cloud explosion (see  
3.6). 
Purhapo what makes LPG gases so dangerous arises from 
the fact that they aro widely used in many filds such as 
hsatinj lighting and cooking in and outdoors and 
recently in road vehicles an increasing number of which 
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are being converted to run on LPG. In respect of caravans 
LPG is stored in small cylinders and sometimes a whole  
caravan site is supplied by many tanks which are not 
subjected to any control or restriction on spacing 
distances. In such a situation the danger to people arises 
from to factors namely the close siting of the tanks to 
the caravans and the high number of tanks which might be 
installed in a relatively small area. 
It is because of its special convenience and cleanliness 
that LPG is so popular. In some cases it is used by poplc 
completely unaware of its danger. The majority of leaks in 
domestic situations usualy occur when the appliances are  
not correctly connected to the cartridges or cylinders. 
In addition to the different types of hazard relating to 
the use of LPG and referred to abov 9 its transport from 
one place to another is another source of danger. Its 
transit and distribution are carried out either by 
pipelines, rail and road tankers each of which has its 
S 
particular type of dangers ctpipa hurts, crash, derailment 
ste0)0 In the U( for sxamp)1s 9 it seems that 300 to 500 
tanks transporting LPG travel regularly on the roads. 
Fortunatly 9 incidents involving LPG carrying tankers are 
few in number. 
27 EMERGENCY PLANNING AND FIRE F]CGHTDJGO 
Experience has always shown that whatever the level of 
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standards used in constructing and operating plants,  
hazards should never be inord0 As products processed or 
manufactured are often hazardous with respect to firs 
XpDSiDnS or toxic r&.as 9 possAbne leakagesranging  
from sruafl amounts to catastrophic losses of containment 
present different navels of risk. Therefore, in .addition 
to the safety actions carried out throughout the plant 
operation, some other measures (non as emergency 
procedures and consisting of actions planned wann in 
advance to &aal with hazardous situations) are of great 
importance. The sffctivsnss of these procedures depends 
on the means put into action g those who use them and the 
public raaction0 
Depending on the type of actAvityp an emergency can take 
place either in a plant or during the transport of a 
hazardous substanca0 the actions taken are quiet different 
and are examined saparatly below.  
2.7.1 Emergency in a Plant. 
Such aarIancyp generally, consists of to complementary 
parts. 
2070101 The works emergency plan. 
For an emergency plan to ho uffocUvo all the actions to 
be taken have to be studied wall in advance in rallation to 
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the types of hazard encountered in the plant. A plant is 
usually divided into several units and sections embodying  
one or more compatible hazards. The hazards belonging to 
every unit should be identified, assessed and plans to 
dal with them established. 
Once the individual plans have been completed, the next 
step is to deline who does what and how and when they do 
it. This consists of the designation of g 
-People whose presence may be indispensable during the  
emergency and the definition of the principal function of 
those who have to exercise control on the emergency 
operations such as the works incident controller and the  
works main controller. 
-Emergency control centres (generally two) located in sale 
P 
areas, well accessible and squipsd with reliable means of 
communication such as telephone and radios plans 
directing the emergency actions breathing apparatus ste00 
-Assembly points as sale as possible. 
-Means of transport for evacuating people should the 
assembly points be threatened in any way. 
One of the main aspects in an emergency is communication 
which plays a significant role in handling the smsrjsncy0 
When an accident occurs the information must be 
transmitted as rapidly as possible to all parts both 
inside the plant (different units laboratory, dii?fsrsnt 
departments) and outside (neighbouring plants in the 
Industrial area and other emergency srvicss)0 
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2.7.1.2 Works emergency procedure. 
This consists of the actions to be taken ones the alarm 
has been raised. For them to be ollectivep the procedures 
should be worked out and the prsonns1 shou'd be properly 
trained in them psriodicfly0 The f iiarition of the 
different psop in diffsrsnt p)acs ith the procthnrs 
help them take the right actions in an emergency. 
On the hearing of the alarm many actions can be 
undertaken sitansous]1y 
-To groups of persons directed by the works Incident 
controller and the works main controller Join respectively 
the place of the incident and the emergency control room. 
The first group is composed of personnel such as firsmn 
operators and other skilled agents whose role is to tackle 
the Incident and prevent its sscaation0 The second group 
comprises ssnior managmznt who,, from ths emergency control 
centre, Issue instructions in accordance with the 
Information and advice originating from the works Incident 
controller. 
-Personnel who g initiaUy 9 are not directly Involved in 
the emergency Join their habitual places of work and aait 
instructions from the umzrgency control cntr0 
-The personnel of nsigthouring units of the plant should 
be kept alert and ready to shut them don when the 
instruction is received. 
-AU the personnel whose presence is unnecessary should be 
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evacuated from the allected areas and directed to the 
assembly points. 
- 	order not to disrupt the emergency operations all 
communications whether by radio or telephone with no 
relation with the emergency must be intsrruptsdi0 
-Ambulances and nurses should be ready to Intervene. 
-The external emergency services should be Informed (see 
2.7.2.3 below). 
-]tn the event of a major Incident there should be an 
appointment of a senior manager as an officia)I source of 
Information. 
2.7.1.3 External authorities and services. 
Xf a small incident escalates into a major one which can 
extend beyond the physical boundaris of the plant, it is 
obvious that assistance from outside services such as 
neighbouring plants police, firs and medical services is 
Indispensable in dealing with the problem in order to 
minimize the conssqusncss 
a) NeighbourAng plants and lire services. 
S 
Their support lies in helping the local manajmsnt of the 
plant affected by the incident put out the firs 2 rescue 
casualties and transport them to the health csntrss. At 
their arrival to the place of the Incident they should be 
given full information on the naturs and scan of the 
Incident in order to use the appropriate equipment and 
extinguishing agents. The coordination and success of the  
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intrvntion depend to a large extent on the coMpatii1Iity 
of the equipment and extAnguishAng agants of th2 diffrnt 
services, and on tho cooperative training and oxorcicao  
previously ctsd 
b ) Po 1 Ic s 
Police play a major rule in the emergency planning. 
Their duties consist of 
-The protction of life and property. 
-The control of movement of traffic, 
-The Identification of the cazuantAou and the information 
of their relatives. 
-The control of bystanders. 
-The evacuation of thz public from tratnd areas.  
-TOs inspection of suspected sota0 
-The liaison with the press.  
For the polic& to carry out their role properly they 
should themselves be provided with adequate protective  
quipmsnt 
c)?1sdica1 services. 
Their role is to provide the nocossary facilitiss for 
transport accommodation and treatment of casualitiss0 
Thio nsc sitatss ths availability of ambulances enough 
room in the hospitals and skillsd staff as the naturs of 
the Injuries can vary according to ths sutancss involvsd 
An the incident. 
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2.7.2 Transport Emergency Planning.  
CLI 
Products manufactured in chemical or petrochemicn plants 
have, for purposes of ss distribution, to be 
transported from one p]Uscs to another. The means of 
transport are by 51 9 buried pApenAnes q rain and road. 
Among them road and rain tankers transport seem to be the 
most hazardous as convoys sometimes pass through populated 
areas. Here also, the construction of tankers according to 
high standards dos not prevent Incidents from happening. 
Thus some actions have to he p11.annd for possible 
emergency.  
What diffrniats road or rain Incidents from works 
incidents is that in the former cases the hazard can 
affect a high number of people concentrated in an area of 
Lars population density such as the Spanish camp disaster 
(arshaU 197) and the time taken by the msrncy 
services to get to the scans of the incident may be hung. 
For the Incident to be sffsctivsy dealt withp the 
psopis' in charge of the transport of different substances 
have to be readily aware of the different properties and 
particular hazards rlatini to each substance if it were  
to escape from containment (after an accident) or to be  
Involved in any chemical reaction. Protective equipment 
must be availaL0 To help people and outsLdu emergency 
services recognise the type of danger incurred during the 
mrncyp the 	 transported must be Identillud by 
otandard labelo and symbonsii. The 	 rncy servicez must 
he trained in dealing with the Incident in situations 
involving different substances. 
thu-b the incidnt has occured the necessary actions to 
be undertaken can be summarAsed in keeping people out of 
informing the incint control centrep trying to 
prevent escalation of the Incident, obtininQI more  
infortion about the ubtinc0 HaRardouz oubstancusare  
intifid by hazard inforticn zymbons displayedon 
D-zCHE° reference 	r0 
To enable the inidnt control cantre to take the  
appropriate steps in dealing with the rncyp it ohouRd  
be Informed by any means on the oction and time of the  
incident, the ubtnc Involved, the close surroundAnSz,  
the thr conditions, the of the continr, the  
possible deaths or injuries and the first aid services  
arrived it the of the incidnt0 
u 
31 XNTRODUCTION.  
The operating of chemical and ptrochvic]1 plants ovr 
the yuaro has ho*rn that q despite tho high otandardo ud 
In constructing and operating of different process units 
failures do ocur, usually, reounting in Roakez of 
different magnitudes. They are duo to either human urrors  
committed in any of the different otagoo (dijn 
fbricticn operation) of the leaking quipnt or Itomo g  
or to materlan d'ficincy0 Equipment of pirtiu]tr intcrt 
In this study are pressure and oturage tnk 
containing liquefied gases for which map first, 	iv 
brief review of some common causes of failure. The subject 
has been chosen because of the potential major haaards 
aozoclatod with th2 bunk ruRoaoz of q&sucz 1iqufid undr 
pressure.  
Tho 	h,2xardo which may origAn&tu from ouch nargo 
Instantaneous r2loases are fire, explosion and poisoning.  
The treatment given in what follows io relevant to all 
three haaards and conslots of tho study of diff rnt 
phases as the release phenomena, mixing of the material  
with air, formation of f)l.ammab)1 and/or toxic vapour 
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clouds, drifting of the cloud and finding of ignition 
sources which may ]ad to fires or unconfined vapour cloud 
explosions endangering the process units and pozuAbny 
populated areas. Toxicity aspecto and their effects  
also discussed. 
32 MODES OF FAILURE. 
3.2.1 Human Factor. 
Human error is one of the factors that ).sad to iaAnurza  
in any field of professional activity. with respect to 
mechanical industry concerned with tho mnuficturini of 
different equipment (vessels, hzat-oxchangers, columns, 
pumps etc.) v errors committed in an early stag2 (design or 
fabrication) will certainly have a wide negative sffct in 
other activities using these equipment.  
Among the equipment in use, those of particu)1.ar inthrt 
in this topic are the pressure vssss0 The activities-
connected with the manufacturing and continued operation 
of pressure vessels fall within the aroaz of mchinica1 
chemical and metallurgical engineering. ThQ human being i 
Involved in aU of those activitiez and any of hi 
faflurss may lead to the vessel failure at any stage of 
Its use. 
Vessel failure may be potential or catastrophic. In the 
first case Inspection, whether oxtornmR during normal 
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operation or Internal 	during periodical or annual 
shutdownsp can r2V2&R 1au1t hih rumudAud in 
sufficient time p will lead to failure. Signs of failure 
are nraUy cracks and loss of thickness.  
On the other hand a catastrophic failure whichpmoot of 
the tLme q is unforsssn and unexpected g occurs suddenly 
without any warning. Such failures are the most to fear 
because of the xthnt of the damage and injury they are  
liable to cause. What makes catastrophic 1ai)urss so 
frightening is that the instantaneous rsLass of the  
Inventory presents an isdiats threat so that there is 
little time avallabno to take actions to tackle the 
problem.  
Sotis Inturmudlato stages with leaks ranging from a 
small amount to the total loss of cantainssnt of the  
vessel can occur. Attention must be drawn to the  
Involvement of different categories of people in the 
different stages of a vessel construction and 	lifs 
(dssign 9 fabrication 	operation). These stages will be 
discussed in more details later in this chapter. 
3.2.2 Material Factor. 
1ssidss the human involvmsnt in fai)turs as a 	hols 
the quality of material used in any equipment especially 
those oporating in severe condLtAonsp is of paramount 
importance. The choice of material used in ths fabrication 
PAGE 30 
must take Into account many factors Including the nature  
ol the roth.act to be procezood and tho conditAunoof  
operation namely pressure and trtiar0 Rn 
pressure 	 which operate above ambient tprthr 
are made of carbon zteoRo whereas for those operating Qt 
Row temperatures use is i10 made of 	Uoy stoelo g 
aluminium, brass and copper. 
Considerable attention must be paid to the transition 
temperature in cases carbon steal is used in vessono 
handling liquefied gazzo. The transition temperature or 
any steal can be defined as the tomparmtura abovewhich 
the th]1 behaves in & ductile manner and below which it 
behaves in a brittle manner. In general, a fracturetakes  
place at c weak point ouch as a crack and propagates under 
certain stress (this may be due to the Internal pessura of  
the vessel or any other cause) in both sides so that when 
the crack has rhd a certain critical v)1 (byon 
which the can no longer rit tho stress Imposed on 
It) the propagation will inevitably continua and may )1.d 
to the vessel failure. 
A vessel can fail either in a brittle manner such as 
glass or cast iron Reading to numerous fragments of  
irnt oiawo, or in Q ductile manner ouch az a 
cartridge of LPG zubmLttod to a hydraulic ovrprr 
until bursting. In thLo )1t oxampnep genuranRy q tho 
fracture leads to one or two large places. 
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g n some pcific situations sharp cornoro, notchoo and  
cracks generally known as 	 risursp Oct in Ouch Q way 
that they accentuate the initial fracture by many times  
causing it to yield to the tr0 Rn Ouch CaUDO the  
choice of adequate material and reinforcement where 
necessary should be provided. other factors Including 
creep q fatigue of material and corrosion whose offactumay 
reduce the trnth of the vessel must be onidrsd early 
In the design stage. - 
The transition temperature mentioned above has been 
reported in ThisLsh (196) who examined some 3000 welded 
ships constructed by the US during world war UO Among the  
3,000 ships Thish stated that 1,200 oullarod serious  
hull lractUr2gp 20 of which whoro claimed to be  
potentially haairdous and 20 resulted in uev(---ru accLdunto  
leading to their breakage into to sections. 
Thish stressed that steels which are normally tain Qz 
ductile, in certain circufflOtancQ09 fail in a brittle  
fashion under the effect of low temperature. The  
trainsition temperature is believed to be difficult to 
determine with any precision and different tests gLva  
different values. From the foregoing it appears cluarp for 
that if a leak of liquid propane tord at 
ambient temperature in z pressure tank occurop the  
temperature of the steel in contact with the kin 
propane can drop to the aitMophric boiling point of the  
propane (-2oC)0 Xf the vssR is of mind steel 
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(3M20) or (A3106130) for which the  
trnition temperatures 	 respectively -ioC and -23oC 
the 	 can fil locally in a brittRo mannur. 
303 DIFFERENT FACTORS WHICH CAN LEAD TO FARLURES. 
The ii of this section is not to give a detailed 
sxintion of all the factors which can lead to & voGooa 
failure but to throw soma light on the different sts 
during which failure is most likely to occur. These are  
design, fabrication, commissioning, operation. 
0301 Design And Fabrication. 
It is at the design stage that all the opecAlicationo 
rstinj to the matorialo, disnions and opsr&tinj 
conditions are ssthbaishsd0 pressure v sss)ls are normally 
designed to meet a weRl dsfinsd upocificatLon the 
departure from which can )1.sd in a 1tsr porAod of time to 
the failure of the vssss1 if undotoctod. The dsijn is 
normally based on codes which can differ from one country 
to another. In the UK for inst&ncs the cods currently in 
use is BS 5500.  
Ones the design his been achieved, the fabrication can 
be undertaken following the same cods which providss 
guidance in order to avoid departure Irom the dssin 
specification. In addLtAonp Inspection carried out during 
fabrication prorsss by olfAcIaR authorltLQz wnn snsurs 
PAGE 33 
that the specifications have been met. As in the design 
stago g any error in the conotrL%ion which is not dutactudC. 
by tho Inspection can be it tho orijth of a lalRuro in a 
later phase. 
3.3.2 Tooting.  
For reasons of safety it As or than.obvAouo that boloru  
operating any vessel it must be ubitt to certain 
categories of tests alter which it is to be sale 
with respect to the risk of fi1ur0 The first tests to be  
carried out take place on the manulacturer's site bfor 
the quipnt is delivered. 
The test 	nr1)y Includes  
-on Destructive Testing (T) which consists of 
radiographic methods that are zopecialny ulfectLvo in 
detecting volume defects ouch as cavLtlzo in 
welds, and ultrasonic testingo which are moresuitable  
for detecting crk0 In addition g dye penetration can 
be to detect surface imperfections. 
-Pressure 	testing 	whichp 	depending on 	crtiin 
in be hydraulic or pneumatic. UuUy 
pressure testing is 1.5 times the operating prur0 
Although pneumatic testing Is uh than 
hydraulic, 	it is otim 	used in ca000 where  
hydraulic tooting Is not convenient. The ttinj time  
during which the pressure tut riin contint 
from 30 to 60 minutes. 
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Once the bov tests have been completed scsfuUy 
the quiptnt is in principle ready to be Incorporated An-
the plant where another series of test including all the  
other equipment and their piping iU take place. Thi 
stage called prscoissionin' conoloto of the trn)1 
cleaning of the plant in order to ramovu rut and 
impurities before the first starting up of the pnt0 Et 
Is to be noted that the first start up is r]ttivs)y 
hazardous asp it is at this stage that )].siks are ot 
likely to occur. 
303030 Operation. 
Logically spkin 	r vessel correctly dozigned o  
properly Imbricated, adequately ta(zted and whose integrity 
is periodically checked, will not ffl in operation. 1ut 
s has been demonstrated by pest Lncldentup failure  
szometLm2o occurs and is usually Induced by other factor 
such as the entry of foreign ubstmncau in the operating  
circuit so as to alter the operating conditions. Such 
phenomenon occured at Bhopanp Endlapi1.94 wherep water 
admission in a tank containing Methyn xoocyanatu(1]C) was 
believed to have caused the tank failure liberating its 
contents which may have resulted in the death of up to 
1000 people with 70000 Injured (11sth and Safety at 
Work, 	rury 1986 
Another foreign substance which can enter a system or 
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voouel accidentally is air ithic, may 	form an 	uxpRooivo  
mixture with 	the contents. En mddAtAon q factors such as 
corrosion 9 flame ipinnt 9 hydraulic rupture and runaway 
reactions are imon the frequent causes of vsss)1 failure  
during operation. 
3.3.4 	 And 1odifiction0 
Maintenance g whose importance is not to be neglected in 
process plant, is the method by which the Integrity and 
RAILD duration of 2quipment are normally preserved. 
Unfortunately, in some circstins 9 mistakes occurin 
during minthn&ncs works can lead to sU leaks which, if 
Ignited whether in an early or delayed stage can escalate 
into disasters. Also, in the replacement of its (joints, 
fittings, bearings tc) 9 it is possible to make mistakes 
in selecting items of the wrong specification. 
01tsn 9 major disasters are the direct consequences of 
sti]11 mistakes committed either in maintenance or 
operating conditions and behind which human error is to be  
found. Compared to small Items of oquLpment such as pups 
compressors, motors etc. which arm subjected to frequent 
maintenance during normal operation because of the  
replacement of fittings ste0 9 pressure vessels have i 
relatively low rats of failure. From table A02 it can be  
-3 
seen that pressure vessels have a failure rate of 17x1000 
per year. Marshall stresses that faAnur2 in Pressure  
vessels occurs mostly Where incorrctly specified 
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replacement items have been used. 
En ordr to avoid rupairing or changing Itumo only &.ftr 
a given problem has occured a so called preventive 
maintenance' (a policy which is now adopted in most of the 
Algerian chemical and petrochemical industries) is to 
change old pieces before they start to cause problems 
therefore avoiding potential leaks. This has been derived 
from the fact that the experience assimilated from normal 
maintenance work during many years and the manufacturer's 
life pr®vision for many items has enabled engineers from 
technical and maintenance departments to assess the 
average duration of life of most of the consumables so 
that they are automatically replaced when convenient. This 
practical procedure has contributed to minimising the 
number of leaks on many equipment. 
Thomson (1987) stated that for the reliability () and 
failure probabilities (F) of a system or equipment to be 
constant g the individual components of the system should 
have exponential functions of reliability with time M. 
p_- X
-- 
R (t) = 
F(t) = 	 32 
F(t) = 	for small values of A 
The rate (h) is assumed to remain constant with time. Rn 
reality it varies. Therefore, the validity of the 
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reliability function being exponential depondo on the  
variation of the hazard rate which Is rtUy 
determined from xpriinti1 data.  
From fig. A2 it can be seen that the hazard rt 
variations can be xprsd in the form of a curve c]tth 
bathtub curve of r1ibiUty°°. showing throe  
Phase IC indicates i high rate of failure for now  
components or Items used for the first time. This  
rate which is of a relatively short duration is tha 
to manufacturing deflects.  
Phase INC represents the tflition of the 	 rate  
at a certain value which depends on tho different 
items. This phase indicates the duration of life  
of a component. 
Phase ICICIC shows the Increase of the hazard rate which 
may Read to the failure of the quipmnt in question 
if it is not replaced in time. 
The xprinta'1 assessment of the duration of Iif 	(of 
given item) rf'rrd to earlier coLnci 	with the  
transaction from phase ICIC to ph' ICICIC0 
Another aspect of paramount importance in process plant 
Is the recourse to modifications in some pci 
situations. This may be rented to the improvement of the  
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quality of a product to replace i defective equipment or 
any particular reason. 1odificitthn Au Q hrou 
operation. This Implies that any Intentional modification 
must be carefully thouM.in order to avoid departures from 
the initial specifications. 
Sometimes, during routine maintenance, unintentional 
minor modifications whose effect can be very hazardous, 
take place. This type of modification generally Ries in 
the use of materials provided for less severs work  
conditionu. For example the replacement of a certain 
Lsnth of pips, flange or valve. In such situations, the 
work carried out must be executed with caution bearing in 
mind that the complete specification of the design ars 
fully maintained 
lCnspection. 
In a process plant, inspection is normally carried out 
by to different sections of managment. Thu first conists 
of several inspectors among the staff of the plant whose 
main activity lies in a continuous checking of the state 
of different equipment so that any departure from the 
initial specifications can be detected in time and 
corrected. 
In normal working conditions inspection is, most of the 
time limited to an external examination and should be 
carried out as often as possible. Vessels and all closed 
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items of quipmnt on the other hand, undergo periodic 
Internal Inspections. )n both cases Inspection Is broadly 
iiir to that of pot-briction inpction 
Xn addition, inspection dealing with equipment mnroady 
in operation Is pificUy concerned with the pct 
such as corrosionerosion, cracks and creep which take 
place over a period of time.  
The other authority involved in inspection consists of  
to or more piits whose particular Interest deans 
with pressure reniel systems. They usually check that the  
Items of quipmnt are submitted to periodic 	tests  
recommended by the nucturr 	that no defects have  
been discovered. 
3.3.6 Other Ftcthrs0 
n addition to the 	in causes of 	i)ur already 
discussed, there still remains or xtrnfactors which 
often are not considered seriously in the normal design 
process q and which may q in some circumstances q pose  
serious threats r as the Integrity of the plant is  
concerned. Some of these factors ouch ao structural 
cops&, &ri fromth faiRuru of supporting utructurQo  
usually weaAned by the ffct of a lira, corrosion or even 
i desLgn fu1t I&Lning to provide fir 
resistance.  
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Must of the quipmnt in a plant are supported by steel 
girders which Al not insulated, can fiia in the vtnt of 
lire. Steen g whichpit ambient temporaturap is a hr 
and strung material, when subjectod to ths sffsct of 
heating, Roses its strength and leads to colnepso in that 
when the temperature has exceeded 500 to 550 oC it will no 
longer be able to resist to the stress Imposed by the 
weight of the structures. To avoid such problem happening  
the steel girders are often covered with a thick 
Insulation layer of concrete. 
During mainthnancs activitiss, mschanica) causes of 
failure rusulting from accidents dU2 to mopsration of 
mobile cranes are sometimes the causs of structural  
A defective cable of a crane can break at any time 
and cause a lilted charge to fall on a otucturo or 
equipment. Simflaray, an overloaded crane can overturn 
causing substantial damas 
Natural factors Including mind loading, earthquakes and 
soil erosion due to intense flooding ars normally takn 
Into account during the design stago but somstimss scssd 
the design parameters. 
3.4 FORMATXON AND DPERS)tON OF VAPOUR CLOUDGO 
When a failure occurs in a vessel containing a liqufisd 
substance the z?nsuLng result is often the formation of a 
large vapour cloud (instantaneous failure) or a plums 
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(continuous leak). The following subsection will throw  
some Right on the fcts of the tosphric conditions 
and the modes of release on the development of vapour 
clouds. 
3.4.1 Meteorological Conditions 
En order to understand the mechanism of gas dispersion,  
it is necessary to review the different meteorological  
factors characterising the dispersion, the ost important 




Wind q among other lactors q plays a dominant role as far 
as dispersion is concerned. Xt is usually characterised by 
its spd and direction whether measured at or above  
ground Lsv1 (normally at 10 meters). The two 
characteristics can be either persistent or turbulent. 
Generally speaking, the ind direction can be defined as 
the direction from which the wind blows at the time of its 
measurement. The number of dirctthns is determined by a 
so called "wind rose" Cf iO3) which is divided into many 
sectors whose number depends on the value of the anLs 
attributed to a given direction. Among the diffrsnt 
directions g the predominant wind direction is tsrmd uThs 
prevailing wind". Kt is this direction which is taken into 
account in dispersion caLcuLations without, hovsr,  
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underestimating the other directions as, the other rion 
whether industria)Iid or popuatd aroas can be  
threatened by the release should thQ wAnd dirction 
change. wind speed and direction are in fact urd by 
meteorological stations and sometimes by organisation 
conducting works on atmospheric dispersion. 
3.4.1.2 Atmospheric stability0 
Besides the influence of wind q the dsjrss of the 
atmospheric stability is another important factor in 
dispersion calculations. itt is to be notsd thatp with 
increasing height, the pressure falls and so doss the 
tspsratur0 The latter can be sxplainsd by the fact that 
if a certain volume of air is taken vertically upward to a 
certain height in the atmosphere, where the pressure is 
less than that at ground lsvsiL the air will expand and 
consequently cool under adiabatic conditions. This fall. of 
temperature with height is known as the adiabatic Raps 
rate. Xf the air is dryp the faln of temperature is 
caUsd "The dry adiabatic lapse rats (DALR) and is 
denoted by the symbol gamma (C) '° O The rats of decrease of 
temperature is approximately bC every 100 m2tres in 
height. Somstimss the lapse rats is greater than 1C per 
100 metres in which case it is called spsradiabatic and 
when it is between 0C and boC it is called subadiabatic0 
lCn some circumstances 	Instead of decreasAngp the 
temperature Increases with Increasing height. The lapse 
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rcto jo then called "]Cnvrt'd°°0 When the lapse rate is 
the atmosphere is classified as unstable and when 
the lapse rate is it is classified as stable.  
Negative or inverted lapse rates make the atmosphere most 
stable. 
3.4.1.3 Pasquil)1 categories. 
)tt is to be noted that the concentration variation of 
wind born substances as a function of distance and wind 
speed was initially studied by Sutton (Lees i980). The  
work was later investigated in detail by Pasquill and then 
extended by other authors such as Smith and Bryant whose 
final results were found not to be applicable to dense  
gases. The stability categories derived by Pasquill and 
which are relevant in atmospheric dispsrsion 9 are shown in 
Table A030 
The PasquiLL stability categories are used to determine 
the dispersion coefficients () and () as functions of 
the distance (x) travelled down wind in the  
PasquiLl-Gifford equations, and to define the parameters 
(height and length) of a continuous point source at ground 
level in the PasquiLl equations. 
3.4.2 Release Phenomena. 
3.4.2.1 General considerations. 
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Th. purpose of this subsection is to examine the 
diffsrsnt aop2cto of release and their InlRuenco on 
subsequent behaviour of the product(s) rassd0 Et is not 
Intended to covr all the pcts which may Road to 
leaking products. The cases of particular interest in this 
subsection are those dealing with pressure vessels and 
pressurised or refrigerated storage tanks 
tf any of these items of equipment were to fail  
liberating its content or part of Itq the manner with 
which the product is released plays a dominant ros in the 
formation and dispersion of a vapour cloud up to the point 
where atmospheric effects and gravity spreading become the 
main dispersing factors0 
Hn a chemical or petrochemical p)1ant, gas products which 
may be flammable, toxic or both flammable and toxic arep  
depending on their physical propertles p stored in a )1iuid 
state either in pressure tanks at atmospheric temperature 
or in refrigerated tanks at atmospheric pressure or even 
in pressurised tanks submitted to semi-rsfrisration0 
After a failure has occuredp and d2pending on ths sirs 
and location of the aperture together with the storage 
conditions and the cross section of the vessel the 
leaking product can be either gas or liquid or a to phs 
mixture. The conditions of storage will determine whether 
or not the leakage occurs under pressure and whether it is 
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a vapour or liquid jet. Each of these cass is QXQfflLnQd in 
some detail below. 
3.4.2.2 Pressurised tank - Small hole in a vapour spac0 
Xt is considered that the orifice through which the 
vapour emerges is relatively small with rlation to the  
surface of the liquid or the cross section of the tank0 Rn 
the Loss Prevention Bulletin No. 38 the size of the hole  
is defined as R = ah/As <<1 where 'ah' and s' are 
respectively the hole area and the surface area of the 
Liquid in the tank. 
Xn such a -case s, when a puncture has occurd in a 
pressure tank above its liquid lsvsl only pure vapour is 
emitted at the pressure in the tank until the whole 
evaporation of the Liquid. The vapour is rsassd at a 
rats which can be calculated making uss of the  
thermodynamic propsrtiss of the gas in qusstion ths 
pressure in the vssssl and the area of the breach. 
Because of the small sis of the apsrturs and the 
relatively high pressure under which the gas sscapssp the 
jet is easily mixed with the air entrained and is diluted 
to such a concentration that it is not dansrous at a 
small distance from the exit point for a flammable gas,  
but which may be hazardous oven at a rsmots location for a 
toxic one. Gsnrally, high wind speeds promote dilution by 
the turbulence created and lead to a decrease in the 
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hard distance. 
3.4.2.3 Pressurised tank -Large hole in a vapour space 
(catastrophicfailure).  
A catastrophic failure of a pressure tank or vcsL i 
one which occurs within a very short time forminçi a large 
opening in the tank or leading to its fragmentation into 
few large pieces. 
As already mentioned above in the design and fabrication 
stages q the fact that pressure tanks are designed and 
fabricated according to high standards doss not prevent 
them from failing. In the EFCE publication sriss No. 33 
vol. 1 Seifert et a1 (1983) pointed it out in this 
°°Xn spits of 	the 	high safety standards 	in 
constructing 	and operating chemical plants the 
occursncs of failures cannot be completely excluded".  
The main difference in a catastrophic failure with 
relation to a small Leak from an aperture in vapour space 
Liss in the phenomenon of"Flashing" which occurs when a 
Liquid gas stored in a pressure tank is suddenly submitted 
to a Loss of pressure. In the conditions of storage prior 
to the failure, the liquid is in equilibrium with its 
vapour at the pressure and the temperature of storage-  
After the failure has occured g a new equilibrium is set up 
at atmospheric pressure and the atmospheric boiling point 




largo extent on the Initial conditions of 
storage prior to the failure. Figure A4 for example,  
shows that the theoretical adiabatic flashing fraction 
(TAFF) for a sthi rage temperature of 30 oC is equal tos.  
40% for propane 
22% for chlorine and ammonia 
207 for butane 
Ls (1980) set up the following equation for the  
calculation of the flashing fraction () 
4- 	 (S0 ea)1 	
303 
ANY 
Where Cp is the specific heat of the substance at 
constant pressure (J/Oo AHv the specific heat of 
vaporisation (J/) 1 and 92 are the Initial and final 
tmpraurs (0) 
For propane the values are-.  
Cp = 240 J/ 
/Hv = 3417 J/çj 
1 =303o( 
(92 = 231 oK 
Replacing each parameter by its value in equation 303 
will give 
0 = 40°h which coincides with the value mentioned above. 
Xn a pressure tank when the ambient temperature  
increases the pressure also Increases and q in the event of 
a sudden laiRuru v Leads to a high percentage of )liquid 
flashing into vapour. 
Attention must be drawn to the fact that the TAFF is 
theoretical and does not indicate a full representation of 
the extent to which vapour flashes off. As already pointed 
out above the fraction can be calculated making use of the 
thermodynamic properties of the substance concerned 
(Equation 303)0 
The calculation of the TAFF is simplified by assuming 
that the vapour flashed off remains in equilibrium with 
the remaining Liquid at its boiling point0 During the 
flashing the vapour released picks up its latent heat of 
vaporisation from the remaining liquid which cools down. 
The other assumption made is that the process is 
adiabatic which is not true0 tn fact 9 the flashing 
fraction takes heat from the surroundings a process by 
which it is again heated. 
)f the temperature and pressure at which a certain 
liquefied gas is stored are relatively high, for example 
on a summer day in a hot country 9 when the pressure in the 
tank falls suddenly to the atmospheric pressure 9 the 
content of the tank is thrown to the atmosphere with a 
certain vigour that 9 in addition to the flashing fraction 9 
a great amount if not all of the Liquid is entrained in 
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the form of small droplets. The turbulence created during 
the release allows for a great quantity of air to be  
with the fine droplets. The heat exchange between the air 
and these droplets is sufficient to maintain them air 
borne in the form of an aerosol. 
Kaiser (Loss Prevention Bulletin No. 38) reported that 
experiments carried out by XC]C using liquefied ammonia 
stored at 20 oC in dar flask shod that when the  
ammonia was suddenly rLasd 9 about 20% of it fRashd off 
Into vapour g the remaining 80% (as Liquid at Ltiz boiling 
point -33 oC) became rapidly airborne and owns ol it fs'Ll 
back to the ground. 
Similar experiments were reported by E1aursr st an. 
(1977) to have been carried out in W05t Germany using 
Liquid propylsns in quantities ranging from 0.224 to 40 
Kg contained in cylindrical tanks The tanks were made to 
fail instantaneously. It was noticsd that the propylsns 
became airborne in all the experiments and nothing of it 
remained in the tank. The experiments were conducted in 
order to model vapour cloud dispersion and dsflaration0 
As will be seen lat2r q catastrophic failure of tanks 
containing liquefied gases stored above their atmospheric 
boiling points alays give rise to vapour cLouds whose  
behaviour depends to a large extent on the conditions of 
ztorage q the atmospheric conditions and the nature of the 
terrain downwind of the release. 
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3.4.2.4 Pressurized tank-Hole in 3 1tiuid upco0 
Xn a pressure tank the product utorud can oucapo au 3 
liquid Jet in to different manners. 91 the breach occurs 
directly in the tank wall the jet of liquid emerging at 
the pressure in the tank takesp first q a cylindrical shape  
consisting of unflashd liquid which then flashs rapidly 
causing the jet to expand forming a mixturz of vapour and 
droplets. As the Jet emerges with a certain vigour the  
flashing vapour is accompanied by a fraction of small 
droplets which pick up heat from the mixed air and 
evaporate causing the jet to expand more and more. 
Here again Kaiser stated that blodon experiments in 
which steam Liquid under pressure as caused tO 2SC&PO  
through an aperture in the liquid space showed that the  
half angle of the jet in some circumstances exceeded 90' 
Comparativly, in a pure vapour it the half angle is of 
the order of 6' The discharge rate G" (kg/m20) for a 




Where Cd is a coefficient of 
edge orifice and unity for 
vsssL) the density of th 
upstream stagnation pressure  
downstream pressure (s/m2)0 
discharge (062 for a sharp 
a well rounded nozzle on a 
liquid (kg/m3)- P1 the  
in the tank (/m2 )5 P2 
/:C \ 
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Another possibility of the Jet escaping from a puncture 
in a liquid space is through a length of pipe connected or 
welded to the tanks Hn such a case the jet, most of the 
time flashes in the pipe giving rise to a to phase Jet 
emering in the atmosphere. The pressure drop at the exit 
of the pipe causes further flashing of the remaining 
liquid. Here again the discharge rate' (G) is given by 
G C [2f ( P 	 30 
Where 0 9 Cd 9 P and ri are the same as in equation 34 
Pc is the critical exit pressure (N/m2)0 
The pressure Pc is a function of the length/diameter 
ratio (hid) off the pipe. 
Two phase flow of a fluid in a pipe has been treated by 
Fauske (1962) 
)Cn both cases once the evaporating process is finished 
the cloud formed will disperse as a plume of heavy gas 
3=42 	Spillage of refrigerated liquid. 
Unlike Liquefied gases stored at atmospheric temperature 
in pressure tanks 9 those stored at atmospheric pressure in 
refrigerated ones behave in a less vigorous manner when 
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released. The lack of stored energy in the form of a 
static pressure in refrigerated  storags causes the bulk 
liquid when, it comes into contact with the ground (should 
the tank fail) 9 to exhibit a short vigorous boiling and 
then stabilise at a steady lower rats of vaporisation when 
the ground has cooled. The rates of evaporation can be 
calculated using the following equations developed by 
Clancay (1974a)0 
i)]tnitial rapid evaporation-.  
w(es - 	 307 




is the mass vaporised within one minute (g/c) 
E the steady rats of evaporation 	(g/cm2 ) 	93 	the 
temperature of liquid (o) 9s the temperature of 
substrate (oK) and ki and k2 are to constants which 
depend on the nature of the soil on which the spill has 
occursd £,Hv the latent. heat of vaporisation (Jig)0 
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It 	is 	to 	be noted, hov'r, that the rate of  
vaporisation depends also on the surface area of contact 
as with increasing area the amount of hat by conduction 
from the soil increases. But, in practice a storage tank 
is always subicthd to a secondary containment in the or 
of a bund in order to prevent the spillage getting out of  
control. The ground and walls of such a ontainint once  
in contact with the refrigerated liquid cool down rapidly. 
As a consequence, the evaporation rate decreases and 
stabilises according to equation 38 In such a situation 
pure vapour escapes from the pool of liquid formed and 
depending on whether it is buoyant or heavy (see 3,43) 
will disperse either in a conventional Gaussian 
distribution model or in a gravitational slumping model. 
I1 9 in the absence of a secondary containmsnt 9 the  
liquid were to be released over a large ara 9 the radius 
of the boiling pool continues to grow with time in the  
same way as a dense vapour cloud or a collapsing column of 
liquid(equation (P6) 
With the increasing area covered by the spillage the  
rate of evaporation increases in such a way that it might 
form a dangerous vapour cloud. 
When a refrigerated liquefied gas is spilt onto water, 
and assuming that there is no chemical interaction (g 
LNG) 9 the radius of the boiling pool grows nearly in the 
same way as it would on an open area as shown above. The 
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rate of heat supply per unit area in this Lit case  
remains constant since warm water is continually brought 
Into contact with the pool of liquid gas. It is what makes 
the difference with a spillage onto land. 
Certain gases q when spilt onto water, dissolve in some  
proportion (6/ for ammonia). The heat of reaction 
released plays a great role in heating more the remaining 
Liquid causing it to boil vigorously. The turbulence then 
generated will entrain air and droplets of both water and 
liquid ammonia. 
3.4.3 Vapour Cloud generation And Dispersion. 
As mentioned above in 3.4.2 the mode of failure has a 
profound effect on the subsequent behaviour of the cloud. 
This section will specifically deal with a study 
concerning the formation and dispersion of a vapour cloud 
emanating from a catastrophic failure of a pressure  
storage tank. 
Unlike light gases which are asily dispersed just after 
having been released, dense vapours are difficult to 
disperse above all in calm weather conditions and may, as 
will be seen later, travel a long distance downwind before  
they are - completely dispersed. In doing so heavy gases 
pass through four main stages in which different physical 
processes play a major role. These are listed in sequence  
below-.  
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a-The initial stags which comes just after the release  
has occurd and which can be aflld"The source term" 
consisting essenhially of those effects such as 
flash-off entrainment of liquid droplts and air,  
density and stabilisation of the cloud 
b-The gravity spreading stage or slumping during which 
the cloud picks up air in small proportions and heat 
from the surroundings. This phase is dominated by the  
density effects. 
c-The entrainment stags which cons .ists of the 
admixture of air in the cloud so that its density is 
progressively rsducsd 
d-The passive dispersion stags in which tho density of 
the cloud has nearly equalised that of the surrounding 
atmosphere. The subsequent dispersion is thus trsatsd 
using conventional Gaussian dispersion models. 
However, in reality there ars&ditinct boundaries 
between the four stages. Each of them is discussed 
separately bsLot0 
Source term.  
iWlash-off0 
This phenomenon has already been discussed in 3.4.2.3 
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above 
ii)Entrainmnt of liquid droplets. 
This process occurs nearly in the same way as the  
flash-off so that after a sudden failure has occurd 9 a 
certain fraction of fine droplets accompany the vapour 
fraction as t)IL The amount of product thrown as 
droplets is also a function of the storage and release 
conditions 
1L. 
From the experiments conducted by ECK and rfcrd to 
above the following factors have been found to he of 
paramount importance. 
-The rate of release showed that the fraction was 
almost zero when the ammonia escaped in a vapour 
state through a small pips connected to the vapour 
phase of the tank and reached, apparntly, its 
maximum (80% of the total airborne mass) wwhen the  
tank was caused to fail suddenly. 
-The location of the aperture in the tank plays 
significant role. Even for a small orifice below the  
liquid level the fraction of the liquid which becomes 
airborne is still important at now rates of release. 
On the other hand if the hole is relatively small 
and located sufficiently above the liquid lv')1 the  
rate of airborne liquid is zero. 
-The pressure of storage. As mentioned in 3,4,2 there  
are two extreme conditions of storage of liquefied 
assg Pressurised and refrigerated tanks0 Meanwhile,  
large capacity tanks (1 9 000 to 2,000 To) containing 
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ammonia for example, are subjected to a combination 
of the to processes. Unlike substances stored in 
fully pressurised tanks those contained in 
semi-refrigerated ones possess a small amount of 
stored energy. Thus the 'fficincy of the bu.k 
boiling process following a catastrophic failure is 
relatively low. As a result only a small prcntag 
of the content of the tank flashes off and rains 
airborne. 
-A fourth factor which may be of some importance in 
estimating the airborne quantity of a given product 
is the value of the relative humidity in the  
atmosphere. With an atmosphere of high relative 
humidity the water vapour contained in the ntraind 
air is condensed when mixed with the co'd cloud 
containing aerosol droplets. The hat exchange serves 
to evaporate the aerosol so that it rains airborne 
as w11 
iii)Entrainmnt of air.  
The sudden failure of a pressurised storage tank 
creates a violent turbulence in the atmosphere so that 
air is inevitably mixed in The amount entrained is 
closely dependent on the same factors influencing the 
f Lash-off and aerosol droplets (these are the  
conditions of storage and release). Although this 
quantity is subjected to too much uncertainty it can 
hosvr, be estimated from information based on roan 
incidents. 
n this topic the initial mixing with air can be 
approximated making use of the accounts emanating from 
the incident which occured at Potchefstroom South 
Africa (1973) in which a pressure tank failed 
catastrophically giving release to 40 m3 of ammonia 
The incident has been reported in Fryer at an. (1978) 
and in Kaiser and Walker (1978) 
According to the papers, accounts from eye witnesses 
revealed that the release had given rise to a 
cylindrical cloud with about 10m in diameter and 20m 
in depth. Assuming that all the ammonia released 
remained airborne and was in the visible cloud (at lot 
values of relative humidity the cloud is not visible in 
the low concentration range) the dimensions correspond 
approximately to an air/ammonia mass ratio of 10/1w 
This value has been used in the calculation developed 
in chapter 4 
As stated above 9 the humidity in the atmosphere has a 
role to play in evaporating the whole quantity of the 
ammonia. The greater the humidity the greater the 
latent heat of condensation supplied to vaporise the 
aerosol and maintain it airborne as vapour. Conversely, 
when the humidity in the atmosphere is now a greater 
amount of air is required to maintain all the aerosol 
airborne. Kletz (1989) has stated that when a great 
quantity of liquefied gas is involved in a single 
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failure, the turbulence generated is such that it As  
not possible to entrain enough air to enable all the  
release to become aerosol and rain airborne. Xn such 
a case a pool of liquid forms and evaporates  
progressively as if it has come from a rfriratd 
tank 
iv)1nsity of the ixtur0 
The fact that a vapour cloud Is dnr than the  
surrounding air does not necessarily mean that the  
molecular weight of the as forming the cloud is 
greater than that of air0 Megson and Griffiths 1984 
stated that the subject had been discussed by 13rittr 
and Griffiths U982a who had proposed four categories 
In all The catorisation which was believed to cover 
most of the cases was based on material properties. 
-Substances with greater molecular weight than that 
of air and which, in Most situations, form dense  
gas/air mixtures. Chlorine, propane, butane, tc0 are  
exampleo of such gases. Among thesop rls of 
chlorine using coMprssd air during the first World 
War seem to outweigh by far the number and quantities 
conducted for purposes of study. The displacement of 
the vapour cloud formed very close to tho ground 
(filling all empty spaces Including trenches and 
craters) 	ohowed clearly the vidnc 	of higher 
density than air. 
]t is to point out hovr, that apart from the  
toxic effect which motivated the release in wartime g  
I'-ji. 
no other advantage was taken to study the dispersion 
process though the releases were carefully planned 
and executed. 
-Materials with Lower molecular weight than that of 
air but when released at their atmospheric boiling 
21 
points from refrigerated containits form dense 
gas/air mixtures. For example methane. 
-Materials with molecular weight Rower than that of 
air and when escaping in a vapour state at their 
atmospheric boiling points are less dense than the 
surrounding air, but under certain circumstances of 
release (see 32) may form dense clouds with the 
admixture of air0 In this category the material which 
has been of most interest in the literature, probably 
because of its large industrial use, toxicity and 
implication in real incidents, is ammonia0 Its case 
will be examined in more detail later. 
-Material with nominal molecular weights Rower than 
that of air but which may have a greater molecular 
weight fraction induced by molecular association 
(e0g0 hexamer formation in hydrogen fluoride). This 
category is not considered in the present study. 
The cases of release of type (3) to which ammonia 
belongs have a tendency of liquid airborne formation 
during the release from a pressurised containment. The 
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airborne liquid in the form of small droplets plays a 
oiificant role in whether or not the vapour cloud 
becomes denser than the surrounding air. 
When considering the behaviour of this type of products 
one will have to focus on the conditions in which the 
substance behaves as a dense cloud or a neutral ons. Throe 
main factors namely the airborne liquid fraction the 
relative humidity and the temperature will determine the 
behaviour. The combination of these factors wAth the 
conditions of storage preceedAng the failure will lad in 
the escape of ammonia to the formation of a mixture of 
vapour, fins droplets of ammonlap and air. 
The variation of the density is displayed in figures 
and A6 reproduced from Haddock and Williams SR/103 
1978) 	Both of the figures Indicate the changes in 
densities of the cloud as a function of the airborne 
liquid fraction and the quantity of air mixed in at an 
ambisnt temperature of 20 oC0 They show that for initial 
value of aerosol comprised between 4% and % of the total 
airborne fraction of ammonLa p ths cloud rmains Ross dense 
than the surrounding air what2vor the value of the 
relative humidity. H1 9 on the other hand, the initial 
airborne fraction (in the form of aerosol droplets) is 
equal to or groator than 16% of the total airborne 
fraction the vapour cloud remains denser than the ambisnt 
air rardlsss of the humidity0 istssn the to critical 
values (4-8X and 16%)  the density of the mixturs will be 
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trthd by the humidity and the dilution with air. High 
cloud densities occur when atmospheric humidity Is now.  
v)Stabilisatthn and initial speed of the cloud0 
Accounts from 	 of the 	tchftroo 
incident, Lonsdala q South Africa (1974) and th 
experiments carried out by Van 1lldn in the thrland 
using Fron-12 9 support the fact that 9 a law moments after 
a catastrophic failure has occurd and all or most of the  
material released has become airborn 9 ths turbulnc 
created by the sudden ejection of ths product is 
progressively dissipated and the cloud formed takes a near 
cylindrical shaps Once the turbulence has coplsthly disd 
atay 9 the sntraimiisnt of air still takes p)lacs but is 
sharply reduced so that for a certain lapse of time the 
cylinder of cloud appears somewhat stable and starts to 
move downwind. The ratio of the height and the radius is 
difficult to establish, and in the lack of reliable 
information it is taken as 1/1 The ratio of air and gas 
is taken to be at Roast 101 (after Fraysr at £109 1978 
and the initial velocity of the vapour cloud is assumed to 
be equal to the average wind speed. 
3.4.3.2 Gravity spreading phase (Slumping). 
i) General considerations. 
The phenomenon of gravity spreading in the early stags 
of 	dense vapour diprion lo g probably the 	i1n 
characteristic which difforontiato them fro 
vapours which disperse according to the normal SauooLan 
model. The evidence of gravity spreading 	following 
instantaneous release of 	liquefied gases has been 
illustrated in both experiments and real Incidents.  
As far as heavy gas2o are concerned, van Uldn seems to 
have been the first to draw attention to the  
inapplicability of the normal Gaussian dispersion. LHJi 
th2Cry q which will be discussed Litr, tested by an 
experiment conducted in October 1973 Vin Uldn 1974) The  
experiment which consisted of a near inotantanacuo rs 
of 1000 (g of Fron-12 poured onto water, was sponsored 
by the Dutch Ministry Of Social Affairs. 
After the Freon-12 had been reRoased p it was noticed 
that a vigorous bulk boiling occurd for about 5 secondu. 
The turbulence generated by the boiling allod for 
cloud consisting of a mixture of Freon-12 and air to form. 
The cloud whose volume as some 2 9 400 m3 took an 
approximate shape of a cylinder. The volume indicated that 
the amount of air entrained during the boiling process was 
of the order of ten times the volume of the Fron with an 
initial density of 1.25 times that of the ambient air. 
Once the cylindrical shape had been formed, the cloud 
started immediately to spread under the gravity effect in 
all directions. 
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Cn the UK 9 the Health and Safety Executive with the 
participation of some European countries hasp in the same 
Yp sponsored a series of experiments using the 
product Fron-120 These experiments will be looked at in 
details in 35 
In addition to the 	 ork actuail incidents 
dealing with large scale releases of liquefied gases 
whether from storage vesseRs q rail or road tankers, and 
pipelines, have provided good svidsnc as far Q0 
gravitational slumping is concerned. Among the products 
involved in the Incidents, ammonia is the best documented 
in the literature. Some of the Incidents are briefly 
summarised below.- 
-A road pressure tanker carrying about 19Ts of anhydrous 
ammonia crashed on a motorway near Houston, Texas on ii 
May 1976 All the content of the tank was rapidly released  
and spread over a large area. The phenomenon of 
gravitational slumping is clearly stiphasissd in fig. A07 
and A.S.The photographs show respectively the 
configuration of the cloud taken some tan minutes after 
the crash and the area of the grass burnt by the escaping 
ammonia. The second photograph was taken a few days Rater 
from a helicopter. The extent of the area showing the 
burned grass is consistent with the gravity driven 
slumping. 
-Another incident involving ammonia and rsfsrrsd to 
earlier occurd at Potchefstroom, South Africa on 13 July 
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1973 The 	tor 	tank, during a transfer operation,  
failed catastrophically liberating some 4OTe of anhydrouo  
&rtiioni10 Although it Is nrUy difficult to obtain 
ufu1 information from eve-wLtneosus. accounts roorthd 
that the visible cloud spread rapidly over a largo area  
making ai cylinder with 20m in height and 10 in diameter. 
-A train derailment at Pnaco1a, Florida, in which some 
4OTe of ammonia escaped rapidly from a punctured tank,  
ocurd on 9 November 1977 The cloud formed was said to 
have been picked up on the radar of the nearby airport. In 
minutes the diameter of the cloud had Increased to about 
one mile. 
-Two pipeline incidents occurd on the same pipe at 
different locations. The first took place on 6 December 
1973 at Conway, Kansas, and the second on August 1974 at 
HutchinsonKansas. In the formr incident about 230Th of 
ammonia escaped in half an hour wheroas in the Ratter som 
330Th were released ever a period of nearly an hour. 
Another train derailment which took place on ii. February 
1961 in Louisiana in which a tank was punctured, allowed 
for 30Th of chlorine to escape. After having travelled 
three miles downwind, the vapour cloud was observed to be  
about three miles across. 
ii) Density spread. 
When considering heavy gas dispersionp Van ULdn assumes 
that dense vapour clouds, once formed, spread in all 
directions in the same ay as a collapsing volume of 
liquid resulting from a dam burst in which the heading  
edge of the atr has the apperance of a wall advancing 
occording to the following xprssion0 
 3.9 
La 	- 	- 	 3OiO 
The velocity of the edge 1$1 is also the rate of the  
growth of the radius dR/dt0 
Van U1Idn found that the value of 1 for the constant 
is in satisfactory agreement with hiz experimental 
rssul ts0 
During the slumping phase the area and consequently th 
radius of the cloud incsass while its height diminih0 
The process may be considered as a conversion of the cloud 
initial gravitational potantial energy into kinetic 
nrçiy.  
Experiments conducted by Van Uldn shod that height 
and radius variations in heavy gas dispersion ar 
different from those of passive clouds (to be defined 
later) whose dispersion is governed by the conventional 
Gaussian mDdsL, 
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A Gaussian model when applied to dense vapour cods 
overestimates the variation of the height and 
underestimate that of the radius. Comparative results with 
Van U1dn measurements are shown in figures A09 (a and b) 
and AO100 Figure A09(a) indicates the variation of the 
height of the cloud with relation to the Liquid column 
Integration of equation 39 givess 




Where Op 	9 V0 ?,eL are the va1ss of R 9 	p V 	at time 
t=O 
Equation 311 gives the value of the radius R at 
different times M. 
In the first stage of his experiments 9 Van Undo 
neglected the influence of windp atmospheric turbulence  
and mixing with air during the sLupin0 In this case the 
volume and density of the cloud are supposed to remain the 
same and its temperature is that of the atmospheric 
boiling point of the gas in question. Van Ulden noticed 
o/ 
also that the rate of spread of the cloud depends 9,1 the 
relative density difference. For small vanues g the front 
edge advances slowly and is very distinct. 
iii) The influence of atmosphric thrnc0 
The fact that wind and turbulence have been neglected 
above is an oversimplification. In reality they are almost 
always present in the atmosphere. Their effects on a 
slumping cloud cause it to travel downwind of the release 
and mix with air so that its density is progressively 
reduced. The mixing takes place at the top surface and at 
the edge of the cloud. In this way the rate of growth of 
the cloud volume is as follows-.  
oV 	Z1RuL 	 (Brighton, 198) 312 
CLY 	Top entrainment velocity. 
Edge entrainment 313 
In 	the early stages of the study of heavy gas 
dispersion, Van Ulden claimed that the vertical mixing 
with air due to the atmospheric turbulence is inhibited by 
the density effect and put U.=00 Later on 9 Germeless and 
Drake (1975) 9 assumed in their box model that the 
entrainment is proportional to the local velocity 
difference generated by mechanical friction over the top 
surface, and they took no account of the edge mixing. Such 
a suggestion 9 however, leads to difficulties in near zero 
wind speed there mechanical turbulence is at its lowest 
value. They set U..=°('Ef =00 Since lif is different from 
zero it implies that the constant is taken equal to Eero. 
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t is car that both of the suptthn 	unlikely to 
be dquat and recent experiments carried out at Porthn 
Don using 100kg "puffs" of Fron-12 suggested that the  
value of 000 as different from ro allowing for the dg 
entrainment to be considered. Concerning top entrainmentp 
Cox and Roe (1977) suggest that it should be dependent on 
some form of the Richardson number (RI) and puts 
UJLr 	ki 	
314 
With 	 01 
ro 
Equation 	314 is valid only when Ut<<U1 (for high 
Richardson numbers) 
Pickn&ct (1978) on the other hand, adopted a simplified 
model or expression by putting 
Ur 	a 	 3.16  





Richardson numbei  
3013 it can be seen that if 	tends to 
number tends to sro and Ut tends to 
difficulty can be resolved by th 
beyond which the gravity spreading and 
dpndics are no longer significant. 
iv) The influence of terrain. 
PACE 70 
The nature of the terrain whether upwind or downwind of 
the release has a significant influence on the dispersion 
of vapour clouds. HiUs honnowo v slops and vUys hav 
a great tendency to enhance the turbulence of the air 
stream which in its turn promotes dilution Reading to a 
decrease in the hazard distance (which is a function of 
the nature of the products rlasd)0 
As dense vapour clouds move very close to the ground, 
their interaction with structures generate high localised 
turbulences which once again participate in a more 
effective dilution0 what is more, features like downhill 
Slopes and dykes usually guido clouds in diffrnt 
directions, sometimes opposite to the wind direction. This 
is due to the fact that when the cloud is trapped in such 
features, it is no longer submitted to the affect of the  
wind, and under the sole effects of density spread can 
move freely. 
v) Cloud heating. 
It was mentioned above that onc2 the cloud is complstsly 
formed and starts to travel downwind 9 its initial 
triipraturs is that of the atiiosphsric boiling point of 
the substance involved in the cloud. It is th2 tspraturs 
difference between the cloud and its surroundings that 
allows for the heat transfer to take place. The cloud 
picks up heat in the following ways 
-Natural convection. 
If the convection is laminar the rats at which the cloud 
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picks up ht from the ground Is iv by 




2. 	 3. 19 
3.20 LK' 
)Cf the convection is turbulent the heating rate isB  
Qc 	 (& 	
) 	
321 
The convection Is turbulent if 
30 0 	




For a local velocity (Vr) of the cloud the local rate of 
heating is given by8 
fjL Cp 	VjL AT  9 	
3.23 
 
The local velocity Vr is a function of the velocity of 
the 	 of the slumping cloud r/t 
324 
R 
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Where ru. is the radial distance from the centre of the  
slumping cloud. 
From equation 324 it can be deduced that for any given 
radial distance ri different from ro the rat.e of heating 
of the cloud is maximum at the beginning of the slumping  
and decreases with the decreasing velocity of the Edge of 
the cloud. 
The authors of Appendix 14 Canvey )Island Study 2978 
from which Equations 3 . 23p 324 and 3025 have been taken,  
stated that the velocity Vr at which there Ao an 
Equalisation between the rates of hating duo to natural 
turbulence and forced convection Lo approximatly iOm/s. 
Compared with the experiments conducted by Van Uldsn in 
which the cloud moved at a velocity of 3 m/sEc the forced 
convection is by far less dominant with respect to natural 
turbulent convection and can therefore be ignorsd0 
-Conduction through wi]10 
32 
kAC (WI)t 
-Heating by the sun. 
In addition to the modes of heating Indicated, and 
depending on the atmospheric stability, the cloud may be 
heated by the sun if the release were to occur during day 
PAGE 73 
time. In neutral weather condition the heat flux from the  
sun is zero and the temp erature of the ground is equal to 
that of air. 
The rate of heating by insolation depends on the  
capacity of absorption by the cloudwhich d epends on the  
nature of the substanc0 a dry ammonia/air mixture for 
instance is virtually transparent to the spectrum of th e  
sun's radiation. 
From the loregoing g it appears that conv ection by 
natural turbul ence is the dominant factor in the h eating  
of the cloud. Hence the rate of Increase of temperature is 
g iven by 
2 
aT 	0L1 - g L 
+ rnCp 
When air is mix ed in during the slu mping phase, the rate 
of increase of temperature due to the admixture of air is 
expressed as follows s.  
dT 
	d-/4b 	 327 
( Cp4 ~ (ms. Cp 
Thus the overall rate of increase of temperature is-. 
2 




M& 	 cL v 
otg 	fa- 7fR Ibr; 3.29 
Equations 3.28 9 329 and 3 . 11 written in the fo llow ing  
dR 	r?)v T" forms 	 set of 	three  
L ?o7r 	J 
di f ferential equa tions which can be ovd numerica lly to 
determine the incr ease of the radius 1P the of air 
(1) mixed in and the temp erature (1) with time M. 
The following 	quaitions are required to solve the  
probLm. 
	
* ,-yn 	 3030 
0 
m ~ mi 	 303 i 
Calculations done by some authors hays rsvsalsd that tOs 
heat picked up by the cloud from the surroundin gs does not 
affect too much its general behaviour. (aissr and Walker 
(1978) 9 and Fryer et al. (1978) pointed out that the 
growth of the radius is not greatly affected by the 
inclusion of cloud heatin g . 
vi) Termination of slumping and transition to passiv 
dispersion. 
Since a slumping cloud is continually heated and diluted 
with air, its d ensity decreases progressively so that 
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there comes a time hsn it is nearly aquan to that of the 
surrounding iir0 At this stage the toud ceases to URUMP 
and the atmospheric turbulence becomes the dominant factor 
in the rest of the dispersion. 
Van ULdn states that the 	upin occurs when th 
turbuRent: energy expressed by 	Doc is equal to the  
average potential energy difference between tho heavy Sao 
-J r Pa) ?)] cloud and the surroundira 	iirL 0000000 	 0hich 	is 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 SO 
2c 
During the spread of the cloud there is a gradual 
decrease in both the height and the front velocity so that 
there comes a moment when the density (A of the cloud is 
assumed to be equal to that of air Thus equation 332 
becomes ,. 
Mt 3033 
The friction velocity can be xprsssed as 
KIA 3034 
Ones the slumping has occursd 9 the subsequent dispersion 
of the cloud can be treated using the conventional 
Gaussian dispersion aiodsL applicable to nutraiR]1y buoyant 
pulls. This is expressed as foLlos for a puff rs)Isaissd at 
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ground level-. 
&PII 	
Y 	 )II C o L T 	 J 
Van Uldn states that when the slumping haia occurd 9 ths 
boundaries of the cloud are defined by a concentration 
whose value is ten times less than that at the centre of 
the 	cloud. This 	sdçjs concentration in 
distribution coincides with 	214 times the standard 
deviation 
Thus 	 33 
2.-ftGL 
3037 
The entraLnment Stage- 
At the and of the slumping the radius and consquntly 
the top surface of the cloud is very large so that 
admixture of air from the top becomes the dominant factor0 
lEn Brighton (1935) the variation of the volume of the 




V _ __  
' /0 - c a ) 
R i o 	/2oY (d3   
3039 
() is vry much less than unity o that in the  sarly 
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stage of the slumping dilution with air is 	airliy 





After a Long time has elapsed and the top surface of the 
cloud has become vary great with respect to its height,  
& 








3.4.3.4 Passive dispersion. 
U In this stage the cloud is dispersed occording to 
equation 3.35.In Van 	dens experiments 9 it was noticed 
that the radius of the cloud continues to grow in the same 
y as in equation 3 	0 The height , Instead of 
decreasing, started to grow at a rate of one third that of 
passive cloud in class F weather conditions. 
From equations 3.36 and 337 we can deduce the following  
expressions for standard deviations which vary with 
varying (40 and R 
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1- 	 3043 
21 
6-Y 	R 	 3044 
In passive dispersion. 
IL 
L 3 J 
1i concentration fluctuations. 
Theoretically the concentration within the cloud is 
assumed to be the highest at the centre and decreases 
progressively towards the edges convntionally defined as 
the boundaries at which a certain concentration of 
interest is reached. This concentration is normally the  
lower flammability limit (LFL) for a flammable gas and the 
Threshold limit values (TLV) for a toxic one. This 
appears, at first sijht 9 to be obvious because the  
dilution of the vapour cloud starts at the ds and moves  
progressively towards the centre during the normal 
progress of the dispersion. 
In practicep hovsr 9 the matter is different in that 
the concentration variation is not as uniform as one may 
think. Generally the theoretical model gives a broad and 
simple picture, but random air movement in the atmosphere 
generates fluctuations in the concentration. Therefore,  
concentrations measured or predicted at any point downwind 
of the release are usually considered as "time average 
concentrations". This effect, sometimes q results for 
flammable gases, in concentrations higher or equal to the 
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LFL in points where theory predicts lower values. 
3.4.4 Heavy Gas Modelling. 
The phenomenon of gravity spreading characterising  
denser than air vapour clouds has Red to a widespread 
interest in calculating their dispersion 	in 	safety 
analysis. Over the last law years several different models  
have been developed 15 of them were tabulated by 18lackmor 
(1982) There are in all two basic categories of madeRs.  
1-Slab or "box" models. 
They are based on numerical solutions of differential 
equations dealing with external cloud parameters such as 
height and radius (the cloud is taken to be cylindrical 
with a flat top). In calculations performed using this 
type of model, it is generally assumed that the mass 
A.. 
tranfr takes place acr-oss the dnsty interface between 
the vapour cloud and air at both edge and top surface. The  
concentration within the cloud is assumed to be uniform 
and the rate of air admixture depends on those factors 
such as atmospheric turbulence, density difference and 
cloud speed. Slab models are naturally limited by the  
realism of the assumptions adopted as they do not exactly 
match the real conditions in which the dispersion takes 
place.  
2- (-type or 3-D arid models. 
They mainly deal with the Integration of numErical 
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difforontial 	ono of mass, momentum of onergy 
conservation. Mass transfer across the Interface between 
the two fluids occurs by diffusion and is proportional to 
the concentration difference. 
(-typemodels are more omplx than box modoRz and aro 
very high demanding on computing.  
Both of the two basic models have been designed to solvL-
the complexities posed by heavy gas releases. A common 
characteristic for the two models is that they both 
provide for a point at which there is a gradual transition 
to normal or neutral dispersion governed by Gaussian 
model. The point at which the transition occurs is 
generally determined by the instant when the average  
potential gravitation energy and the available turbulent 
energy are nearly equal. 
As will be seen in 3O5O3 the different models are tested 
in laboratory experiments in order to validate to some 
extent their practical use in the assessment of 
consequences which would result from real releases in 
Industrial plants. 
35 FIELD AND LABORATORY EXPERIMENTS. 
3.5.1 Spillages on Land and Water. 
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&) Introduction.  
The increasing public concern about the harmful effects 
which would result from Lars accidental releases of toxic 
or flammable substances led scintific experts to perform  
field experiments to study on a large scale the  
atmospheric dispersion of heavy gases. As already 
specified in 3.4.3 higher molecular weights q lo 
temperatures and conditions of release play a significant 
role as far as the density aspect is concerned. 
In this section we review the major reasons for 
performing field experiments and the influncs of 
different factors (spill size, type of rmR2asep material 
spillsd 9 the nature and configuration of the terrainetc.) 
on the dispersion procsss0 
b)The purpose of doing field experiments. 
Attention was called to the discrepancies observed when 
using different theoretical models to predict distances 
rachsd at a certain concentration for a spill of the uamE  
product and size. Havens (197) rsvald that the dictnc 
travelled to reach % concentration by a mthans/air 
vapour cloud resulting from the spill of 2000 m3 of purs 
LNGp was respectively 13 (m on one model and 44-E8 Km on 
another one. Such discrepancies crsatd great doubt ao far 
as the reliability of the models is concerned. Therefor 
the sole means to confirm or contradict thorstical 
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dispersion predictions was to perform field experiment 
c)Effects of spill size on initial density- 
Two main factors namely the gravity spreading and the 
inhibition of vertical mixing (due to the density gradient 
formed) characterize dense gases. The gravity spreading in 




where 	 0.4 	 3047 
The numerator and denominator in 346 represent 
respectively the initial spreading velocity and the 
ambient velocity. 
Expression 346 is also valid for an instantaneous spill 
with the initial height equal to 
	
Vo 	 304 
VT R I- 
The effect of density on vertical mixing is expressed by 
the initial Richardson numbers 
(-?) 04L 	 3049 
lEf the ambient velocity J" were to be equal to the 
friction velocity U expression 349 would be the square 
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of 3.46 therefore resulting jg (R~o  ~' pit -) 
The calculation of RIO necessitates the length scale 
to be clearly defined for each spill. Coisrin 
instantaneous spills for a given volume of gas cloud the 
initial height can vary for one spill to another. As a 
consequence the initial Richardson number varies as well. 
Apart from the height of the cloud with relation to its 
radius or top surface, the size of the cloud itself plays 
a role on whether it exhibits density effects. Continuous 
releases conducted in water flumes and reported by Iritter 
(1980) showed that dispersion was passive in lateral 
NLt< 4 
spread for 	 The plume on the other hand, 
did 	not 	extend 	upwind 	of 	the source for 
000 0000 	 00000 Concerning vertical mixing 
another series of experiments reported in Mc Quaid (1976) 
showed that the entrainment stabilised at a Richardson 
number less than 5. On this basis Puttock and i8laccmore 
(1981) suggested that density effects are no longer 
important for experiments with RIO < 100 
d)Xnstantaneous and continuous releases. 
In order to understand the process of dense gas 
dipersion 9 the experimental spills have to be conducted in 
the same way as postulated ones. In fact, three different 
types of release can occur in real incidents 
-Instantaneous releases resulting from catastrophic 
failures. 
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-Continuous releases over a long period of time 
-Xnterdiate releases over a finite period of time and 
which are considered neither insttaneous nor 
continuous 
For the three types to be categorised some criteria 
have to be defined. Puttock and 1Elackmore (194) stated 
that a spill can be considered continuous when the 
release emitted at a constant rate lasts at least until 
the lowest concentration of interest (generally 2% for 
most flammable gases) has been reached at a maximum 
distance from the source when the steady state is 
established. 
An instantaneous release is characterised by two 
factors namely the time (t) over which the release has 
occud and the bulk velocity (Ub) of the cloud formed. 
The Latter is usually taken equal to the mean wind 
speed (U) measured at a height of iOm Thus a release 
is considered instantaneous when the product U$t is 
less than the radius of the cloud at a time when the 
gravity spread velocity is one tenth the wind velocity. 
d'LL 	. 	[ 	
jJ.v/7rrJ 
10 
2. 	 3.50 
rM 	
41a 
ry The factor of ten is taken by Puttock and BRackmoro 
(1981) to be arbitrary and was chosen to mark the 
difference between two of the spills performed at 
1aplin Sands. One spill took a cylindrical shape when 
PAGE 8 5 
the left hand side of equation 30 was 5 while the 
other gave rise to a very elongated cloud for a value 
of 25. 
An intermediate spill is one within which the 
concentrations are less than those in a cloud of the 
same size but spilled rapidly and greater or equal 	to 
those of a continuous spill released at the same rate0 
e)Types of release. 
In addition to the criteria discussed in (c) and (d) 
the way and state in which the material is released 
together with the nature and configuration of the 
terrain play a significant role in the diepersion 
process. The releases performed fall into three 
different categories.- 
-Spillages of liquefied gases on land bunded by walls. 
The releases of this type were all near instantaneouc 
in a liquid state. They represent catastrophic failures 
of bunded tanks containing refrigerated liquefied cases 
(see 3425) They do not hotever, provide the 
instantaneous sources of vapour clouds required in 
dispersion studies. 
-Spillages of liquefied gases onto water. 
Unlike the first type of release the areas of spillage 
were not confined. As a result the product underwent 
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an Increasing evaporation rats as warm water was 
continually brought to the surface and the pool radius 
Increased. Such spillages can be characterized as 
Instantaneous gas rLasss0 The way in which the spill 
takes place is significant with relation to the density 
of the gas cloud formed. In a high Jet spill the  
liquefied gas may completely evaporato before reaching 
the water surface taking its heat of evaporation from 
the ambient air. The plume originating from such a 
spill would be much colder and consequently denser than 
that for which the liquefied gas takes its latent heat 
from water and entrained the same amount of air. 
-Spillages on Land of large volumes of materials 
already in a gaseous state(mixtures of 1ron 12 and 
air). 
The combination of initial height and density causes 
the gas to exhibit density spreading during which the  
admixture of air gives rise to a vapour cloud which, 
under atm°sphric conditions 9 represents the starting 
point of the dispersion process. This kind of release  
is relevant in the dispersion study of vapour clouds 
originating from catastraphic failures of pressure  
tanks containing liquefied gasss0 
f)Materia1ls spilled. 
In the two first of the three types of release  
mentioned in () above most of the sxpsrimnts involvsd 
LNG (95% methane). This was Justified by the desire to 
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improve knowledge of hazards in an area related to 
considerable public concern. -ovr, as lo pointed out 
in Puttock and i3lackor (1931) LNG does not provide 
the simplest basic dense cloud from which to develop a 
theoretical understanding. In addition to its lo 
molecular weight which tends to favour its positive  
buoyancy LNG introduces complications related to 
thermal effects. By gaining heat from the surroundings 
(ground surface and air) its buoyancy is sharply 
enhanced so that the density effect is rapidly 
dissipated. 
The other substances involved in the trials were 
oxygen., propane, chlorine, nitrogen, ammonia and freon 
12 Propane and fron 12 do not present the  
difficulties incounthrd with LNG. Their high molecular 
weights allow thsrii to remain denser than the ambient 
air even at ambient temperature (in calm weather 
conditions). Ammonia has already been shown to form 
denser than air vapour clouds when released from 
pressurised containments at its atmospheric boiling 
point. 
The xprimnts conducted up to 1982 are reported in 
tables A.4 9 A and A,60 As stated by the authors of 
these tables ths division into three groups is made for 
the reasons given in () 
Review of Some Experiments. 
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As can be seen in the tables mentioned above,  
numerous trials have so far been performed in various 
conditions. Some of the releases were deliberately 
ignited for purposes which will be discuss2d Latr0 It 
Is not necessary to give in what follows, a full 
description of all the trials as they have already been 
widely reviewed in the literature. 
Since the present work is mainly dealing with 
catastrophic failures of pressure vessels and the 
eventual ignition of the material released we will 
particularly have a brief look at two of the trials 
Listed in table A06 (third type of release) and one of 
those listed in table A.5.  
a)Maplin Sands tests. 
These tests are described in detail in Puttok and 
8lackmore (1981) They were conducted in summer 1980 by 
Shell Reseach Ltd. The experiments with quantities up 
to 3128 m3 (spill No 45 9 table A07) took place on a 
safe and remote site on the north bank of the Thames 
estuary near Foulness Island. In all 34 successfull 
spills, some of which are reported in table A07 9 were 
conducted. Of these 11 were ignited0 
Both instantaneous and continuous releases were 
performed. 4 instantaneous discharges (2 using LNG and 
2 Propane) were achieved by means of an octagonal 
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submersible barge 12m across onto water contained in an 
artificial dike 0075m high giving a pond 300m in 
diameter. The remainder were all continuous from 
150mm diameter insulated cryogenic line connected to 
the storage facility onshore. The rates of releases 
varied from 1 to 56 m3 per minute wind speeds 
recorded varied from 12 to 1000 m/s at lOm height. 
The experiments were monitored by some 360 instruments 
including gas sensors, thermocoupnesp anemometers Etc. 
These were deployed on 71 floating pontoons most of 
which were spread in the form of arcs contained within 
an angle of 90 downwind of the release point0 Most of 
the pontoons were equipped with 4m masts. The gas 
sensors were placed at heights varying from 0 to 
2.4m. Two special pontoons served for the m2asurment of 
the meteorological conditions (temperature wind speed 
and direction relative humidity, insolation etc.). The 
spills were photographed from twoRand-based towero and 
a helicopter. 
Among the 34 spills performed only 21p of which 3 were 
ignited 9 were thought to be useful They are reported 
in table A07, while the tests were being conducted some 
qualitative observations were made8 
-All the continuous propane releases showed evidence of 
density effects especially in now wind. They produced 
low and wide plumes. Exceptionally, spill 45 was 
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conducted in a very low wind (22 /s) As a result,  
the spill gave rise to a considerable upwind spreading  
of the gas 
-Concerning instantaneous propane spills, one of the  
three (No 60) was performed in a 12 mis wind.  
Accordingly, it exhibited very large density effects.  
The puff resulting from the spill was almost perfectly 
circular. Spill No 63 (with 35 miswind) took nearly 
the same shape as No 60 and was seen to be roinj in 
height as it moved away from the spill point0 
of the continuous LNG releases revealed that the  
plumes were higher and narrower that those from 
propane. Hoever, for each spill the plume behaviour 
as markedly dependent on the source type. For example 
spill 37 for which the LNG was discharged 002m below  
water level produced a highly buoyant cloud which went 
above even the nearest sensors at 40m from the source. 
Comparison between spills delivered close to the water 
surface and others at 2 to 3m height shooed that the 
plumes originating from the latter were somewhat denser 
than those from the former. 
-Among the instantaneous LNG spills 2 (No 22 and 23) 
were performed successfully and are believed to provide 
useful dispersion data after analysis. The mind speed 
as relatively high (5 m/s) with relation to the 
propane spill No 63 [n both cases the generated clouds 
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were elongated in the wind direction as if they had 
come from continuous releases. 
Some preliminary conclusions from the analysis of six 
well established steady-state spills namely 46 9 47 9 54 
56 9 39 9 15 are discussed in Puttock and l3lackmore 
(1981) 
b)Porton Down trials. 
This series of experiments which are discussed in 
detail in Picknett (1978) 9 and briefly in Puttock and 
J3lackmore (1981) 9 Jagger (1985) and Marshall (1987) 
took place in 1976 They were carried out for the 
British Health and Safety Executive (HSE) at the 
Chemical Defence Establishment, Porton Down. A total of 
42 releases, of which 35 were thought to be useful, 
were conducted. Each consisted of a 40 m3 freon 12/air 
mixture. Variable proportions were used to obtain 
initial relative densities between 103 and 4.20.The 
0 
gas was marked by orange smke before release to make 
it visible. 
The releases were initiated by means of collapsible 
plastic tents on flat grass land in different weather 
conditions using variable ground roughness and 
sometimes sloping land in order to observe their 
effects on the dispersion process. 
The development of the different gas clouds was 
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monitored by side and overhead cameras. Thir 
dimensions were measured by means of reference posts 
displayed downwind of the releases. Some continuous 
concentrations were measured at different heights and 
distances from the source using 10 concentration 
monithrs. The remainder were dosage measurements by 
some 120 gas samplers deployed at 4 different distances 
from the release point. 
The first remarks made when the experiments took place 
-The cloud was observed to slump and spread in all 
directions according to the concepts derived by Van 
Ulden 
-The initial cylindrical shape predicted 	by 	the 
different slab models was not completely true. As the 
cloud moved downwind it assumed a wedged horseshoe 
shape probably created by the stagnant air in the wake 
of the tent prior to the release. 
-Some wisps of cloud broke away from the main body. 
Preliminary analysis revealed that although this series 
of trials provided valuable data it does not form 
reliable data on which to validate models. This is 
mainly due to the scale of the experiments which does 
not match postulated incidents and some difficulties 
PAGE 93 
such as the non-uniformity of 	the cRoud q 	the 
concentration masurmnts (calibration and moloturo  
contamination of the sensors), the following of the  
cloud everywhere for sampling. 
c)Thorn2y Island trials 
This series of experiments was performed between 1982 
and 1984 by the British Maritime Technology Ltd 
(formerly National Maritime Institute) under contract 
to the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) A total cost 
17 million was supported by 38 organisation of which 
B were from overseas countries. 
The trials were conducted nearly in the same way as 
those of Porton Down but using substantial amounts of 
freon 12/air mixtures to match at least the rea l scale 
of some postulated releases. The release of gas marked 
with orange smoke was initiated by collapsing in less 
than three seconds a 12 sided container 14m in diameter 
and 13m in height. This gives a total volume of 2000 
The 29 trials performed were divided into 3 phases 
according to the configuration of the terrain. 
-In phase X v 16 trials took place 	on 	a 	flat 
unobstructed terrain. 
-In phase 11 9 10 trials were achieved with some 
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obstructions in the path of the clouds (4 with a 3m 
high impermeable lance placed on a ieo' arc at 50m 
downwind of the release point y 2 with lOm high 
permeable screen positioned as above to simulate a belt 
of trees, 4 with a 9m cube at the same distance as 
already stated to simulate isolated buildings). 
-]n phase UI 9 3 releases took place inside a fenced 
area 54x26x204m with a release rate of 5 m3/s0 
These heavy gas dispersal trials were in their turn 
monitored by side and overhead cameras. 42 masts with 
heights up to iSm and equipped with sensors and 
samplers were arranged in wedge pattern in the path of 
the cloud. Concentrations were measured down to 0,1%, 
One mast 30m high used for meteorological condition 
measurements was placed 150m upwind of the release. The 
wind speed varied between 1-2 m/s and 7-8 m/s and the 
range of the atmosphere stability was from 8 to F. 
At first sight it seems that these experiments have 
provided most of the data so for awaited for the 
validation of the physical models especially wind 
tunnel models (see below) whose extrapolations to real 
incidents are also limited. 23 papers relating to the 
trials were presented at a symposium held at Sheffield, 
England during which such topics as the design of th 
experiments, methods of intrumentation and recording, 
comparison with models and general review of the 
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results obtained were discusssd Mc. &uc CL +51S 
arrelL and McQuaid (1985) reviewed the whole range of 
trials together with those of Porton Down to sythesize 
the information needed by the HSE to predict the 
behaviour of heavy gas dispersion. The main aspects 
covered area 
i)The prediction of the consequences originating from 
accidental releases0 
ii)The analysis of past incidents in order to relate 
them to postulated ones0 
iii)The assessment of the dependability of safety cases 
provided under the 1984 CXMAH regulations. As already 
indicated immediately above,, the trials are thought to 
be very successful but the results may take a long time 
to be assimilated. 
Laboratory Experiments (Physical modelling). 
As seen above, large scale experiments have proved to 
be very expensive, time consuming and do not match the 
size of accidental releases of hazardous substances. 
Therefore, recourse to relatively much cheaper small 
scale experiments using wind and water tunnels in 
laboratories has been adopted with the aim to validate 
mathematical models and predict the likely consequences 
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of potential accidental releases. Both instantaneous  
and continuous releases were performed. 
The basis of the modelling is to perform at a very 
small scale (1/50-1/1000) heavy gas dispersion using 
gases such as carbon dioxide or freon 12 in wind 
tunnels and salted water in water flumes. )Cn such 
scaling the following dimensionless numbers are of 
significance 
JUL 
Reynolds Number (Re) = 
Froude Number (Fr) 
Density Difference Number = 
When operating wind tünn)is it is difficult to scale  
Reynolds number. At small values of Re the plume of 
heavy gas tends to laminarise. As a consequence the  
entrainment velocity diminishes significantly and the  
plume dilution may be Influenced by molecular 
diffusion. Howeverp the latter is unlikely to be 
dominant unless the entrainment has completely fallen 
to zero. 
The Froude number is another parameter which has 
proved to be difficult to match because in a model the 
wind velocity is significantly reduced. For example a 
wind speed of 3 mIs in a prototype becomes COIl mis in 
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mdcl with a scale of 1/300w The complication can be 
surmounted by the combination of the Froude number and the 
Density Difference Number to obtain what is called the 
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oussinesq approximation" (Turner 
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the source produce &L1. 
TO- 
:entrations of interest are reached. 
When applying the Richardson number a wind tunnel model 
can be run at higher wind speeds than with the Froude 
number alone. This can be realised by the use of smaller 
length scale ratios. For example 9 a scale of 1/100 gives a 
wind speed of 03 mis in a wind tunnel instead of 017 mis 
with a scale of 1/300 
A multitude of experiments were conducted at the Warren 
Spring Laboratories (WSL) 9 UK 9 The Norwegian Hydrodynamic 
Laboratories 9 The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
meteorological wind tunnel, USA etc.. The dimensions used 
are as follows 
Length 22m 
WSL Width = 403m 
height 
Length 	I8=3m 
EPA Width = 3.7m 
height = 2.1m 
At the WSL freon 12 was mixed with air to obtain 
values between 03 and 26 and was coloured 
with smoke to make it visible for photography. At the 
EPA wind tunnel carbon dioxide was made visible by 
vaporising mineral oil in its stream. 
The influence of slopes, turbulence and thermal 
effects on the dispersion mechanism were investigated 
and are discussed respectively by IBritter and Snyder 
(188) ritter (1989)O Other aspects such as surface 
roughness and atmospheric stability for which there was 
no specific studies are believed to have little 
inflence on the dispersion process. 
3,6 VAPOUR CLOUD IGNITION. 
3.6.1 Introduction. 
The previous sections of this chapter have mainly 
dealt with the different causes of failure in storage 
vessels and behaviour of the material released. 
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However when the inventory has been lost and depending 
on the conditions of releasup the immediate 
surroundings and the weather conditions to situations 
can take places.  
-The released material 	is zalzly disprd 	or 
contained 
-The material is ignited in which case ignition may 
give rise to a flash fire 9 a pool firep a fireball or 
an explosion. 
Each of the three last incidents is discussed below, 
3.6.2 Basic Concepts of Combustion. 
Fire and explosion are manifestations which arise 
from the ignition of flammable fuel/air mixtures. Two 
distinct types of flame (premixed and diffusion) can 
take place. In the first case fuel and air are mixed 
before ignition whereas in the second the mixing occurs 
in the same region as the ignition and the subsequent 
burning results in a localised diffusion flame. In 
both cases the phenomenon is well demonstrated by the 
Bunsen burner used in laboratories. 
Unlike gaseous fuels and class A liquids which at 
ambient temperature can readily give flammable mixtures 
with air 9 class 13 and C liquids require a certain 
amount of heat supply (which depends on their 
respective vapour pressures) to produce flammable 
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mixtures. These are bounded by the lower and upper 
flammability Limits (LFL and LiEU which can be determined 
using a standard apparatus such as that conceived by th 
US Bureau of Mines. 
The Rower flammability Limit tLFL of a vapour/air 
mixture is the lost concentration at which piloted 
ignition leads to sustain flame propagation. Concerning  
flammble liquids, reference is made to the flash point 
which is the Lost temperature at which the vapour 
pressure of the Liquid gives a vapour/air mixture which 
corresponds to the LFLQ 
The firpoint which is a few degrees higher than the  
flashpoint is the lost temperature at which the vapour 
pressure of the liquid is such as to produce in an open 
cup a vapour/air mixture capable of sustaining combustion 
once ignited. 
The flammability Limits of a vapour/air mixture widen 
with increase in temperature and oxygen concentration. As 
i result near limit mixtures which at ambient temperatures 
are theoretically non-flammable may be Ignited by strong 
ignition sources in the vnt of a local rise in 
temperature.  
Pressures above ambient also affect significantly the  
upper flammability Limit while they have practically no 
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influence on the lower flammability limit (Fig A11(b)) 
An ignition source can be defined as an external supply 
of energy which raises the temperature of a T1abLs 
vapour/air mixture to a certain value at which the mixture  
is capable of sustaining combustion. The ignition energy 
can be obtained by different processes (mchanica1 9 
electricai g chemical, nuclear etc.) in different forms 
(open fire, spark s, static electricity, gas lights, burning 
brandsetc.). 
Flammable mixtures can be ignited by very small amounts 
of energy produced by sparks. The minimum value is caLLdg 
"The minimum ignition energy (1XE)" ThAs q as is shown in 
figure A.12, corresponds to the minimum amount of energy 
required to ignite a mixture just on the fuel rich side of 
the stoichiomtric proportion (the latter is a mixture  
which corresponds to Just the necessary amount of air or 
oxygen needed to burn all the fuel vapour contained in the  
mixture). Table A8 shows the 1)tEE together with 
flammability data for many gaseous substancss0 
11 a flammable mixture is heated to a sufficiently high 
temperature spontaneous ignition will occur in the absence  
of any ignition source. 
The rate of flame propagation through a flammable 
mixture is characterised by"The Burning Velocity". This 
depends on such factors as the composition of the mixture  
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( it is maximum for mixtures slightly on the fuel rich 
side of stoichiomtric for most hydrocarbons) its 
temperature and pressure (it increases in both cases but 
is less significant for pressure rise). 
In addition to the factors cited just above, turbulence  
and degree of confinement contribute to enhance flame  
speed which is different from burning velocity (this is 
defined in section 3O6OO4O1)O 
Gugan (1979) states that burning velocities generally 
measured under laminar or static flow conditions range 
from about 037 to 04 rn/s for saturated hydrocarbons 
(ethane, propane) whereas for unsaturated ones they are 
higher (100 rn/s for ethylene and 1.3 rn/s for acetylene). 
3.6.3 Pool Fires. 
A pool firs can be defined as a pool of flammable liquid 
burning with a diffusion flame. To well known cases where 
POOR fires of significant sixes and defined shapes may 
occur are storage tanks and the bunds surrounding thsrn0 in 
both cases the shape taken by a burning pool is 
approximated by a right cylinder in the absence of wind 
but in most cases where wind is present the cylinder is 
oblique (lying in the wind direction) and is referred to 
by some authors as "Tinted". 
The burning rats can be expressed by the following 
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equation derived by Zabtakis (Ls 190) 
w()] 	3.52 
(. 	c/fr ) 	 3.53 
Where CL' is the diameter of the pool (cm)- VC the net 
heat of combustion (J/QJ) the total heat of 
vaporisation (J/g) A9  the liquid burning rat (cm/min)i 
' the liquid burning rate for pool of Infinite diameter 
(cm/min) and nd k% are constants (A 00076) Values 
of AS for some selected substances are given in table A9 
After the ignition has occurad and the flame has 
engulfed the whole surface of the liquid in the DDlp the  
burn up rats increases to a steady state. If the fuel is 
pure substance and the ambient conditions are unchanged 
the flame size will remain the same throughout the burning 
of the liquid and the fire will die out from the steady 
state as the fuel is exhausted. I1 9 on the other hand, the 
fuel were to be heterogeneous such as crude oil, shortly 
after reaching a maximum value 9 the burn up rote decrease 
as the more volatile constituents are burned and so does 
the flame size0 
Depending on the nature of the fuel and the size of the 
pool the flame is more or less smoky (at the top for small 
pools about 10 cm diameter and light hydrocarbons such as 
LNG, and within the flame itself in cases of large pools 
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containing high molecular products such as gasoi)I) soot 
formation is enhanced by oxygen starvation. In the end 9 
when the residue becomes richer in higher constituents 
(aromatics) 9 the flame becomes smokier, irregular and dies 
out as its temperature falls below that which corresponds 
to the fire point of the residue. This phenomenon is best 
observed when burning crude oil which contains 
hydrocarbons from Ci to C25 and higher. 
Thermal radiation and its effects for both pool fires 
and fireballs Will be discussed in 3.6.4.5. 
3.6.4Fireballs. 
3.6.4.1 Introduction. 
Unlike refrigerated liquefied gases with vapour pressure 
less than atmospheric which, if containment be lost, give 
rise to pool fires when Ignited,, those with vapour 
pressure greater than atmospheric (stored in pressure 
tanks) are very likely to give rise to fireballs. This 
phenomenon which was observed in both experiments and real 
Incidents is a manifestation which arises from the 
ignition of a vapour cloud with a rich concentration in 
the core. Once ignited, the cloud starts to burn ar.und 
its outer envelope and "lift off " to form a fireball. Such 
a scenario, generally, takes place in the event of a early 
ignition very close to the release point. A fireball is 
characterised by its diameter, duration 9 mass of fuel and 
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heat radiation. 
3.6.4.2 Mass of fuel in fireballs. 
From experiments (using vapour explosion of n-pentane) 
carried out to study the canism of fireball formation 
Hasegawa and Sato (1977) stated that when the theoretical 
adiabatic flashing fraction (TAFF) exceeded 36% almost all 
the fuel was consumed in the fireball s a part of it burned 
on the ground when the percentage was in the range 20-36°/ 
and most of the fuel burned as liquid on the ground when 
the percentage was less than 207 
3.6.4.3 Geometry and size of fireballs. 
When a vapour cloud originating from a sudden failure of 
a pressure vessel is ignited, the initial shape of the 
ensuing fireball will depend on whether the ignition takes 
place at or above ground level. From the experiments 
carried out by Hasegawa and Sato in which the ignition of 
n-pentane' took place' above ground level the fireballs 
obtained were nearly spherical. 
For vapour clouds of substantial sizes igniting at 
ground level the initial form prior to lift off is 
hemispherical. Once the combustion is initiated, the flame' 
rapidly engulfs the whole cloud causing a violent 
turbulence which promotes further dilution inside the core 
of the cloud so that "all" the fuel participates in the 
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combustion. The hot combustion poroducts with a lower 
density than ambient cause the fireball to lift off under 
the bJyancy forces taking progressively a spherical shape 
as it moves upward. 
Assuming a stoichiometric composition which corresponds 
to the maximum energy release, the diameter of the 
fireball can be expressed as fol]lowsg 
D= KM' 
Where D is the fireball diameter (m)is the mass of 
fuel (kg) < and V are constants. This is an empirical 
correlation for the mass of fuel in fireballs0 Different 
authors quote different values for X and Y. 
For exampleo.  
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From historical data based on real incidents (table 
A010) from which the graph in figure A013 has been 
derived 9 it appears that the size of fireballs is 
influenced neither by the type of fuel nor by the 
combustion process and depends only on the mass of fuels. 
3.6.4.4 Fireball duration. 
The determination of this duration is very complex as it 
depends on factors such as the rate of combustion, the 
concentration distribution inside the cloud, the cooling 
of the fireball by radiation and admixture of cool air. 
The overall duration comprises four stages starting from 
the moment of release taken as time zero (Eo)0 
a)From release to ignition 00 	O- 	0 
b)From ignition to lift off °o '- 
c)From lift off to full formation t0 	
0 
d)From full formation to radiation ceasin 
The time to ignition depends on whether the ignition is 
immediate or delayed and on the mass as this last 
factor determines the time to the LFLO The fact that 
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ignition is no longer possible below this value the time 
to ignition has a limiting value when the concentration at 
the centre of the cloud reaches the LFLO 
In cases involving substantial quantities of fuel 
originating from sudden failures of pressure tanks where 
the transition to dilution control by gravitation effects 
occurs well before the LFL is reached, and 
the weather and topographical conditions 
dilution of the core to the LFL may take 
consequtly 9 the ignition may be delayed0 
the real duration of fireballs starts from 
depending on 
the complete 
a long time0 
In such cases 
the time at 
which the ignition has occured0 Roberts (1982a) gives 
and.has follopsg 
Le.o MF 	 3059 
360 
From equations 359 and 360 Roberts deduced that for 
'1'<120 	K g 	 and 	for 	Mf>120Kg, 
LOo 
0 Therefore for releases up to 120 Kg the fireball will 
not lift off. In such cases the fireball is fully formed 
and its energy radiated while it is still at ground level. 
Thus, the formation of fireballs and lift off is 
significant only with large fuel releases. 
High (1968) expressed the overall fireball duration (from 
ignition to radiation ceasing) in an equation transformed 
PAGE 1 0 
by Marshall in metric units as formula-. 
O. 396 NF 
o.320 	
3.61 
364,5 Thrmal radiation and its effects0 
a)Heat release. 
The total energy release Or (J) in a fireball is expressed 




were MT is the mass of fuel in the fireball (kg) and He 
the heat of combustion of the fuel 	/Vg) 
The mass of fuel in the fire ball is not necessarily the 
same as the mass released. ]n the following calculation it 
is assumed that the TAFF>36% and that all the fuel is 
burned 
Concerning the theoretical energy release (stoichiometric 
Al 
propotion assumed) the average energy output for a typical 
hydrocarbon is 47 1J/(g0 Thus, equation 3062a becomesg 
Q ' 4 io£ M 
Assuming a theoretical combustion efficiency as unity the 
power of a fireball (total energy release per unit time) 
Is-. 
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Pb' 	= £ 	 3. 63 
= -1123.690 M F  ½ 
Calculation of power density Pd (/m3) for fireballs and 
pool fires in Marshall (1987) showed that the amount of 
fuel reacted in unit time per unit volume of flame is 
nearly the same in both cases0 
b)Fraction of energy radiated. 
]T all the energy produced in a fireball were to be 
absorbed by the combustion products there would be no heat 
radiation and the temperature of the flame would be the 
adiabatic flame temperature. However 9 some of the energy 
is radiated and the rest remains in the combustion 
products. Thus, the intensity (Es) at the fireball surface 
may be expressed as followsg 
is 
	
P'119 	 3.64 
FL 
Where' ]ts" is the intensity at surface (watts/m2) 	Fr the 
fraction radiated and Rthe fireball radius. 
From the data available in the literature it is suggested 
that Fr varies in the range 010-040 and is directly 
related to the vapour pressure of the liquid at the moment 
of release. From data obtained by Hasegawa and Sato and 
plotted by Roberts (1982 fig. A014) it can be seen that 
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Fr increases from 015 at a pressure of 02 1Pa to 04 at 
a pressure of 135 i'lPa0 
Replacing the fireball radius in equation 364 by a value 
,% it 
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The energy (Ir) dissipated by radiation is governed by the 




Where rG is a constant 	567 x 1O 	/m20 ° 	is the 
emissivity (taken as unity in this study) and I is the 
temperature ()o 
From the foregoing it is clear that Its =Itr 
GT 	3O'F, 	 3.66 
This implies that the temperature of the fireball is 
Tbr4. 10 ioj 
241 3 f_- ),0.2--!S 	 367 
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For Fr = 0030 the temperature would be I = 1611.9 
0  X or 1346 
co 
c)Thrma)I pulse received. 
The intensity Ijp received by a f)lat immobile object at a 
distance Rc from the centre of the fireball and 
perpendicular to the incident radiation can be 'xprssd 
as fo1Los 
23. 6 1 v 10 	P - 
IL 
411 1yp 
2/3 M'-- 	 368 
d )Att2nuation 
When travelling through the atmosphere the radiated energy 
is subjected to a certain attenuation which dpands on 
atmospheric conditions (humidity) q source characteristics 
(different wave lengths suffer different attnuation) 
distance (the greater the distance the higher the  
attenuation). Thus q the pulse 	rcivd at a certain 
distance R., after attenuation is 
2 9. 	-O Hfl 	 369 
rp 
2 
Where 'na" is a factor of atmospheric 	transmittance 
representing the fraction transmitted. 
IloorhousE and Pritchard (1982) plotted a graph which gives 
values of "a" as a function of the relative humidity (RH)O 
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The graph was fitt ed by the Uoing 
a = 1 - 0 . 12 lo%O (R7 ,p 	0 	(RH = 0 . 20) 	 370 
a = 096 - 012 log.~O (Ryp  ; (RH = 	 3.71 
a = 092 - 012 log.,,9(R rP 	(RH = iLO) 	) 	372 
For example at a distance of 200m the transmittance is 
0 . 727 for RH = 020 and 0 . 643 for RH = I . C .  
From the foregoing it apars that the att enuation due to 
the passage of radiated en ergy through the atmosph ere is 
significant. Therefore, it has to be considered in the 
assessment of thermal effects from both fireballs and pool 
fires 0 
e)ReLaitionship between radiation intensity, duration of 
exposure and injury. 
The energy radiated from a fireball is very likely to 
cause injuries to bystanders. The extent of these 
injuries (burns of different degrees) is dependent upon 
the radiation intensity, the duration of exposure and the 
distance from the fireball. The investigators agreed that 
the probability fatality is expressed by the dosage 
14 
 11 V_ 
ioo ) 
' 0000000giving the probit equations. 
(# 	IT 	 ) 	S73 
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Where the intensity of heat radiathd? is in /m20 
Dosages and probits corresponding to different proportions 
of fatalities are ivn in the table below derived from 
Eisenberg t al. (197) 
Tai 3.1 - PxD 6 it4 	 -ki2?,y 	 tL 
PI 
COOl 278 lO 	l& 
0.5 4o2 23ClO 
Oo 7o5 
Also, on a common agreement the investigators expressed 
the first degree burn as foots 
374 
A complete calculation for 1262 Is fireball has been 
developed in chapter 4 
3.6.5 Explosion. 
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3.6.5.1 Introduction. 
As already mentioned in 3.6.1 the ignition of a flammable 
mixture may 9 in some circumstances q result in an 
explosion. Unlike pool fires and fireballs an explosion 9 
in addition to the heat generated 9 is always accompanied 
by a blast wave whose effects may be destructive. 
Explosions are of two kindss. deflagration and detonation. 
In the former the flammable mixture burns relatively 
slowly (the flame speed being a function of the substance 
involved and the degree of confinement) without 9 however 9 
exceeding sound velocity. The latter is quite different 
and is characterised by a high propagation of the flame 
(greater than sound velocity) resulting in a shock wave0 
Both manifestations are discussed in more details in this 
subsection which also deals with the circumstances that 
give rise to explosions, the influence of the surroundings 
on the blast wave, historical and experimental 
Investigations into the overpressures generated by large 
vapour cloud explosions and their potential effects on 
people and structures. 
Explosion process. 
Many definitions of explosion have been given in the 
literature. Nearly all of them agree that explosion is a 
sudden release of energy accompanied by a pressure wave 
and a loud noise. The energy can be released in three 
different forms 
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-Physical energy (explosion of a pressure vessel or 
pressure storage tank due to high pressure). 
-Chemical energy (explosion of a reactor due to an 
exothermic runaway reaction, explosion in a pipe due to 
the ignition of a flammable mixture). 
-Nuclear energy (nuclear explosion) 
In this study only explosions involving release of 
combustion energy are considered. 
What is common to the three types of energy release is 
that all of them generate a pressure' disturbance' in the 
ambient air. Because of its compressibility 9 air becomes 
heated locally with a resulting increase in the velocity 
of sound. Consequently, the leading edge' of the 
disturbance becomes steeper as it travels through the air 
leading to a blast wave which is the principal cause for 
most of the damage caused. The generation of flying 
missiles 9 ground shock and fire are responsible for the 
remaining of the damage. 
3.6.5.3 Confined and unconfined explosions. 
OW 
Explosions of flammb]1e fuel/air mixture's may be confined 
for example in a pipeork 9 a vessel or even in a building 9 
or unconfined (occuring in the open air). In each 
situation the explosion can give rise to a deflagration or 
a detonation although the latter has not been confirmed 
with entire confidence for explosions occuring in the 
open. The only explosive fuel/air mixture in which propane 
PAGE 117 
was involved and which is thought to have resulted in a 
detonation is that which occured at Port Hudson, Missouri,  
1970 (Lees 1980) 
3.6.5.4 Confined explosions0 
Whenever a flammable mixture is ignited the nature of the 
ignition source and the degree of confinement will 
determine whether the resulting explosion is a 
deflagration or a detonation. The two manifestations 
differ fundamentally and are very destructive especially 
the detonation. The occurence of a deflagration 
necessitates the presence of an ignition source and a 
mixture within the flammable range. The heating of the 
mixture to its authignitian temperature can also generate 
a deflagration. The conditions which give rise to a 
detonation are The flammable mixture should be within the 
detonable range (this is narrower than the flammable 
range) 9 the source of ignition must be sufficiently strong 
(e0g0 an explosive charge of TNT). Transition from 
deflagration to detonation may occur in pipes and ducts. 
3.6.5.4.1 Deflagration. 
In a flammable mixture the burning velocity which was 
defined above as the rate at which flame propagates 
through the mixture is different from the flame speed. 
This can be explained by the fact that in most explosion 
situations both burned and unburned gases are moving. The 
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expansion of combustion products due to the rise of 
temperature generates a bulk motion whose velocity 
together with the burning velocity represent the flame 
speed (with respect to a fired point). The flame 
propagation through the mixture is subsonic. 
Two extreme conditions in which a deflagration can occur 
ares total confinement and in a completely open 
atmosphere The rise of temperature which depends on such 
factors as the initial pressure and temperature, 
composition and components involved, will result in the 
former case in an increase of pressure up to 7.5 times 
(for a stoichiometric mixture), and in the latter in an 
increase of volume about 8 times the original one (this is 
the theoretical expansion factor for a stoichiometric 
mixture). 
Deflagration can be illustrated by a flammable mixture in 
a tube with a closed end. If the mixture is ignited at the 
closed end and assuming an isobaric situation, the burning 
velocity can be expressed by rOV and the bulk velocity 
due to the thermal expansion is eight times greater8 
OoCOV (heat loss through the tube walls is assumed to be 
zero). Thus, the flame speed along the tube is equal to 
the sum of the two velocities 
Its is to be noted that the displacement of the unburned 
gas ahead of the flame can create a high turbulence which 
contributes to enhance the flame speed. Gugan (1979) 
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stated that the flame speed in the absence of turbulence 
for hydrogen is about 24 m/s but turbulence can enhance 
this value to about 240 rn/s0 
Inside a pipe the flame propagates in only We direction 
whereas in the open air it propagates in three dimefl'iOflSo 
Irthe flame speed of a flamt1e mixture centrally ignited in 
which propagation is three dimensional would be only three 
times that of the burning velocity Unsaturated 
hydrocarbons such as ethylene and acetylene exibit high 
flame speeds which generate turbulence leading to much 
higher flame speeds 
To say that a unidimensioflal flame propagation in a tube 
or pipe occurs at a constant pressure is not true. To be 
rea listic , a certain pressure rise takes place and is due 
to three factors namely the pipe frictional effects 9 the 
inertial effects of the gas and the change of momentum 
across the flame itself. The two last factors are also 
found in a three dimensional 
behaviour. Heat loss through 
the tube walls results in a lower factor of expansion 
leading to a decrease in the flame spead0 
Detonation. 
The detonation of a flammable gas/air mixture 9 as already 
referred to above can be initiated by a powerful source of 
ignition or may result by 
transition from deflagration' 
The latter requires a strong acceleration of the flame 
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phenomenon which can take place in pipelines. 
Convers]iy 9 in a vessel with 	the occurence of 
detonation 	is very unlikely. 	Where L and JO are 
respectively the length and diameter of the vessel. 
Whether or not a detonation occurs in a pipe or duct, 
depends on the length of the pipe (run up length) and its 
configuration (straight or ben-, and with or without 
obstacles). Unless otherwise stated, ignition is assume to 
occur at the closed end of the pipe. Each of the factors 
cited above has a great influence on the flame speed. As 
with vessels 9 for a short pipe with a ngth/diameter 
ratio of L/D < 3 9 smooth and straight 9 detonation is v2y 
unlikely to occur. The pressure rise is rapidly vented 
before the flame speed reaches a significant value 
Xf 9 on the other hand, the length of the pipe is high 
(L>3D) the pressure rise leads to high turbulence which 
causes the flame front to accelerate progressively through 
the flammable mixture ahead and develops into a combustion 
wave preceeded by a shock wave making the deflagration 
turn into detonation. Flame speed is significantly 
enhanced by bends and obstacles. 
Flame speed for several gas/air flammable mixtures as a 
function of run up lengths in straight and obstacle free 
pipes of up to 12 inch (30043cm) diameter have been given 
by the HSE guide. These are tabulatd below for propane 
PAGE 11 2 1 
air mixtures. 
Tb13g Flame 	pd versus 	run up 	lengths for 
propane/air mixturs0 





For propane/air mixtures the IHSIE guide givesa detonation 
velocity of 1 9 740m/s in a pipe 10, long and 30048cm 
diamtr.  
In contrast to deflagration g detonation Is a type of 
combustion in which the flame propagates at many timou the  
velocity of sound in the unburned gases (supersonic) or, 
to be more precise, at the v1ocity of sound in the hot 
products of combustion. The overpressure generated can be  
of the order of 20 bars. 
Detonation 	is 	a 	s11 	sustaining 	physico-chicia 
manifestation. This is due to the passage of tho shock 
wave 	through the unburned mixture causing 	its 
instantaneous compression and hating thereby loading to a 
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spontaneous Ignition and combution0 	Ht Lo the nry 
release 	by the chemical reaction whAch, when led into th 
shock WaV2, maintains the continuity of the procsss0 
Blast wave and its interaction with obstacles. 
As previously stated, the main effect in an explosion i 
the nration of blast wave. The corresponding  
overpressure may cause Injuries to people and damage to 
property. The blast wave considered hers is that 
originating from the explosion of a flammbls fuel/air 
mixture at ground )Iv]L Nevertheless, the description of 
the ffcts is based on an explosion involving a high 
explosive (TNT). 
The typical behaviour of a blast wave in air, observed at 
a certain distance from the location of the 	xplosion is 
xprssd by the curve shown in figure 31 The figure 
shows that the blast wave travelling outwards reaches the  
distance of interest at time "ta" (the arrival time) after 
the explosion has occurd and causes the local pressure to 
rise sharply to a peak value "pi" generally called "the 
peak side-on overpressure". CmmdiatsLy aTthr, the 
overpressure gradually decays to the ambient pressure Po 
in a time to(ths positive phase duration. This phase is 
followed by a negative pressure of peak va)Iu °pi" and 
thsn grows to its original value Po(the atmospheric 
pressure in a further time "t-" C the negative phasLm  
duration) 











Figure3.1 Decay of ova rpvessuv with time 
a 
24 
When the front edge of the blast wave hits the front of 
structure, the pressure builds up vary rapidly. This 
pressure is known as the reflected overpressure "Pr". ICts 
value when measured at 90 with the direction of 
propagation of the blast wave g is maximum (the peak 
reflected overpressure Hpr+) and may vary from 2 to 
times the side-on overpressure.  
Other parameters characterising the blast wave are the  
shock velocity,, the dynamic pressure generated by the ind 
created by the shock front and travelling behind it, and 
the particle velocity or peak mind velocity. 
The maximum pressure difference between the front and th 
back of a structure occurs at the moment of reflection and 
results in the creation of translational forces which tend 
to displace or overturn the structure in the direction of 
the blast wave. The blast wave then moves around the  
structure and propagates in the ambient air until it dies 
away. The translational force created by the side-on 
overpressure and reflected peak overpressure is known as 
the diffraction loading whereas the force resulting from 
the dynamic overpressure which also tends to topple the 
sriucture is known as the drag loading. During the  
negative phase of the blast wave the change in direction 
of the wind created generates a partial vacuum which can 
suck out windows. This, generally, occurs in the far 
field.  
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3.6. 5 .4.4 1t wave an d yild UY QM 
]tn an explosion the characteristics of the blast wave 
generated are often determined by the application of the 
scaling laws of which the most common is that of Hopkinson 
(Lees 1980) This. law states that self similar blast waves 
are produced at the same scaled distances when two charges 
of the same explosive and geometry but of different size 
are detonated in the same atmosphere. The scaled distance 
is defined as 
3075 
were r is the distance (m) wi the mass of explosive (kg) 
and Zthe scaled distance Cm/kg ) 
Curves showing overpressures versus scaled distances are 
given in figures A016 and A0170 They were derived 
experimentally from trials carried out using charges of 
TNT. 
Another parameter of importance in blast wave scaling is 
the yield of an explosion which is governed by the 
explosive power of the material and the efficiency of the 
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where subscrip 0 is for the reference value (for example  
TNT) for which the nrjy of detonation is approximately 
4600 kJ/kg. 
The yield represents the amount of energy led into the  
blast wave, the remaining being shared by the flying 
missiles and the heat produced. 
At two different distances 	and 	the scaled distance  
for two explosive charges iss.  
3077 
(Wo) 	 ""13  
This giveso.  
307 
From equation 378 the yield (can be xprsd as a 
function of either the distance or the mass W of the  
explosive.  
Other useful parameters in the blast ways are the time 
parameters already discussed above (arrival time and 
duration time) and the decay parameter 	0 The scaled time 
(1)is expressed ass.  
Vt 	 3079 
w 
were t is the time. 
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The scaled time for two different explosive chars ig 
-/ 
ww 	 3.80 
This giveso.  
_.1w1 
A:, 	\&o 	 3.01 
For the arrival time °'ta°° and duration time"td" equation 
381 can be written respectively asg 
\ Lo 	 382 
3.83 
In an explosion it is not the overpressure only which is 
of importance but also its duration. The integral of the  
overpressure during the positive phase is known as the  
overpressure impulse "]tp" 
The scaled impuls(I) is given by 
IpS 	'P 	 385 
3.6.5.5 Unconfined vapour cloud explosions. 
The parameters discussed Just above are ain1ly related to 
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dense explosions involving high explosives such as TNT 
which are largely considered in military field. Concerning 
process plants, explosions originating from flammable  
vapours are of prime importance. This is due to the fact 
that in addition to their potential destructive power they 
may occur at remote distance from the point of vapour 
release and may threaten the nearby populated or 
industrialised areas. 
The chief difference between the xplosion of a vipo ur 
cloud and that of a charge of ml is that the former is 
characterised by a large volume of flammable cloud, a low 
overpressure at the explosion centre, a different initial 
shape of the blast wave with a longer duration time. These  
features have been discussed in the second report of the  
Advisory Committee on Major hazards (Harvey, 1979) 
As already indicated above if the cloud (toichthmtric 
mixture assumed) were to be confined within a containment 
whose volume is equal to that of the cloud under adiabatic 
conditions 9 the xplosion would give rise to an 
overpressure about 75 bars. 
In 	practice, 	however, 	the situation is completely 
different in that the vapour cloud explosion most of the  
time takes place in the open air, the efficiency of the  
combustion is low 9 and a great amount of energy is 
released as heat. As a consequence, the maximum value of 
the overpressure would be only a fraction of that 
PAGE 12 
mentioned above The second report of the ACMH (1979) for 
example suggests a value of about I bar at the centre and 
07 bars at the boundaries of the cloud. 
In the far field the blast wave of a vapour cloud takes 
nearly the same shape as that of a TNT explosion. This i 
shown in figure AO1 (a) and (b)0 
The fact that the duration time of a vapour cloud 
explosion is long renders the blast wave more destructive 
despite the Low value of the overpressure0 In the lack of 
reliable data for this feature the second report of the 
ACMH suggests a provisional duration time of SO ms upon 
which to design the works buildings so that they withstand 
blast wave effects. 
3.6.5.4.1 Historical Review. 
Apparently, the concept of vapour cloud explosion was not 
known until the early seventies. The first who draw 
attention to the phenomenon was Strehlow (1972) whose 
compilation is of considerable historical Importance. 
Strehlows work has, since then, been referred to by many 
writers such as Marshall, Lees, Gugan etc who have 9 more 
or less, analysed the different incidents to determine 
which are realy considered as vapour cloud explosions 
(VCEs) and which substances have most been involved in 
such incidents. 
PAGE 1 3 0 
Another well founded work on VCEs is that of Davenport 
(1977b) which included vapour clouds which did not 
explode. 
There seems to be no reliable data as which of the 
incidents was really the first VCEO But, according to 
Marshall (1987) 9 the explosion which occured in 
Ludwigshafen, West germany 9 1943 may be recognised 9 in the 
absence of any other evidence, as the first industrial VCE 
which inflicted serious consequences. 
Among the 100 VCEs tabulated by Gugain 9 LPG and its 
principal constitu4nts (propane and butane) represent 
nearly half the number with 43 incidents of which 18 gave 
rise to blast. The remaining consists of a multitude of 
different products mainly pure substances. Among the 
substances involved, unsaturated ones seem to be very 
prone to blast generation. 21 of the 27 unsaturated 
substances tabulated in Gugan (1979) gave rise to blast 
effects. 
The incidents have some common factors which mainly are 
the large size of the releases and the phenomenon of 
flashing as most of the VCEs were caused by flashing 
liquids. When considering a VCE it is generally assumed 
that the amount of vapour participating in the explosion 
is equal to the mass released. 
Often, one third of the release flashes off into vapour 
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entraining 	the 	remaining as aerosol droplets. This 
phenomenon has been discussed in (342) 
There seems to be a direct correlation between the size of 
the vapour cloud and the chance for an explosion to occur. 
A threshold quantity of 10-15 Te has been suggested by 
(letz (Lees 1980) 
The ignition of the vapour cloud, according to (eltz 
(1980) 9 most of the time 9 takes place within 100 meters 
from the point of release. 8ometime5 however, the vapour 
cloud may 9 depending on the surroundings and particularly 
the nature of the terrain downwind of the release 9 drift a 
long distance before igniting. 
3.6.5.4.2 	Experimental 	work 	into the blast effect 
generated by UVCEs0 
The fact that the explosion of a vapour cloud occuring in 
the open air is termed 'Unconfined Vapour Cloud Explosion 
is misleading. The extent of the damage caused by such 
incidents in the past is good evidence of the existance of 
some confinement which is responsible for the flame 
acceleration and consequently the generation of the blast 
wave causing the damage. 
Investigation into the blast wave generated, 	using 
different types of confinement, has been carried out on 
both small and large scales. Most of the experiments on 
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small scale are discussed in Gugan (1979) As the present 
work is mainly dealing with Large releases of haardou 
substances (toxic or f1able) we will especially focus 
on the experiments conducted Gn a large scale in the 
Netherlands and during which propane was used. These 
trials are discussed in Zeeuwen at a10 (193) and are 
briefly summarised be]Iow. The tests consisted of 
continuous evaporation (up to 40 kg/s) of Liquid propane 
(1 9 000 kg per test) in a pond, let it disperse freely over 
a site fitted with obstacles and then ignite it. The 
events were recorded by video cameras installed upwind and 
crosswind from the source respectively at 50m and 
200-300m. The overpressures were measured by blast gauges 
placed at various distances and in various directions from 
the ignition source. 
In &l1 9 four types of full scale tests were carried outs. 
Experiments without obstacles (first series consisting of 
10 trials 7 of which did ignite) q with horizontal 
obstacles (only one trial was conducted), with vertical 
obstacles (third series consisting of 9 experiments) and 
finally tests with vertical obstacles and horizontal 
confinement (a series of 8 trials 7 of which did ignite). 
During the progress of 	the 	tests 	the 	following 
observations were made B 
-First series-.No flame acceleration was observed0 the 
speed varied from 3 to 10 m/s depending on the 
reactive mixtures. 
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-Second series-.The flame aerated in the 
crosswind direction to a maximum of 16 mIs and 
then dropped to 6-10 m/s past the obstacles 
-Third seriesNo flame acceleration was observed (the same 
result as in the first series). 
-Fourth series-.It was noticed that the flame speed 
increased considerably with increasing covered 
area but dropped when passing it. The flame 
speed measured was 50-66 m/s Rise in pressure 
was also noticed (20 mbar within the array of 
obstacles and 5,9 mbar at 75m)0 
From these series of experiments it can be concluded that 
horizontal confinement plays a great role in flame 
acceleration thereby leading to the generation of blast 
which, in most industrial explosions 9 inflicts serious 
damage. The phenomenon can be explained by the fact that 
the ignition of a large flammable mixture confined within 
two horizontal closed surfaces comprising different 
obstacles leads to a local increase in pressure which 
tends to push both burned and unburned gases between 
restriction thus increasing the flame speed to such an 
extent that it might give rise to shock waves (see 
3.6.5.4.1). 
3.6.5.4.3 Yield of unconfined vapour cloud explosions and 
TNT equivalent. 
As already stated above by 'yield or efficiency factor is 
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meant the quantity of chemical energy roluauod au Maot 
wave. According to the data available in the literature 
this value can amount to Yield is difficult to 
determine with precision. It depends on such factors as 
the amount of flammable substance which participates in 
the xplosion the reactive mixture, topography,weather, 
position and strength of the ignition source. 
6ugan (1979) plothd yield versus combustible mass for 22 
UVCEs0 They do not seem to have any corrslation0 what can 
be noticed is that a value of IOZ is rarely exceeded. This 
figure can be used for calculating potential damage based 
on TNT equivalence. 
The TNT equivalent mass (kg) which would produce the same  
extent of damage as a given mass of flammable gas is given 
by 	
TAIT 	E Ffr-- 4F!: 
were Amy is the mass of TNT (kg) E the yield of the  
explosion (001)1ths mass of flammable gas (kg)c,.the 
heat of combustion of the gas (J/kg) andths energy 
released by a kilogram of TNT (460 1J/kg) 
For example, the explosion of vapour cloud containing 30 
Th of propane would give a TNT equivalent ofs.  
M-rNTo011O3GOOD 	 32870 at dL32 
4.6 	 0 F IT 07 
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3.6.5.5 Effects of explosions. 
Generally, an explosion gives rise to the following  
effectso. Blast damage, thermal effects and missile damage.  
Most of the data relating to these effects come mainly 
from the study of accidental explosions and the results of 
research for military purposes. 
36,551 Damage to people. 
Injuries caused to people by an explosion can arise from 
each of the three factors enumerated above Burns caused 
by heat radiation have been discussed in 3646 Lees 
(1980) stated that half of the short term fatalities in 
the nuclear explosions at Hiroshima and Nagasaki were 
caused by burns. 
Injuries from blast include 
a)direct 	blast injuries (rupture of organs) due to 
overpressure whose effect depends on such factors as the 
peak overpressure the positive phase duration and the 
position of the person (standing against a structure such 
as a wall or a tank or in the open) and whether he is 
struck by a side-on or reflected overpressure. Different 
value of lethality and Levels of injury for nuclear 
weapons have been established by Glaston and Dolan and are 
reproduced in table A0110 
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b)Indirct 	blast 	injuries 	originating 	from flying 
missiles, whole body translation or as a result of 
structural collapse. 
Damage to property. 
Blast effects and missiles generated by UVCEs are  
responsible for substanial physical damage in process  
industries. Information on damage caused by blast effects 
for numerous objects including buildings, gas works, oil 
storage tanks LPG installations etc. has been given by 
Glathn(1962) who claims that in the Texas City explosion 
in 1947 oil storage tanks were svrly damaged for 
overpressures in the range 3-4 psi. Different levels of 
damage as a function of overpressure have been established 
by Clancy (1972b) 9 table A0120 
37 TOXIC RELEASES. 
3.7.1 Introduction. 
The release of toxic substances in the atmosphere is on 
of the major hazards that can be ncountrd in process 
plants. Their Effects are closely linked to the nature of 
the chemicals themselves, the xposurs time and the 
ambient conditions. Unlike firs and explosions which, 
most of the time, occur within the plant or its immediate  
vicinity, therefore, threatening the employees and the 
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nearby population s, a large toxic release of chemicals such 
as chlorine or ammonia, in the most unfavourable weather 
conditions, can threaten lives at even highly remote 
locations (10 miles or more) from the release point. 
This is mainly due to the fact that unlike flammable 
gases or vapours 9 which present no harm once their 
concentration has dropped below the LFL 9 toxic substances 
have the ability to cause harm and even death at very how 
concentrations. The number of potential casuahities 9 
however, would depend on the population density in the 
path of the cloud and the effectiveness of the emergency 
procedures available as sometimes evacuations are needed0 
hEn 	this section we review the effects of toxic 
substances, the toxicity assessment together with the 
limit values for short and long exposures, the means of 
expressing toxicity data, and finally a brief description 
of the assessment of the hazard of toxic releases. 
3.7.2 Effects of Toxic Substances. 
Toxic substances can get into the body by three 
different ways namely 	inhalation 9 	ingestion 	and 
penetration through the skin. Generally, gaseous 
substances, vapours, fumes and dust enter the body through 
inhalation. Solids and liquids may be ingested with 
contaminated food or water. Sometimes, substances in all 
forms, when in contact with the skin 9 penetrate through 
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the pores. 
Exposure to toxic substances may result in the following  
effects 




-Systemic damage involving the whole body. 
Different chemicals act in different ways. Substances 
such as chlorine and ammonia when inhaled cause 
respiratory irritation giving an early warning. lEn such 
cases the person(s) affected react automatically. 
Odourless chemicals such as carbon monoxide and carbon 
dioxide, on the other hand, can reach a dangerous level 
leading to immediate unconsciousness without warning. The 
inhalation of hydrocarbon vapours generate narcotic 
effects which affect the senses of a person and make them 
prone to accidents. Other chemicals such as toluene 
diisocyanate renders the affected person unaware of danger 
thereby able to perform hazardous acts. 
Depending on such factors as the nature of 	the 
chemicals, the dose received and the exposure time, damage 
to the affected parts of the body may be temporary or 
permanent. 
30703 Toxicity Assessment. 
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Most of the chemical and petrochemical Industriou ar 
nowadays dealing with the use and fabrication of thousands 
of hazardouo chemical. Levinson (197 ttd that about 
15,000 industrial chemicals are already in use and some 
3,000 new ones are produced every year. Therefore, an 
estimation of the toxicity of each substance hao to be 
carried out before its economical exploitation which may 
include the - -. of food 9 drugs  cosmetir-o utc. 0 
Two methods are used to assess toxicity. They are 
Epidemiological studies and animal experiments. 
Epidemiological studies are based on surveys generally 
carried out in order to reveal effects which have appeared 
on a group of people exposed to a given chemical over a 
long period of time. The purpose of the studies is to 
identify those chemicals which manifest signs of toxicity, 
assess the severity of their effects and fix limit values 
(see 374) which must not be exceeded if the health of 
the population is to be preserved. Such methods 9 although 
useful in identifying hazards due to particular chemical, 
have the disadvantage of detecting the disease only after 
the population has been affected therefore failing to 
prevent such manifestations0 
Nowadays, however, preventive measure are adopted in 
most of the economic sectors where chemicals are used. 
They consist of medical examinations carrying out chest 
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radiography 9 blood and urine tests in order to detect 
potential pre-disease phenomena. 
The second method in use to assess toxicity is based on 
animal experiments. This technique consists of the 
administration of different doses of chemicals to groups 
of animals (rats or pigs) and watch the effects which are 
produced. Comparison is always made with control groups. 
The results depend on species and on age and weight. 
This method, in its turn, presents some difficulties 
which mainly lie in the interpretation of the results0 
When different species manifest the same reaction to one 
or several chemicals 9 extrapolation to man can be made0 
But, when different species react differently to a given 
chemical, extrapolation is very difficult and requires 
extension of the experiments to a wider variety of 
species. 
As many chemicals, 	when 	administered 	in small 
quantities, manifest their effects after a long period of 
time, long term studies on animals are required. The aim 
awaited from toxicity testing is to draw quantitative 
information on toxicity effects. 
3.7.4 Limit Values. 
Values of toxic limits are expressed for two types of 
exposure namely brief and prolonged exposures. In the 
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former case 	the 	limits are given as the Lethal 
Lo 
concentration 0000 which refers to the concentration of 
airborne material the inhalation of which results in the 
death of 50% of the animals submitted to the test 
(exposure period 4 hours) 9 and the Lethal dose LDO 000 which 
refers to the quantity of material administered which 
results in the death of O% of the test group. The 
material to be tested is given either orally or by 
absorption through the skin0 in both cases(, .... 
OOOOO O 	 a 14 day period is allowed for the 
observation of the symptoms. 
These two ways of toxic penetration in the body 
represent typical scenarios of accidental intoxications of 
people caught in the path of large releases of toxic 
substances. A well known case is that of Bhopal, India 
(1984) in which the failure of a tank containing 
Methyl-Isocyanate (MIEC) resulted in the death of many 
thousands of people and the injury of tens of thousands. 
Concerning prolonged exposures to low concentrations 
over a working lifetime, toxic limits are expressed in 
threshold limit values (TLVs)0 Although this kind of 
exposure is beyond the scope of this topic it is worth 
giving a brief outline. 
TLVs refer to airborne concentration to which a group of 
workers is exposed without adverse effects over a working 
lifetime. The duration of exposure is generally 7-8 hours 
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a day or 40-45 hours a week. The concentrations usually 
fluctuate and are averaged over a working day. 
TLVs are expressed in two unitsg ppm (parts of gas or 
vapour per million part s of contaminated air by volume at 
25C and 760 mmHg), and mg/m3 (milligrams of substance per 
cubic meter of air)0 TLVs are determined experimentally 
using one or all of the three types of evaluation 
(industrial experience, experimental studies on humans and 
animals). 
The susceptibility of individuals to low levels of 
concentration varies from one person to another (this 
maybe due to age weight, health state n alergy etc) 
leading to a variation of the degree of confidence which 
can be placed in TLVs0 
There are three categories of TLVsg 
a)Threshold 	Limit Value-Time Weighted 	Average 
(TLV-TWA) which refers to the time weighted average 
concentration of a 8 hour workday or 40 hour workweek 
to which a given group of workers is periodically 
exposed (8 hours every day repeated during work 
lifetime) without adverse effects. 
b)Threshold Limit Value-Short Time Exposure Limit 
(TLV-STEL) which represents the maximum concentration 
to which workers can be exposed for a period of up to 
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15 minutes continuously without manifesting elfects 
such as intolerable Irritation, chronic tissue 
change narcosis to such an extent that may lead to 
accident proneness, impair se-rescue or reduce work 
efficiency. The number of exposures must not exceed 
four per day with at least 60 minutes interval 
between different exposures and provided that the 
daily TLV-TWA is not exceeded. 
c)The Threshold Limit value-Ceiling (TLV-C) which is 
the maximum concentration not to be exceeded even 
Instantaneously. This category represents fast-acting 
substances. 
37,5 Toxic Substances. 
As already pointed out in 3.7.3 toxic chemicals do not 
constitute a fixed list. The necessity to progress in 
scientific knowledge in order to cope with the needs of 
modern life results in the discovery of new substances0 
most of them are produced deliberately but, others are 
unwanted and generated as by-products or even 
accidentally. 
Some chemicals have been known for years and even 
decades and their effects have been thoroughly explored. 
Substances can be irritant, asphyxiant or toxic. Some are 
tabulated below 
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Some substances can manifest two or more symptoms. For 
example hydrogen sulphide is both irritant and asphyxiant, 
hydrogen cyanide and carbon monoxide are both asphyxiant 
and toxic. 
Tab 1 33 	S 	 , 
substances IL V-I WA 
carbon dioxide OOO ppm 








chlorine 1 	ppm 
ammonia 25 	ppm 
QZ phosgene 001 	ppm 
hydrogen cyanide 10 	ppm 
U toluene diisocyanate 002 ppm 
benzene 25 	ppm 
Other well known substances areas 
-Vinyl chloride monomer (VCM) 	TLV-TWA = 200 ppm0 
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This value has recently been reduced to 5 ppm in the 
US and 25 ppm in the Uc<O 
-Asbestos TLY = 0 fibres per cm30 
-Metals 
a)Orqanic formg Tetraethyl and thtramethyl 	ad 
TLV-TWA = 01 mg/m3- mercury(alkyl compound) 
TLV-TWA = 00001ppm0 
b)Xnorganic form-. Vapours of lead and mercury. 
-Ultrathxic 	 substances 
Tetrachlorodibeno-paradioxine (TC) which seems to 
be the most poisonous substance in existance0 This 
chemical was responsible for the Seveso disaster, 
Italy 9 (1976) 
The effect of toxic substances may be immediate (which 
in extreme cases includes death), delayed (Symptoms appear 
only after a certain time has elapsed), or latent 
(symptoms appear after a long perid of time). Latent 
effects can be caused either after a long exposure even at 
low concentrations or from a single short exposure to a 
high concentration of a chemical. Examples of chemicals 
with such long term effects ares. benzene which induces 
blood changes and attacks the bone marrow, and toluene 
diisocyanate which attacks the nervous system causing 
nervous disorders. 
Other chemicals with long term effects include a large 
number of carcinogens the number of which has greatly 
increased in recent years. This phenomenon has now become 
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a major problem in the chemical industry. The problem 
mainly, lies in the difficulties of determining the 
carcinenic effects Among these difficulties we haves 
-The lack of knowledge on the dose response and on the 
existance of a threshold. 
-The lack of tests by which to determine whether a 
compound is Likely to cause cancer. 
-The Long period of time between the first exposure and 
the appearence of carcinogenic effects (tumours) without 
intermediate detectable symptoms. 
-The masking of the effects of a particular substance by 
those due to other toxic substances. 
Some 	substances 	known to cause cancer areg 
-naphthylamine which is now prohibited in the UL( and is 
banned in many countries asbestos and vinyl chloride 
monomer (VCM)O 
3.6.7 Expression of Toxicological Data.  
The main mode of exposure to 
inhalation. The degree of harm cal 
toxic substance is related to 
profile. This relationship was 







toxic chemical is 
by the release of a 
concentration—time 
object of the study 
Eisenberg et a10 
The investigation resulted in the following arguments 
and conclusions The authors made a distinction between 
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'dosage' which refers to the concentration-tims profile 
and 'dose' which represents the amount of substance  
retained by the body and which is dependent on the  
brathino rate and the retained fraction. The work was 
mainly concerned with the dosage 1 Ct which is the  
product of the concentration C (mg/m3) and the exposure 
time t ()0 When applied to people caught in the path of a 
toxic release q the dosage can be calculated using 
dispersion calculation. The lethal dose Docorrsponds to 
the dosage which results in the death of O%  of exposed 
group 
The authors express the dosage-response relations in the 
form of a probit. equations.  
PLO - a- _*_ 6 I, D 	 30e7 
iD- 
where fla" and °'b are constants and D the dosage which is 
given by 
o 	 3. E38 
0 
where "n" is an index for which a value of 2.75 was found 
to fit well the data quoted. 
Probit equations 	for 	lethality 	(indicating 	the 
probability of death versus dosage) of chlorine and 
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3.7.7 Assessment of the Hazard of Toxic Releases. 
The hazard originating from a large accidental loss of 
containment of toxic substance may be estimated either 
from historical record of toxic releases and their 
consequences, by theoretical considerations based on 
assumed scenarios of release taking into account various 
estimates of emission, weather conditions and toxicity 9 or 
by investigations of toxic release hazards which may arise 
in process plants. 
Each of the three methods of assessment is briefly 
discussed in Lees (1980) The discussion deals mainly with 
chlorine and ammonia, the large releases of which are 
believed to be the most serious hazards. 
Two lists of major chlorine releases which occured all 
over the world have been established by Simmons, Erdmann 
and Naft (1974) 9 and by Marshall (1977b)'0 They are 
respectively reproduced in tables A013 and A0140 Table 
A013 shows that the major part of the accidents is mainly 
associated with storage tanks and loading facilities. The 
worst accident is that which occured at Zarnesti 9 Roumania 
(1939) and which resulted in the death of 60 people. 
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Lists of chlorine and ammonia releases are given in 
tables A015 and A0160 From table A015 it appears that the 
accident at Baton Rouge Louisiana on 10 December 1976 
with a release of 90 Te at the rate of 18 Te/hour, is 
believed to be the largest civil chlorine release 
recorded. Fortunately there were no fatalities. 
As already pointed out in this chapter 9 releases of 
chlorine took place during the first world war but no 
advantage was taken to assess their effects. 
The relationship between the size and toxic release and 
the number of people killed has been the object of an 
investigation conducted by Marshall (1977b) who has 
developed a mortality index expressed as deaths/tonnes. 
Values of this index are shown in table A0140 
Theoretical considerations of toxic release hazard deals 
with the assumption of particular scenarios of appropriate 
estimates of emission s, dispersion and toxicity. Emission 
and dispersion have extensively been discussed in 34. 
Concerning the toxicity aspect, the question Lies in the 
prediction of the fatality hazard range which depends to a 
large extent on the nature of the chemical considered, the 
weather conditions and the nature of the terrain downwind 
of the release. 
Studies of this kind have been conducted by many 
investigators among which we can cite Fryer at a10 (1978) 
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for the instantaneous release of 1 9 000 Te of anhydrou 
ammonia from a pressure storage tank (Canvey Island), and 
Howerthn (1979) who considered various release scenarios 
including an instantaneous release of 11 9 323 Kg of 
chlorine in a 223 rn/s wind speed in both moderately 
stable and moderately unstable conditions. 
Conclusions drawn from the Canvey island study, assuming 
that the concentration of 0.002 Kg/m3 is potentially fatal 
for a 30-50 minute exposure, is that in the pessimistic 
case the hazard range may be up to 8 Krn the width of the 
cloud was shown to take a maximum value of 4.8 Km at a 
distance of 31 Km (termination of slumping) from the 
release point and zero meters at 8 Km The width being 
defined as twice that distance off axis at which the 
ammonia cloud could prove fatal.  
Howerton 9 on the other hand, showed that for the 
instantaneous release considered the concentration of 35 
ppm ( dangerous concentration for a short exposure) is 
very likely at a distance of 10 miles in stable weather 
conditions, and under unstable conditions the cloud 
concentration drops below 35 ppm at about 25 miles from 
the release point. 
The number of people who may be exposed to a potentially 
fatal cloud of toxic release depends on the factors 
enumerated above and the population distribution. 
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The investigation of toxic release hazard in lactorieu  
is in the study of potential leaks which may occur 
during normal opration. The study As called 'Hazard and 
Operability Study (HAZOP)'0 itt is a time Consuming method 
which necessitates a team of several members to carry out 
an in depth study consisting of the identification of 
probable releases, the quantitative assessment of their 
frquncy, size and effects whose estimates are based 
respectively on reliability calculations and data 9 
emission 	calculations, 	dispersion 	calculations and 
toxicity data. 
A study of this kind assessing the hazard from a large 
chlorine release from a factory in the U( is briefly 
described in Lees (1980) referring to the work of 1icken 
(1974) 9 Sellers (1976) 9 and Hewitt (1976) 
The method can in the same way be applied to the present 
study. 
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Lessons 	learned from the pest incidents Involving 
Liqufthd petroleum gases (LPGs) such as those which 
occurd at Fyzin 9 France, 1966 (Less 1980) 9 and Mexico 
City in 1984 (Loss Prevention Bulletin 064) 9 in which 
hundreds of lives and valuable properties were Rost, have 
clearly shown the magnitude of the hazard emanating from  
the use of such substances. 
What makes LPG so dangerous, is that alter release, it 
is rarely safely dispersed especially in still weather 
conditions. As it moves very close to the ground when 
entrained by the wind, an ignition source whatever it is 9 
in most cases, can be found within the doss surroundings 
of the point at which the )loss of containment has occursd0 
The two incidents referred to above together with the 
explosion which occur-sd in Crescent City, X111nois 9 1970 
among other numerous cases are good examples. 
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For these reasons and, in order to predict the likely 
consequences which would result from a loss of containment 
giving instantaneous release of 260 m3 of propano stored 
in a pressure tank at atmospheric temperature, the purpose  
of this study is to examine the way in which the gas is 
released and disperses in the atmosphere,, calculate the  
maximum distance travelled by the resulting cloud (in the  
absence of an ignition source), assess the impact of the 
heat release from a fireball or the blast wave generated 
by an explosion should the cloud find an ignition source  
in its path. 
42 DATA FOR THE CALCULATION. 
The following calculation applies to a otorage tank 
containing 260 m3 of propane, see Fig. 4.1. The tank 
belongs to an oil refining factory situated in the north 
east of Algeria. The storage dimnsions 9 specifications 
and weather conditions are set out bELot' 
i-Dimensions of the storage tank0 
a-Shape -.cylinder 
b-Diameter 
c-Length 	 g310 m 
d-Total volume 	 -.265 m3 
E-Useful volume 	 260 m3 
2-General storage and weather conditions on the 
Algerian coast. 
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a-ambient temperature 	0 0C-45C 
b-Wind speed 	 g1,4-36 mis 
c-Relativehumidity 	 0-93o 
d-Storage pressure 	 -16 Bars 
-State of propane-. liquid 
3-Conditions prior to the rLas0 
a-Tank capacity-. 260 m3 
b-Pressureof storage-. 10 Bars 
c-Temperatureof storage'. 30 0 C 
d-Wind spd 4 m/s 
s-wind direction 	orthWest( figure 401 
f-Times.At night 
The three points 3c, 3d 31 form class D category 
weather conditions( neutral ) see table A30 
4-Conditions after 
-Pr2ssur I 	r( atmospheric  
b-Temperature of the cloud-. -42 0C 
c-Claiss D category. 
43 SIMPLE MODEL. 
The conditions of release and dispersion process have 
been discussed in chapter 3 In the present calculation it 
is assumed that the cloud formed after the failure has 
occu?d 9 takes a cylindrical shape with the height t 0 equal 
to the radius R0 As a simplified model is first 
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considered, the assumptions that during slumping there is 
no heat transfer from the surroundings and no mixing with 
air are made. 
Concerning heat imput it has been shown in the Canvey 
Island study using iOOO Te of ammonia that the warming of 
the cloud does not affect too much its behaviour. All that 
can be said is that when heated the cloud will increase 
further in volume under the expansion effect and 
therefore 9 its density diminishes. This process will make 
the cloud less dense and make the atmospheric turbulence 
take over sooner. In this way 9 the distance at which the 
slumping occurs will be slightly shorter than that for 
which the heating is neglected. 
Once the assumed cylindrical cloud is formed, analogy is 
also made that it will slump under the effect of gravity 
in the same way as a collapsing column of Liquid (equation 
309)0 
Van Ulden experiment using 1,000 kg of freon 12 (a 
material with a density 42 times that of air) indicates 
that the volume of air entrained during the release is of 
the order of 10 times that of the gas. This value is 
therefore used in the present calculation. 
From 42 the volume of liquid propane is 260 m30 Table 
41 gives the expansion factor as 2523 Thus, the volume 
of propane as vapour iss. 260x252036 9 98m30 The volume of 
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air entrained during the failure is 698Om30 The volume 
of the gas cloud Iss.  
V = 655 9 980+69872178m3 
When the failure has occured at 3OoC the flashing 
fraction was shown in chapter 3 to be 40%. Xf the process 
is adiabatic the remaining 60 d/ will stay as liquid at 
-42oC0 The amount of heat () needed to vaporise the 
liquid fraction is 
-10 
°r 437,72x126 9 2OOOOOx6O/iOO=303XiO J. iL 
The amount of heat (ac.) extracted to cool the entrained 
air from 3OoC to -42oC Iss.  
C M 
h= 6 9 980x10164xiOOOx1x7205XiO J. 
From equations 41 and 42 it can be seen that the 
amount of air entrained is sufficient to vaporise all the 
remaining liquid propane so that it stays as vapour at 
-42oC0 
The initial density of the vapour cloud iss.  
mg = 260/206 =1262 Te =126200 kg. 
ma = 655 9 980x10164 = 7638887 kg. 
10 = 890 9 08807 kg. 
164 kg/m3 
ILr3 
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The volume (Va) is given by 
v= irR1 
	 LIM 
with : Ro = fro (V,0,1,r ) 
(7213 L Vllr) 
The density of air at 30C is 11645 Vg/m3 (air is 
assumed to be an ideal gas). During the slumping the cloud 
is assumed to travel at the average wind speed (4 rn/s) 
Equations 333 and 334 give the folloing values of the 
front edge velocity (UT) and the friction velocity (U$) 
for Z = 10m LK = 04 U() = 4m/3 Zo = Oi rn/s0 
UT 	0.7 rn/s 
U8 = 0.347 rn/s 
S 
At the end of the slumping the height () of the cloud 
can be obtained making use of equation 309 which givess.  
(°•)t 	
-= 6. Oem 
From the result above it can be noticed that when the 
slumping has terminatedp the height of the cloud is too 
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low. Frayer et al. (1978) in their study in which the 
hght of the cloud was found 'to be 0.15mp stated that the 
roughness element that stand in the path of the cloud are 
as high as 10 times the roughness length Zo0 As a reult 
the height of the cloud at the end of the slumping was 
taken as 1m0 In the present study it is assumed that the 
nature of the terrain is the same as above and the value' 
of liii for the is adopted. 
At this stage the radius of the cloud is 
1= R"  
From the assumptions that heat transfer from the 
surroundings and air admixture are ignored during the 
slumping phase s, the density of the cloud remains the same 
(164 kg/m3)0 The time taken by the cloud to transit from 
61m (initial va]lue)to 480m (end of the slumping) can be 
calculated using equation 311 
(C4) 
As the cloud travels at the average wind speed y the 
distance travelled Is-. 
4x140 = 560m 
After the termination of the slumping one can assume 
that the cloud can be approximated by a Gaussian 
distribution in which the height and radius coincides with 
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a tenth of the instantaneous ground level concentration at 
the centre of the cloud. This is an assumption adopted by 
Van Ulden after the experiment carried out in the 
Netherlands in october 1973 (equations 3.36 and 337) 
These (radius and height) correspond 9 in a Gaussian 




Using 	a Gaussian 	concentration distribution, the 
instantaneous ground level concentration at a given point 
is given by equation 3.35.  
At 	the end 	of 	the slumping the ground level 
concentration at the centre of the cloud is 
C o• 0 . 
ifZZoo 
- r 	(2v3) (o. 4-) 
The concentration of interest at the edges of the cloud 
is taken to be equal to the lower flammability limit 
(LFL) 
LFL = 201x10924/100 = 0040 kg/m3 at 30000 
Since the temperature of the cloud is equal to the 
atmospheric boiling point of propane (-42oC or 231oK) 9 the 
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volume of the cloud is less than that at 3OoC0 Thus q the  
LFL becomes-. 
LFL =00040x303/231 = 0052 kg/3 at -42oC0 
Similar calculation gives UFL = 024 /m3 at -2oC0 
The LFL seems to fit fairly well with the assumptions 
made by Van Uldn in that it is nearly one tenth the  
concentration at the centre of the cloud-. 
0682/002 = 13.11. 
	 Lq 
It has been stated in 343,4 that Van Uldens 
experiment showed that as the cloud continues to move 
downwind the radius continues to grow according to 
equation 39 and the height starts to grow at 1/3 of the 
rate that would be observed if a passive plume were to 
disperse in a very stable atmosphere (class F)0 
Equations 311 335 343 344 345 and 45 give 
values of t R 9 6 9 O-00and C (0000t) for various 
distances (x) downwind of the point at which the slumping 
has terminated. These are reported in table 42 
Concentration variation with time and travelled distance 
is reported in figures 42 and 43 
It is to be noted that (neebone and Prew (1974) proposed 
the following equations for the calculation of 	the 
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o0 165 520 243 0.886 03 S 
0 1175 536 251 1.09 0.233 
1180 1185 550 257 1.297 0187 
220 195 5s5 264 1. 4965 0.153 
250 205 579 271 1.690 0.129 
300 2115 593 277 1.860  011111 
340 225 606 283 2.066 oogs 
380 235 6119 289 2.249 o85 
420 245 632 295 2.43 075 
460 255 65 3011 2.506 0 . 	roe 
00 2.65 657 307 2.780 
540 2.75 570 3113 2.952 0.055 
580 2.85 682 3119 312 0O50 
620 295 693 324 3.289 0O46 
660 35 705 329 34540042 
700 3 1 5 7116 335 3.618 oo 40 
70 325 727 340 3.78 0.036 
780 335 7318 345 4 0O34 
820 z 45  749 350 4o1J0 0.032 





















standard deviations Vy and ri,  for continuous spills of LNG 
onto water-.  
O3 	.4.3 - L' (jr) 
o.o5c ox) 
where "x" is the distance travelled downwind. 
Applying these equations to the case under study will 
give for a distance of 560m (end of the slumping)-.  
4Qn 
a- 	l4%Of9V 
These values 9 when compared with those found above 	= 
224,3 and 	= 0467) lead to slightly narrower and higher 
plumes. 
It can be seen from figures 42 and 43 that the ground 
level concentration at the centre of the cloud reaches the 
LFL after 285 seconds and 1 9 140m from the instant and 
point at which the failure has occured0 But, because of 
the fluctuation of the concentration within the cloud, it 
can be assumed that the cloud is no longer dangerous only 
after the concentration at its centre has reached a value 
equal to half the LFLg 
0052/2 = 0026 (g/m30 
At this concentration the cloud will have travelled 
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nearly 1560m0 It can be stated that 
under which the release and dispersion 
without encountering any ignition 
concentration at the centre of the clou 
value mentioned abovep the cloud will 
considered to be safe beyond a distance 
for the conditions 
have taken place 
source until the 
i has reached the 
be harmless and is 
of 1560m from the 
release point. 
44 TA(][N6 INTO ACCOUNT AIR 1IXINGO 
It has already been mentioned that at the be'g4ining of 
the slumping the cloud was in a cylindrical shape' with 
initial height and radius R, equal0 It was also 
indicated that the temperature of the cloud was that of 
the atmospheric boiling point of propane (-42oC)0 
In this calculation the cloud will pick up air during 
the slumping from both the edge and top surface. Thus 9 its 
volume will change according to equation 312 in which U 
U. and Ri are expressed by the equations 3.139 315 and 
3.16. 
From equation 3.11 we haves 
a1\j V0 	Ac 




Ci 	 ) 
~emv Tr 
The increase of volume is given by equation 338= For 
,= i equation 3 . 313 becomes8 
va 	(77) -0- 





with  •j1 	(2-)- 	i2 Ws 
Taking the values of the constants as follows-. 
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0 . 94 
And replacing each parameter by its value will give 
41 
is very much Less than unity so that at the beg&inning 
of the slumping the dilution is expressed by equation 
3 . 40 .  
After a long time has elapsed and the radius has become 
too great with relation to the height the dilution is then 
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given by equation 3.41.  
The rate of increase of the height is given by equation 
3.42.  
The variation with time of R, ±L L. for a friction 
, Vo 
velocity U = 0.347 are reported in table 43 
When the admission of air is taken into account, 
Picknett (1978) states that hen the slumping has occured 
and the passive disper ion commences 9 the following 
expression is satisfied 
Hence 	the time taken by the slumping until the 
transition to passive dispersion is given by 
Cii 
2Ci 
Substituting the parameters by their values will gives.  
t = 506 s = 85 mn 
Assuming again that the cloud disperses in a normal 
gaussian distribution after the end of the slumping 9 the 
instantaneous ground level concentration at the centre of 
the cloud is derived from equation 335 as follows 
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Ta2z 43 .. 	 q cL 	s 
ILL V 
v 
0 611 1000 100 
20 185 01,670 6°17 
50 282 0.576 11230 
1100 395 0 1,510 2143 
200 555 0.455 37o60 
300 0426 5270 
400 782 0.410 67.50 
500 874 0.400 62-34 
600 957 0.396 9760 
700 11033 01,396 11340 
800 111104 0397 130,100 
900 1171 0.400 114800 
11000 11234 0408 
1200 11352 0.430 210.00  





C (ô,O,c) = 	0 
	
= 
0.156 V S4 	
= -11.3 
C (O l 'o, 	= 
Lq 
The distance travelled by the cloud iss.  
d = 4x506 = 2 9 024m 
Remnbering that the UFL and LFL are respectively 024 
Kg/m3 and 0.052 Kg/m3 it can clearly be seen that zktg 
concentration reached at the centre of the cloud at the 
transition to passive dispersion 9 when taking into account 
the mixing with air during the slumping phase is 40 times 
less than the UFL and 9 times less than the LFLO It is 
also 46 times less than half the LFL of propane. 
From the above results 9 it can be stated that when the 
slumping has occured 9 the cloud is entirely safe from the 
point of view of lire. If the cloud were to be toxic such 
as chlorine or ammonia 9 the concentration would still be 
harmful at the end of the slumping because toxic gases are 
dangerous even at very low concentrations. 
PAGE 17 2 
45 IGNITION. 
For the purpose of this estimated calculation for which 
it is wished to know the effects of the failure on the 
different parts of the plant and the population which 
mainly consists of the employees of the plant and the 
nearby inhabitants 9 the worst case is to be considered 
which, for the matter under study consists of the maximum 
energy release either by heat radiation from a fireball or 
blast wave generated by a vapour cloud explosion. 
From the fact that the safe dispersion of the cloud is 
not of interest to the present study 9 it will be assumed 
in the next part of the topic that before reaching the 
safe distance the cloud will find an ignition source in 
its path. 
It is to be noted that the experience learned from past 
incidents involving LPG such as Feyzin and Mexico, has 
shown that the vapour cloud is very likely to find an 
ignition source very close to the release point. 
For the case under discussion the probability that the 
vapour cloud will find an ignition source within 150m is 
very high. This assumption is derived from the fact that a 
public road passes at a distance not exceeding 150m from 
the tank for which this study applies. The road which is. 
very busy especially in summer time 9 is situated downwind 
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of the assumed release and surrounds the plant on a 
perimeter of nearly 2 9 000m. Just after the road, a growing 
village 9 which did not exist at the siting of the p)1.ant 9 
lies over an area of about 20 hectares. 
From the above arguments it is obvious that if the 
ignition source is not found in the road, it will probably 
take place a further few meters from a domestic electrical 
source such as a fridge, a cooker or the like 
For this particular case we assume that the ignition 
takes place when the edge of the cloud has reached the 
road. At this stage 9 the cloud is still in the slumping 
phase0 lEts concentration is above the UFL with only an 
outer thin layer comprised within the flammability range. 
"'- 
From equation 3.11 and knowing the radius R 9 the time 
when the ignition occurs can be calculated as fo1llowsg 
Z 	'1. k-P0 
zJ 0 VO 
@me yr 
X = dt + R = 150m 
U = 4 rn/s 
After making the calculations it gives 	t = 7s R = 
125m da = 28m0 
The edge of the cloud will have reached the public road 
7 seconds after the failure has occured0 At this stage the 
centre of the cloud will have travelled 28m0 
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Once the assumed ignition has occured 9 there will be a 
very rapid propagation of the flames arround the cloud 
creating a violent turbulence which will lead to more 
mixing of the cloud with air. The burning cloud will then 
lift-off giving rise to a fireball. 
At the time the ignition has occured 9 the centre of the 
cloud is still very near to the point of release situated 
in an area containing other tanks of storage. From figure 
41 it can be seen that a great area inside the plant 
containing the tanks of crude oil (No 1 and 2) will be 
covered by the cloud. 
The following stages will deal with the post-ignition of 
the cloud and the impact of the heat radiation from the 
fireball generated. 
Fireball diameter. 
From equation 3057g 
D = 505x(126 9 200) = 276m 
Fireball duration. 
From equation 361 
.333 
t 2 = 00396x(126 9 200) = 19s 
Thermal radiation and its impact0 
a)Theoretical energy release. 
From equation 3062b 
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6 
= 47 x 10 x 126 9 200 
LIA 	
9 
5 9 93104 x 10 Joules 
b)Average power of fireball (heat release in a unit 
time). 
From equation 363 
5L 4OMp 	 .6 	31 
o3 
c)Intensity at fireball surface. 
From equation 3,64 
Is 	3Z.401 0.30 	
ro 
c.3 	-ilo 	'/ 
1r (i)- 	 - 
d)Temperature at the fireball surface. 
From equation 366 
-o (o•) 	 WK dL 4C 
e)ThermaYt pulse at a distance R.p. 
From equation 368 
LT 	
_!1ZOc . 0.30 	= 	 i A//t: - ; L. 
f )Attenuation 
I IL 
Values of radiation 	intensity changing 	with 
distance R.p are reported in table 44 and figure 
4040 
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r 4.dL. 125.2 T 	Mka2. ç 
, 133 200 350 500 700 900 iioo 1300 1500 
irP 	(W/n,) 
3.910 1.8610 2.981 15210 21 6210 441 3.31j 
.ITP 5.4n lo 2.010  4.4, 10 1.8 7.210 3.510 2.21O 
AkL 
0.56- 0.12 Lo=qjRTP) 
0.703 0.683 0.554 0.636 0.618 0.605 0.595 0.586 0.578 
7, 
ITPi a11,L 2.741O 1-27n 4 3.91O 1.91O 3.4;c 10 5.510 3. ra a 10 2.510 1.9 .103 
Q14±. 
3.4108 1.2110 8 2.51O7 9.508 38 x 10 6 
6 
1.9.10 101O 6671o5451o5 
Ir 3.410 1.4 a 103.6106 1. 6106 1.61O5 1.1105 
3 Ox 1O 






g)Probability of fatal burns versus dosage. 
Referring to table 31 and snaking use of figure 44 
and table 4.4 9 the following injury levels at 
various distances can be derived for a stationary 
objects 
Injury thresholds BOOm 
Fatality threshold (1/)s 500m 
Fatality probability (07)s 360m 
Fatality certain (100°h)s 250m 
From figure 45 and table 4 	the injury levels at 
various distances can also be derived for a 
rotating object. Its is to be noted that, if a 
human being turning away from fire is modelled by a 
cylinder rotating arround itself, the energy 
received at a certain distance is 	times that of Tr 
a flat surface exposed at 90 to the radiant heat. 
Thus 9 the injury levels for a rotating object at 
various distances are as folloss 
Injury thresholds 450m 
Fatality threshold (1 0h)s 290m 
Fatality probability (50°h)s 200m 
Fatality certain (1007)s 140m 
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51 PLANT SITING AND LAYOUT. 
The location of a chemical or petrochemical plant should 
comply with the availability of the necessary utilities 
which facilitate its construction and operationp and the  
safety aspect so that if an incident occurs the damage  
caused is as low as possible. For this to be achivd 9 
suitable distances with relation to populated areas and 
other types of industrialised sites nuclear plants) 
should be taken into account. Concerning the layout 
segregation of different types of hazards and spacing 
distances 	provide great contribution in preventing  
escalation of incidents thereby minimising the 	xtnt of 
potential losses.  
The ease of handling of different substances as liquids 
is affected by their physical state at atmospheric 
conditions of pressure and temperature. Their behaviour on 
spillage depends on the conditions of storage and release 
together with the nature and configuration of the ground 
on which the spill has occurd0 The release of liquefied 
gases from pressure tanks has proved to be the most 
dangerous because of the flashing phenomenon which leads 
to the formation of cool and dense vapour CLOUdS0 Examples 
of such gases are LPG, chlorine and ammonia. 
5.2 EMERGENCIES AND FIREFIGHTING. 
Historical records of industrial incidents have shown 
that despite 	the high level of standards used in 
designing, constructing and operating chemical and 
petrochemical plants 9 failures do occur and are often 
accompanied by chemical releases which, most of the time s, 
present harm to both people and installations. As a 
result, adequate emergency plannings should be elaborated, 
tested and ready to be implemented when necessary.  
5,3 CAUSES OF LOSS OF CONTAINMENT. 
Catastrophic failures of pressure vessels, although 
recognised as rare events 9 sometimes occur and result in 
serious consequences. The causes of these failures are due 
to either human errors committed in one of the phases 
cited just above or to material-deficiency. The failure 
rate of a given .item of equipment is expressed by the 
'Bathtub curve of reliability'0 the curve shows a high 
rate of failure for newly manufactured components. This is 
due to defects in fabrication which are not detected by 
inspection. A second phase of high failure rate appears in 
the final stage of life of the component and is due to 
long term causes such as corrosion, erosion and fatigue. 
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During normal operation some materials (carbon steels) 
are embrittled by low temperatures (due-to accidental 
releases of liquefied gases)p and all are weakened by high 
temperatures. Other causes of failures are due to mistakes 
committed in maintenance and modifications g and external 
factors such as wind loading earthquakes etc.. 
5.4 VAPOUR CLOUDS AND THEIR EFFECTS. 
The major hazard which arises from the catastrophic 
release of a large quantity of liquefied gas stored in a 
pressure tank is the formation of a toxic or flammable 
vapour cloud. The hazard is due to the density effect 
exhibited which makes the vapour cloud move close' to the 
ground threatening the population in its path. In doing 
so g the vapour cloud may travel long distances and take a 
long time to disperse to harmless concentrations (LFL for 
flammable gases and TLVs for toxic ones). Such behaviour 
is greatly affected by the weather conditions namely wind 
and atmospheric stability. 
The evidence of density effect has been highlighted by 
both accidental releases (Potchelstroomp South Africa 	13 
July 1973) 	and field experiments (Van Ulden g October 
1973 Maplin Sands 	Porton Downy Thorney lts)Iand)0 The 
latter were conducted in order to understand the mechanism 
of the dispersion process and be able to predict the 
behaviour and potential consequences of postulated 
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incidents. Theoretical models and their validation by 
laboratory experiments have proved to be useful in the 
study of dense vapour cloud dispersion. 
It is to be noted that the results found in sections 43 
and 404 give a rough idea as far as heavy gas dispersion 
is concerned. As pointed out in 3.4.4 the results are 
limited by the realism of the assumptions adopted. 
Nowadays 9 however 9 much more precise results can be 
obtained by the use of computer models such as DENZ 9 which 
require certain input information in the form of 'cards'. 
These information comprises.  
-The mass of gas and air within the cylinder together 
with its initial density and temperature. 
-The ratio of height ht0 to radius R00 
-The value of the wind speed at a height of 10m. 
-The different weather conditions to be considered. 
Hazards which might arise from vapour clouds are fire 
and explosion (for flammable gases) and poisoning for 
toxic substances. In each case 9 the extent of the damage 
caused depends on such factors as the nature and amount of 
material in the vapour cloud s, the weather and 
topographical conditions 9 the population distribution in 
the path of the cloud and the mitigation precedures0 
35 CONCLUSION AND RECO1MØNDAT]EONS0 
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From the foregoing it appears clear that the 
exploitation of industrial installations processing or 
manufacturing hazardous substances 9 although provides 
great contribution in coping with the needs of modern 
life, always presents some degree of unwanted and 
sometimes unforeseen hazards (major explosion or toxic 
release) which if not controlled will result in disatrous 
events. 
Since the complete elimination of hazards is almost 
impossible, the only way to deal with them is to limit the 
frequency of their occurence by preventing as much as 
possible failures and consequently releases 9 and limit 
their eventual consequences. This can be achieved in a 
first step by the remote location of the plant with 
relation to populated areas (the distance being a function 
of the severity of the hazard and its frequency), and the 
layout of the different equipment and units as the latter 
has a great deal to contribute in preventing escalations 
of incidents. The second step is to devote more attention 
in the design 9 fabrication and inspection stages in order 
to avoid early errors which might be costly later on. The 
third step is to avoid departures from the operating 
conditions during the operating stage in order not to 
alter the integrity of the equipment (intermittent rises 
in pressure or temperature due to mailoperation or 
de.fective control instruments may in the long term weaken 
the capacity of the equipment to withstand stress thereby 
leading to their failure). 
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Similarly, maintenance operations and/or modifications 
should be carried out with caution. 
The actions cited above do not 9 however 9 prevent the 
occurence of failures. Therefore, mitigating procedures 
based on previous risk assessment with relation to the 
nature of the activity and the surroundings should be 
foreseen well in advance in order to limit the potential 
consequences In the special case of substantial 
quantities of flammable and toxic releases leading to 
vapour cloud formation 9 the steps most likely to be 
odopted are the familiarisation of the employees and the 
surrounding population with the nature of the hazard and 
the emergency procedures to avoid panic and facilitate the 
eventual evacuations 9 and intensifying simulations with 
local emergency services for better coordination during 
real incidents. 
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(degrees, hue) 	0 
Wind .%pe(' 	njh) 
2-3 	4-7 -22 23 
35010 2.0 U 2.9 2.0 
20-40 2.3 2.4 2.5 0.5 
50-10 2.5 2.1 2.9 2.0 
80-200 0.9 2,3 2.9 2.5 
210-230 0.4 0.7 2.5 2.2 
240-160 0.5 0.6 1.2 0.6 
270-290 0.8 2.0 2.0 2.0 
200-220 0.6 1.2 3.2 3.3 
230-250 2.7 2.6 5.8 5.5 
260-280 2.0 3.2 5.5 4.2 
290-320 2.4 2.0 3.0 21 
320-340 2.2 2.2 2.0 0.9 
w E 
All 	 22.0 	23.2 	27.0 	313 	24.7 
Watnall: Latitude 53 02'N, longitude 020 25W 
Figure 	Table of percentage frequency or wind 
direction and speed and corresponding wind rose For 
Wattiall, 295968 (Meteorological Office, 2971) 
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FIGURE A 	Photographs of grass burnt by the escaping 
ammonia, taken four days later from a helicopter. 
Above: looking eastwards. 
Below: looking westwards 
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Figure A% 1, Variation of 
flammability limits with 
pressure: (a) gasoline 
vapour in air at reduced 
pressures (Reprinted with 
permission From Mullins 
and Penner, Copyright 
1959 Pergamon Press); (b) 
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Figure A ,9Y., Variation of overpressure with time in TNT 
equivalent and constant velocity piston models of an 
unconfined vapour cloud explosion (after Munday, 1976a): 
(a) TNT equivalent model; (b) constant velocity piston 
model (Courtesy of the Institution of Chemical Engineers) 
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TALE, 	PROPERTIES or SOME GASES AND VAPOURS, 











Hydrogen - 	 252 - 	 240 22.8 
Nitrogen - 	 296 - 	 247 34 
Oxygen - 	 183 - 	 218 50.5 
Methane - 	 264 - 	 82 46.5 
Ethylene (Ethene) - 	 209 9.3 30.2 
Ethane - 	 88.6 32.2 48.3 
Propylene - 	 47 92.0 45.5 
(propene) 
Propane - 	 42 96.8 42.2 
Chlorine - 	 34.3 244 77 
Ammonia - 	 93 132 229 
Butane - 	 0.3 252.3 37 
Cyclohexane 80.7 280.0 40.2 
Water 200 374 218 
Principal Constituent ot Natural Gas. 
McrshaH 1937 
TAV3LE 2 2:RANK OIU')ER or IIAflIL2TY TO FAILURE or ITEMS or 
EQUIPMENT. 
Equipment Item. 	 Failure Rate 	 I 
	
years. 	 II 
Pipe fittings, e.g. bends, 	tee 	Junctions 
and small bore instrument connections. 350 
Valves 260 
Rotating shafts on pumps or 
agilators. 	S 60 
Expansion bellows 40 
Pressure hoses 33 
Pressure vessels 27 
Gaskets 4 
Straight piping 2 
MarshaH 197 
- . 	 2W 
TaWeA3 	Pasquill's Mn,IIfty cnegorIe ('t1itIt, 9960) 
(Courtesy of IIM Stationery 0/Ike) 
Surface fiisoiaiion 
wi,i1 .peed strong modcrnle 
at 10 ?n 
hvight 
(rn/s) 
<2 A A.-fl 
2-3 A-fl 8 
3-5 8 VjC 
5-6 C C-f) 
>6 C 1) 
Night 
slight 	 thinly 	 3/8 
overcnI or 	cloud  
4/8 cloud 
8 	 - 	 - 
C 
C 	 U 
I) U 	 I) 
U 	 U U 








Moderatel y sabe 
21 
TABLE 
Lond spillo of liquefied g000 into bund 	 I 
Year 	Ref. Material No. of 	Quantity 	Ratean  	 I 	C Duration 	Typo 	 RI 0 RI 0 Siofnco 	SuzoandAw 	Souco Samoa=
(na' liquid) (on' min 	(min) 	 ZM= 	 tOpocznpy 
liquid) 3 Conc. 	Tamp. 	Mat. 
RN-) 
Mg pgoduetc 1966-7 (16) Ooyon 11 0.04-0.15 	30-250 
AGA/TYi 1968 (171 LNG 18 	 0.2 0.2 
Gas do Fnuco 1972 (18) LNG >400 
	
up to 3 — 
Gaa do Fooce 1972 (18) LNG 1 0.16 	4.5 
Bnttelio/AGA 1974 (191 LNG 42 	0.4.51 0.3-0.5 
(14 l(itod) 




— Wag Ili dv %zm z bumd  
ciav:etooi 
Soil Bunda 	Tippina 
liquid 9 &-200on' 	buclwt 
Stands' santa 0.15 	Soil 200 sos' bund 
Istantanocon Wag 4s dzy Boanda 
liquid soil; pots'- 3 on'-460& 
uEetisoa coono satli 
loam bAb WBILD 
Stoadv otato 	 300° Soil 
3 
30 	26 	9 
Sca Toblo le fog Icoteloton. 
'Defined to the interval between the tionuu when 10% and 90% of the liquid has evapo-
rated, according to at pool spread (if on utus') and evaporation calculation. 
Puock and 131'ackmore 1932 
- Inztentanooua - 	 - Water 60 ro pond T1p9L08 0 0 
liquid. perhapa bucket 
loot. 800 
0.2-0.3 Steady nato - 	 100 Water 60 ro pond 12 0 
0.2-1.3 Up to 10 Steady etato - 	 200 Water 70 ro vrido 30 0 
WIG with 
20 as bAnd 
0.1-0.6 lriatantanoou 12000 Son, 
wailn 
Bazo Jot 7 ro from 18 2 
liquid. throo present suzfaco  
inm gao pcintinr 300 
upwards 




9-6 4-8 Stocdystato 600 
At surfaco 
or up to 
1-6 L5-=.10 Steady steno - 	 40 Sea. or 3 m aboeo 
300 faco 
pond 
- - Inotantancorna 17000 - Water suxroundcd 200 70 
liquid, by flat 	-- 
inatantanoonro Mn"* thoro Sinkinri 
000 3501M open 
upwind baro 
- - InatantanoGta3 - 	 - 
liquid 
24 
1eggar lesol 1 30 jot 
12-10 2.2-3.5 Most. steady (3000) 20 Watoz for 25 30 down- dorm onto 90 100 
58010, 000 wind of snurco. ( nnbmort3ed 
bordorlino than 7 M rise sploab plato 
ioot.gao in 80 
0-19 0.2-2.3 
Bureau of 1970 20 LNG 51 	 0.04-0.5 
Mines 
Bureau of 1970 20 LNG 4 
Mines 
Bureau Of 1972 21 LNG 13 
80mm (6 umful) 
Ean!Afl 1971 22 LNG 17 	 0.09-10.2 
SheLl Gad&' 1973 	23 LNG 	6 	 27-190 
Shell Maplin 1900 'ropnno 11 
(3 Ignited) 
oU MapUn 1900 See- LNG 	- 13 - 
tlon (4 llted) 
4 
Shell Maplin 1980 this Prepano S 16-25 
paper (1. ignited) 
Shell Mapun 1980 LNG 7 6-20 
(3 ignited) 
China L.alto 1978 32 LNG 4 
'Avocet '  
China LeLto 
Burr& 
1980 24 LNG 8 40 
China tLm 1901 LNG (5 ignited. 320 
Coyot& 10 APT taut-0) 
China Lake 1981 Ammonia 
Frenchman Planned LNG Up to 
TABLE 14c: 
Unconfined rptlla of liquefied tosar on water 
Year 	Ref. Material No. of 	Quantity b 	 Duration 	Typo 	 Ri o t RI 	
Surface SuroundAn6 	Source 	Sonooea 
tecto (m liquid) (30 ron 	(min) 	 roar roar topogmphy 
liquid) Conc. 	Temp. 	Met. 
P u ~ ~ o c k and 13 1ackmo r e 1982 
TABLE 
Intziovinoouc roleawn of = on hod 
Year 	Rd. Mntoth1 No. of Quantity 	Rato 
toot3 
DGA. 173 25 Freon 12 	2 1000 k 
Notnzda 28 (2400 in 
at density 
1.25c 




SE Ptnonod 28 Fnon.. 2000 ot' 
Thomav 1902 dent cad 
Idand 
Fu ~~ ock and 
Typo £wcoo SouodAor Sousco S0000to 
- I 
 
Coma. 	Tont. 	ot.. 	P 
- 
- ItOOtOdIOOU_d 2000 Sand LleuW 1 	0 	9? 	? 
Gas flArthod  
im 5 scc 
wath muck 
- 
Instan taneous 4000 Fiat amai> Cuba. d 10 	0 	42 	3 
coo land. ze to 
from 2 to With 
200 MM ; ZOMO faU 
00 C&Oth.(3 I3ádoo 
land 






TALA 	 1 












OJ m Rbov 
Wder 9eve o 
46 4.0 6.8 2.2 0.25 m above QJnuiinV 
wt atmosphe r ic 
contQon@ 
46 2.8 7.8 7.0 M wnter ev4 
(improved  
pipe entH 
47 3.9 4.6 6.2 
50 4.3 4.0 8.3 At wa terieve 	gnftet 
5.0 3.7 7.8 At w ater iev nQe1l 
62 5.8 8.8 7 
water 2vel 
54 2.8 6.0 8.0 M wa ter leve 
56 5.2 4.0 5.1 
VnQnQnnouR pfoflfle 
00 27 ni 9 - 11.2 Sinking barge Thotogrsphle dntR only 
63 117 VP9 - 3.4 Sinking barge Only 	a-7Iek dat a  
Continuous U4(J 
112 11.0 110.7 2 2-3 m above Low and no n -constan t  
water 	 vel op lIg rate and wu11 
16 2.7 8.7 3.0 
20 8.6 5.4 5 fir water 
34 2.0 36 8.6 
35 3.8 4.6 110.0 
31 8.0 6.0 4.0 0.25 m below High ly bt,yrn11 cloud. 
w a ter level Mkqed 13enso ro  
30 4.5 2.8 4.5 0.25 m RbOVQ Vg nited 
wa ter level 




22 	110 m 	- 	 S 	Oinking barge 11nIQet; prior to %III, 
ckl d1sperglon te gi 
23 	7 m9 	 - 	 S 	8lnIn,re Momentary Ign it ion 
PuHock and B ~ cckmore 
192. 
215 
Lower flammability limit 
(L) 
% Vol 	g/m3 	kJ/m 3 
L - 	Upper flammability 
limit (Ma 








Hydrogen 4•QC 3.6 435 0.13 75 67 2.5 3.2 0.01 0.5 Carbon monoxide 12.5 157 1591 0.42 74 932 2.5 0.43 - - Methane 5.0 36 1906 0.53 15 126 1.6 0.37 0.26 2.0 Ethane 3.0 41 1952 0.53 12.4 190 2.2 0.44 0.24 1.8 Propane z.i 42 1951 0.52 9.5 210 2.4 0.42 0.25 1.8 n-Butane 1.8 48 2200 0.58 8.4 240 2.7 0.42 0.26 1.8 n-Pentane 1.4 46 2090 0.55 7.8 270 3.1 0.42 0.22 1.8 n-Hexane 1.2 47 2124 0.56 7.4 . .310 3.4 0.42 0.23 1.8 n-Heptane 1.05 47 2116 0.56 6.7 320 3.6 0.42 0.24 1.8 n-Octane 0.95 49 2199 0.58 
n-Nonane 0.85 49 2194 0.58 
n-Decane 0.75 48 2145 0.56 5.6 380 4.2 0.40 Ethene 2.7 35 1654 0.41 36 700 5.5 >0.69 0.12 1.2 Propene 2.4 46 2110 0.54 11 210 2.5 0.48 0.28 Butane-I 1.7 44 1998 0.50 9.7 270 2.9 0.48 Acetylene 2.5 29 1410 (100) 1.7 0.02 Methanol 6.7 103 2141 0.55 36 810 2.9 0.52 0.14 1.5 Ethanol 3.3 70 1948 0.50 19 480 2.9 n-Propanol 2.2 60 1874 0.49 14 420 3.2 0.38 Acetone 2.6 70 2035 0.52 13 390 2.6 0.50 1.1 Methyl ethyl - 
ketone 1.9 62 1974 0.52 10 350 2.7 Diethyl ketone 1.6 63 2121 0.55 
Benzene 1.3 47 1910 0.48 7.9 300 2.9 0.45 0.22 1.8 




l'crnmerrs for liquid lnurning r11e on pools of 
selected suhs(nncN (ltuurgcsq Sind 7.nbeg1119, 18M 11962 I11 6899) (Courtesy of the Bureau of Mines) 
V.0 Ic, 
(cm/mm) (cm') 
Hydrogen l.4'' 0.07°' 
fluInne 0.79 0.027 
llexane 0.73 0.019 
Benzene 0.60 0.026 
Mcthnnol 0.17 0.046 
LNO 0.66" 0.03" 
(a), 	(jnec,lnIp, 	nIiie. 
a,), Whit c(cu(cIed rrom other data. 
Lees 19H0 











11 	Aberdeen, 117/1/74 Butane 2 35 
Scotland. . 	 . 
2 	Lynchburg, 913172 Propane 9 60 
Virginia S. 
3 	St. Paul, 11/11174 LPG $ 	 110 50 
Minnesota. . 
4 	Eagle Pass, 29/4/79 LPG 23 170 
Texas 0 
5 	Kingman, 517173 Propane 43 1150 
Virginia. 
• 	 6 	Goldanna, 28112177 LPG 70 1160 
Virginia. 
7 	Crescent City, 21/6/70 Propane-.. , 	.75 75-100 
Illinois. - S... 




Lewisville, 29/8/78 VCM  2110. 1135. 
/ 	
Arkansas. 
10 Houston, 119/110/72 VCM 263 1150 
Texas. 




TABLE A.N , OVERPRESSURE AND HUMAN INJURY. 
100% Lethality S 	- 8 bars 
50% Lethality 3.3 	- 3 bars 
Threshold Lethality 2 	-: 3 bars 
Severe Lung Damage 1.33 	- 2 bars 
50% Eardrum rupture 2 	- 2 113 bars 	(under 20 years of age) 
50% Eardrum rupture I 	- I 	1/3 bars 	(over 20 years of age) 
[Note that Glasstone & Dolan's figures have been rounded off). 
McrshcH 1987 
Table Ic	Damage tirothicest by blast (Clancey, 0972b) 
Pressure 	Damage 
(paig) 
0.02 Annoying noise (237 dr). If of low Frequency 
(10-15 227.) 
0.03 Occasional breaking of large glass windows 
already under strain 
0.04 Loud noise (143 do). Soflk boom glass failure 
0.1 Breakage of windows, small, tinder strain 
0.15 Typical pressure for glass railtire 
0.3 'Safe distance' (probability 0.95 no serious 
damage beyond this value) 
Missile limit 
Some damage to house ceilings; 20% window 
glass broken 
0.4 Limited minor structural damage 
0.5-1.0 Large and small windows usually shattered: 
occasional damage to window Frames 
0.7 Minor damage to house structures 
2.0 Partial demolition of houses, made 
uninhabitable 
1-2 Corrugated asbestos shattered 
Corrugated steel or aluminium panels, 
fastenings fail, followed by buckling 
Wood panels (standard housing) fastenings 
rail, panels blown In 
2.3 Steel frame of clad building slightly 
distorted 
2 Partil collapse of walls and roofs of houses 
2-3 Concrete or cinder block walls, not reinforced, 
shattered 
2.3 Lower limit of serious structural damage 
2.5 50% destruction of brickwork of house 
3 Heavy machines (3000lb) in industrial 
building suffered little damage 
Steel frame building distorted and pulled 
away from foundations 
3-4 F rameless, sell-Framing steel panel building 
demolished 
Rupture of oil storage tanks 




TAMe A ' 3 Significant chlorine accidents  (after Simmons, Eramonn and Noft 11974) 
(Courtesy of the American institute of Chemical Engineers) 




1926 Dec.-13 St. Auhan, France 
1929 May tO Syracuse, N.Y. 
1939 Dec. 24 Zarnesti, Roumania 
1947 Nov. 5 Rauma, Finland 
1952 Apr. 4 Witsum, Germany 
Par ges 
IO,.fl A... 	Ii 
1961 Feb. 23 	- 	 0 
1965 Sep. 12 Nr, Baton Rouge, La. 	0 
l9lO Jul. 28 	- 
1972 Mar. 19 Nr. Louisville, Ky. 	0 
Rail tank tars 
1934 Feb. 28 Niagara Falls, N.Y. 
1935 Mar. 13 Griffith, lnd. 
1941 Feb. 4 Chicago, Ill. 
1961 Jan. 31 La Barre, La. 
1962 Nov. 30 Cornwall, Ont. 
1963 Apr. 28 l3randtviltc, Pa. 
1963 Aug. 9 Philadelphia, Pa. 
1967 Nov. 8 Newton, Al. 
Truck tanks 
No significant accidents 
I-lot, containers 
Loading hose ruptured 
Wychem 112 sinking, no leak 
Sunk during Hurricane Betsy, no leak 
Unloading pump break 
Broke From tow and rested on dam, no leak 
25 	 19 Tank burst 
25 I lank burst, t-1 2 -C1 2 explosion 
25 	ca. 60 lank burst 
30 19 Tank burst From overfilling 
15 	 7 Tank Failed (a converted old boiler) 
16 	 Anchor failure 
30 . 	 Anchor Failure 
18 	 Release caused by heat from lire 
30 1 (1 14 gassed) 	Train wreck, tank punctured 
30 	(89 gassed) 	Anchor failure 
9 Valves sheared off in wreck 
(430+ gassed) 	Loading line broken when tank was rammed 
35 	 lank punctured in wreck 
1928 Jul. 7 Asbokan, N.Y. 
1928 Jul. 13 Asholcan, N.Y. 
1969 May 8 Cleveland, Ohio 	 2 
Pipelines 
1936 Nov. 12 Jnhnsonhurg, Pa. 	3 	 I 
1949 Sep. I Freeport, Tea. 5 
1964 Jul. 12 Mobile, Al. 	 11 
CJlinders 
1920 Niagara Falls, N.Y. 	 3 
1925 Dc Noya, Oklahoma 
1941 Jan. 13 Natrium, Va. 	 2 
1954 Jun. 25 Montreal, Quebec 
Exploded, contamination with NCI, 
Exploded, contamination with NCI, 
Transfer line broken by housing 
8 i line burned In attempted welding 
1501b cylinder burst 
Suck back of gasoline 
1501b cylinder exploded 
Cylinder fell into hold of steamship 
Lees 1980 
MI 
Table A 4 9 Some data on the relation between size of tonic  release  and number of Totalities (after Marshall, 119771,) 
(Courtesy of the Institution of Chemical Engineers) 







1947 Nov. 5 Rauma, Finland 30 19 0.63 
1939 Dec. 24 Zarncsli, Roumania 25 ca. 60 Ca. 	2.40 





1929 May JO Syracuse, N.Y Storage tank 22.5 I 0.044 
1952 Apr. 4 Wilsum, Germany 15 7 0.46 
1917 Wyandotte. Mi. 13.6 I 0.073 
2956 Mar. 10 lake Chaiks, La 2.7 0 0 
1967 Nov. 8 1h) Newton, Al 5o"I 0 0 
1935 Mar. 13 (iriltith, 2nd 27.3 0 0 
1961 Jan. 31 La flarre, in 2 7.5 1 0.036 
1962 Nov. 30 Cornwall, Ont. 27.5' 0 0 
1941 Feb. 4 Chicago, III . 16.3 1 ' 0 0 
1973 Mar. 5 Loos, 8.0 15.5 0 0 
1934 Feb. 28 Niagara Falls, N.Y I4.5' 0 0 
1963 Apr. 28 llraitdtsvilk, Pa Rail tank car 0 0 
1940 Jan. 26 Mjodnlcn, Norway 8 3 0.375 
1914 7 Chrome, N.J. 7 0 0 
1966 Jun. 14 La Spczin, Italy . 7 0 0 
1957 Oct. 19 Runcorn, U.K 2-3 0 0 
1928 Jul. 7, 13 Ashokan, N.Y. 2 0 0 
1950 Jul. 20 Dillingham, U.K. 0.5 0 0 
1969 May 8' Cleveland, Ohio Two I-ton containers I . I I 
1961 Feb. 23 Dillingham, U.K. . 22 0 0 
1949 Sep. I' frecport, Ten. L 5 0 0 
1936 Nov. l2' Johnsonhurg, Pa. f Pipeline 3 2 0.33 
1970 Oct. 19 Jvlc, Sweden 	) 2 0 0 
1920 Niagara Falls, N.Y. 	' 0.066 3 45 
1947 Jan. 13 Natrium, West Va. I Cylinder 0.066 2 30 1925 Dc Nnya, Oklahoma 0.066 2 30 
2954 Jun. 25 Montreal. Canada 	) 0.066 I 15 
Total or 30 incidents 271 142 
Mean or 30 incidents 9.03 4.73 0.52 
Ammonia 
1970 Nov. 16 Blair, Neb. 145 07 ? 




1969 Feb. 18 Crete, Neb. 
} Rail tank car 
6 0.094 
1968 Aug. 21 Lievin, France 157 	. 5 0.337 
1971 Jun. 5 Floral, Ark. 570 0 0 
1973 Dcc. 6 Kansas CtYat } Pipeline 210 0 0 
Total or 6 incidents 1042 29 
Mean of 	incidents 273 4.83 0.027 
l'ho.rne 
1928 May 20 hamburg, Germany Storage tank 107 20 1.07 
to). This value differs rrom that given by Simmons, ardmann and NO (1974). 
tb) The date quoted In the original reference has been cor,ected—I'M 
(r). This value Is about tO teat than thut given by Simmons. Erdrnnnn and NoR (1974). 
(d), This Incident Is referred to elsewhere In this boob no McPherson, (ansan. 
Lees 19O 
TABLE A15 1, RELEASES OF CHLORINE, 







Baton Rouge 10/12/76 Factory Storage tank 90 0 
Louisiana 
Ranna 5/11147 Factory Storage tank 30 19 
Finland 
Cornwall 30/12/62 Urban! Rail tanker 28 0 
Ontario Rural 
Griffith 131 3/65 - Rail tanker 27 0 
Indiana 
La Barre 311 	1/61 - Rail tanker 27 
Louisiana 
St. Auban 13/12/26 Factory Storage tank 24 19 
France 
Syracuse 10/ 5129 Factory Storage tank 24 
New York 
Zarnesti 24112139 Factory Storage tank 24 60 
Rumania 
Wyandotte 1917 Urban Storage tank 17 
Michigan 
Chicago 4/ 2147 Urban Rail tanker 16 0 
Illinois 
Niagara Falls 8/ 2/34 Factory Rail tanker 25 
New York 
Walsurn 4/4/52 Factory Storage tank IS 7 
W .C. er many 
I3randtsville 28/ 4/63 Rural Rail tanker 8 0 
Pennsylvania 
Mjodolcn 26/ 1/40 Factory Rail tanker 7 3 
Norway 
Freeport Il 9149 Factory Pipeline 4 0 
Texas 
Lake Charles 10/ 3/56 Factory Connecting 3 0 
Louisiana pipework 
Johnsonhurg 12111136 Factory Rail tanker 2 0 
Pennsylvania 
Mobile 121 7/64 Factory Pipeline Unknown 2 
Al aba ma 
MarshaH 1987 
TABLE M 	RELEASES OF AMMONIA. 







Floral 51 6171 Rural Pipeline 600 0 
Arkansas 
Enid 7/5/76 Urban Pipeline 500 0 
Oklahoma 
Conway 6/12/73 Rural Pipeline 277 0 
Kansas 
Landskrona IN 1/76 Port Ship-storage 280 2 
Sweden connection 
Blair 16/11/70 Rural Storage tank 160 0 
Nebraska 
Crete 18/ 2/69 Urban Rail tanker 90 9 
Nebraska 
Belle 211 	1170 Urban Rail tanker 75 0 
West Virginia 
Texas City 31 9175 Urban Pipeline 50 0 
Texas 
Potchefstroom 131 7173 Urban Storage tank 38 28 
S. Africa' 
Houston II, 5176 Urban Road tanker 19 6 
Texas 
Lievin 21/ 8/68 Urban Road tanker 19 6 
France 
McrshcH 1987 
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